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ABSTRACT
The current state old-age pension system in China has two severe problems: the urgent 
and immediate problem of the pension burden of State-Owned Enterprises and the 
longer-term problem arising from the rapid ageing of the population.
The current state pension system which operates on a pay-as-you-go basis combined 
with individuals’ saving accounts is incapable of tackling either of these problems. It 
does not provide a level playing field for different enterprises, hinders restructuring of 
State-Owned Enterprises by delinking pension provision from enterprises management, 
nor assist in the term transformation of savings and the funding of infrastructure and 
other long-term investment. This thesis argues that one approach to solving this problem 
lies in reducing contribution rates and expanding coverage by encouraging a privately 
managed and funded pension system with contributions that are closely linked to future 
benefits.
This thesis examines the way in which this problem can be solved by the promotion of 
private pensions. By looking in detail at the way OECD countries treat five of the main 
assets held by households: bank deposits, government bonds, share ownership, home 
ownership and private pensions, this thesis concludes that tax privileges are one of the 
important factors underlying the rapid growth in private pension schemes in some 
industrial countries. As argued by the OECD (1994: 3): “...although there is no clear 
evidence that taxation affects the overall level of saving by households, it certainly 
affects the allocation of such saving between different assets...”. Removing those tax 
incentives may lead to higher effective tax rates on pension savings and hence diminish 
the popularity of private pension schemes, as did in fact happen in New Zealand.
Based on the tax treatments of private pensions in OECD countries, I have analysed five 
common tax models, i.e., EET (contributions exempted, fund income exempted, 
benefits taxed), TEE (contributions taxed, fund income exempted, benefits exempted), 
ETT (contributions exempted, fund income taxed, benefits taxed), TTE (contributions 
taxed, fund income taxed, benefits exempted) and Eet (same as EET but tax-free lump 
sum payment) as alternative options for China. The five models are mainly compared on 
the grounds of economic efficiency and analysed from the point of view of individual
savers. Which of the five tax regimes is the best option? This analysis suggests that the 
most attractive tax regime for individual savers is also the most expensive one for the 
government in terms of the forgone revenues. This thesis also compares the relative cost 
to the government of the tax incentives by estimating the tax revenues of the five 
alternative regimes. The cost is measured as deviations from the current tax treatment on 
bank savings in China.
This thesis also examines the features of private pension schemes and the distributional 
effect of fiscal benefits from the aspect of fairness and equality. Unlike the case of direct 
expenditure by the government on state old age pensions for all employees, which 
benefits mainly middle to low income employees, the cost of the tax expenditure on 
private pension schemes benefits mainly higher income employees.
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Chapter 1
I. INTRODUCTION AND THESIS PLANS
1.1 Research Background
Proposals for radical pension reform are increasingly reaching the top of the government 
agenda from developed to developing countries. The need for worldwide pension reform 
is driven by high public expenditure combined with demographic changes and 
stagnation in economic growth. In OECD countries total social expenditures on income 
support for the elderly have increased since I960. For the OECD area as a whole, public 
pension expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from 4.4 
percent in I960 to 9.2 percent in 1985 (OECD, 1988: 30). The Eurostat-ESSPROS data 
for the EU-151 reports that expenditures on pensions (including cash benefits in the 
disability pensions, old age pensions, survivors’ pensions and unemployment benefits) 
accounted for 13 percent of GDP in 1997. In most of member states in the EU-15, 
expenditure on pensions took the largest share of expenditure on social protection, 
namely 48 percent of total expenditure. In China public pension expenditures rose 
dramatically during the last 10 years of the last Century. From 1991 to 2000, the annual 
average increase in pension expenditures reached 30.19 percent. However, the annual 
average increase in pension contributions was only 27.92 percent during the same 
period.
The current public pensions in China are basically operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, 
i.e. the revenues collected from general taxation or contributions from the working 
generation are immediately used to finance the benefits of the currently retired 
generation. Consequently, changes in the numbers of retirees relative to the numbers of 
employed have an immediate effect on the financial situation of the scheme. A very 
direct way in which the ratio of retirees to employed is altered arises from changes in the 
demographic structure and the ageing of the population. Already since the turn of the 
1980s China has experienced a substantial increase in the proportion of elderly people in 
the population, with a considerable impact on the share of public pension expenditure
1 Including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
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from total national resources. The ratio of workers to retirees decreased from 30.3:1 in 
1978 to 3.3:1 in 2000. This means that in 1978 one retiree was supported by 30 workers, 
while in 2000 one retiree was supported by only three workers. However, this 
development will become even more important in the future as the ageing trend is 
accentuated. Due to rapid increases in life expectancy and declines in fertility rates, the 
population is ageing much faster than it did in industrial countries. While those over 60 
accounted for 9 percent of China’s population in 1990, they will be 22 percent of the 
population in 2030 and 26 percent in 2050. It will take China only 30 years to reach the 
1990 OECD level of 18 percent, while in most OECD countries it took nearly a century 
for the population over 60 to double from 9 percent to 18 percent.
Adding to the long term problems of population ageing, longer life expectancy due to 
developments in medical technology and declining capacity of family support for the 
elderly is the urgent problem of enterprise restructuring due to the high pension burden 
resulting from high rates of contributions to the pension pool under the public pension 
scheme. Under the current pension system, a retiree, depending on his/her former 
employment, can obtain 60 to 90 percent of his or her standard wage, and in some areas, 
the replacement rate can reach as high as 100 percent. The retirement benefits of state 
pensions are even higher than those in so-called high welfare nations such as the 
Scandinavian countries. In the past, the generous social security pension was proclaimed 
as one of the advantages of the socialist economy, but today it is held responsible for 
depressing economic growth and slowing down enterprise restructuring. As China is 
attempting to move towards a market-oriented economy, the issue of how pension 
policy affects the efficiency and productivity of the enterprises becomes significant. 
Under these circumstances there is a great urgency to undertake the reform of the 
retirement system.
The World Bank (1994) has proposed a far-reaching reform to the pension systems in 
both developing and developed economies. The Bank argues that the current pay-as- 
you-go defined benefit pension systems, which exist in many rich as well as poor 
countries, are seriously flawed and no longer serve the objectives they were intended to 
promote. The Bank proposes instead fully funded, mandatory, defined contribution, 
private pensions as the main pillar of its new system. It suggests that the proposed
2
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reform will not only be beneficial to retirees and pensioners but also at the same time 
enhance savings and promote capital formation and economic development. Economists 
have a wide array of views about the extent to which pension provisions should move 
from a pay-as-you-go based publicly managed and defined benefit system to a funded 
and privately managed and defined contribution system.
Since the end of the 1970s there has been a marked change in the final GDP distribution 
within sectors in China. There has been a dramatic decline in the proportion of the 
government sector in the national income as a whole, a slight increase in the collective 
sector (mainly in Collective-Owned Enterprises), and by contrast, a rapid rise in the 
individual sector. Therefore the capacities of the government, the enterprises and 
individuals to bear the pension responsibilities have also changed. For instance, the 
percentage of the state revenue to GDP dropped from 28.4 in 1979 to 12.4 in 1998. 
Also, the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP dropped from 13.32 in 1979 to 11.67 in 
1998. State ability for social income redistribution is therefore weakening. State-owned 
Enterprises across the nation as a whole ran at deficit in 1996, which made it a hard task 
for them to maintain the heavy burden of the pension costs. On the other hand, during 
the period from 1978 to 1998, individual income per capita in nominal terms for the 
urban residents increased at an annual rate of 16.85 percent, and their fixed bank 
deposits rose at an annual rate of 31.61 percent from 12.89bn Yuan to 4,179.16bn Yuan. 
Under this predicament private pensions, as a supplement to the current state pension 
system, could be considered an efficient way of reducing the pension burden as has 
appeared in the welfare literature as well as in western practices since the 1980s (Le 
Grand, J. and Robinson, R., 1984; Papadakis, E. and Taylor-Gooby, P., 1987).
In 1995, with the reform process of the public pension system, the government of China 
called for the establishment of an enterprise supplementary pension as a supplement to 
the state pension in recognition that pension expenditure has become a heavy burden for 
both central and local governments. Although the government has been encouraging the 
development of private pensions including the enterprise supplementary scheme and 
personal saving scheme, there has not been much response from either enterprises or
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individuals. The pension mixture in China has been dominated by the public pillar, i.e. 
the state pension. Appendix 1-1 shows that the rate of coverage of private pensions, 
including enterprises supplementary pension schemes and some personal savings, was 
about 2 percent by the end of 1996. Due to the availability of the data, this calculation 
does not include those private pension schemes operating on industrial levels. However, 
the coverage is even lower if estimated on a national basis. According to interviews with 
pension researchers, by the end of 1994 less than 1 percent of enterprises were providing 
supplementary pensions and less than 1 percent of workers participating in personal 
saving pension schemes. The traditional Chinese welfare model centred on the family 
and work unit. For those living in the rural areas that constitute almost 80 percent of the 
national population, formal pension coverage is still rare and the families are their only 
source of income assistance at retirement.
Five major factors could contribute to the minimal importance of the private pensions in 
China. First, the replacement rate of public old-age pension is high enough to maintain 
the life standard of covered workers in retirement life, therefore the scope and role of 
supplementary pensions are limited. Second, the financial market is underdeveloped and 
lacks investment instruments for the private sector. Third, saving through banks is the 
tradition for most Chinese people, although they might invest a small portion of their 
incomes in government bonds and other securities. Fourth, the long-term social welfare 
policy could have helped to produce a dependency culture: it is generally believed that 
social security is an inherent benefit of the socialist state and should, therefore be 
provided by the government. Finally, the government has provided enterprises limited 
tax incentives to set up pension insurance for employees and has provided individuals 
zero tax incentives to save for themselves.
Unlike that in China, private pensions in developed countries have been growing sharply 
since the Second World War, especially in recent decades and are playing an 
increasingly important role in providing retirement income for the elderly population.
2 There are no typical personal pension schemes in China. Those people who are aware of poverty in old 
age do save for their retirement purposes, but those saving mainly unitise the form of life insurance, which 
are currently operated by either social insurance executive agencies or commercial insurance institutions.
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This phenomenon can be recognised in the light of private pension assets as a 
percentage of GDP rising over time. The holdings of financial assets by pension funds 
have increased as share of GDP by about 11 percentage points over the last ten years of 
the twentieth Century for the OECD area as a whole, the stock rising from 28 percent of 
GDP in 1987 to nearly 39 percent of GDP on average in 1996. In some countries such as 
the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Switzerland, the pension fund 
assets exceeded 50 percent of GDP. Even though private pension schemes have only 
been introduced in recent years in some countries, they are growing at a rapid pace.
This thesis discusses why and how part of the public pensions in China could and 
should be transferred to the private sector by setting up a private pension system. In 
view of the fact that in many countries the investment income of private pension funds 
is exempt from taxation but the majority of other savings is not, this thesis focuses on 
the issue of taxation. It analyses the paramount importance of tax incentives to 
developments of private pensions in some OECD countries and discusses how Chinese 
private pensions should be taxed. In the conclusion chapter, the issue of general tax 
reform - improving tax administration on personal income - is addressed because tax 
incentives only work with a well functioning income tax system.
The development of private pensions in OECD countries can also be attributed to the 
following important reasons, which may not appear together in a particular country. 
First, in some countries public pension programmes are intended to provide people with 
basic benefits so that private pensions have to play a large role in providing retirement 
income for retirees. Second, well-developed financial markets create the fundamental 
conditions for funded pensions to gain high returns. Third, in some countries setting up 
a pension scheme for employees is compulsory for employers and in others individuals 
are mandated to contract with a personal pension scheme or life insurance company. 
Therefore, the importance of mandation and regulations to the promotion of private 
pensions in China is also discussed where relevant.
As there is no clear line drawn between public and private pensions it is necessary to 
define here what is considered as a private pension in this thesis. In theory, a retirement 
pension system could be any combination of the following three pairs of elements:
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public system and private system, defined benefit and defined contribution, pay-as-you- 
go and funded. A public system is organised and administered primarily by the 
government, whilst a private system is one that is organised and administered primarily 
by the private sector. A defined benefit plan pays a worker’s pension that is conditional 
on a worker’s earnings history, length of employment and year of retirement. A defined 
contribution plan, on the other hand, does not have pre-determined benefits: a worker’s 
future pension depends basically on the asset performance that is determined by 
managers and financial markets. A pay-as-you-go programme means that there are no 
accumulated funds against pension liabilities: current workers’ contributions pay current 
pensioners while their future benefits are paid by the future workers in the form of either 
tax or contribution. In a funded programme, however, pension liabilities are pre-funded 
against future payments to pensioners: individuals’ pension benefits depend on their 
previous contributions and accumulated assets. Any combination of these elements is 
possible although in practice some are more common than others. A private pension in 
this thesis refers to a pre-funded pension system on the basis of either defined benefit or 
defined contribution and run either by the government or outside the government. It 
includes both enterprise pensions (occupational pension) and individual savings 
pensions (personal pension) and also voluntary schemes and compulsory schemes.
1.2 Research Methodology
This thesis combines an institutional analysis and the analytical technique of modem 
economics of public finance. Secondary data provide the main sources for the study. As 
Yin ( l994: 4) classifies, there are five major research strategies in social science: 
experiments, surveys, histories, secondary data analysis and case studies. This thesis 
utilises secondary data analysis by way of tax rates and regulations obtainable from the 
countries studied. The benefits of the secondary analysis, as Dale et al. (1988: 44-45) 
argues, are of particular value to the lone researcher who wishes to use quantitative 
methods but has no source of funding, or to the research student who does not have the 
resources to carry out the primary data collection necessary to answer a particular 
research problem. That is to say the advantages of secondary analysis are savings in 
terms of money and time, and the avoidance of data - collection difficulties. The
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secondary data used in this thesis include relevant statistics on public and private 
pension schemes in both China and OECD countries and more importantly, the tax 
treatment of five of the main household savings in China and OECD countries. Those 
data are obtained from the following four main sources: (i) The various versions of 
statistics yearbooks issued by the State Bureau of Statistics (China) and the Centre for 
statistics of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (China); (ii) Surveys on the 
taxation of household savings by OECD in 1994 and OECD Tax Data Base 2000; (iii) 
Various publications and (iv) Series of Chinese documents issued by the State Council, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the State 
Administration of Taxation.
Some interviews were conducted with official representatives in China to give the 
analysis a stronger empirical grounding and to provide insight into contrasting views on 
China’s current pension system, especially with regard to forms of state intervention in 
old age pension provision. These interviews took the form of consultative meetings with 
individuals involved in pension policy, or conduct research on pensions. They provide a 
considerable amount of important information as well as personal views on the reform 
of the pension system in China.
1.3 Plan of the Thesis
The first task of this thesis is to examine the problems of the current state old-age 
pension system in China that set the background for the research question. Considering 
the introduction of the Chinese state pension system, Chapter 2, examines the key 
characteristics of state pensions and addresses the needs for change.
The second task is to conduct a review of the literature on the issues of pension mix 
regarding some social but mainly economic objectives. This is intended to be a 
background to the tax analysis of fiscal incentives, tax incentive costs and policy choice 
conducted in later chapters. In Chapter 3 the relative merits and demerits of both public 
and private pension systems are discussed with special reference to the issues of benefit 
adequacy, risks, contributions returns, coverage and incentive to save. Some important
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macro-economic issues relating to pensions will be discussed, notably, the link between 
saving and economic growth and the interaction with financial markets.
The third task is to examine the way OECD countries promote private pensions with 
their tax systems. Chapter 4 consists of a detailed study of the taxation of private 
pensions in the majority of OECD countries and summarises the differences and 
similarities. This chapter attempts to examine the effect of preferential tax treatments on 
the development of private pension and the sensitivity of saving flows to tax incentives, 
based on the experience of some OECD countries. Five tax models were chosen in order 
to observe an ideal tax model for the purpose of promoting private pensions in China. 
The five tax models, based on OECD regimes, are EET (contributions exempted, fund 
income exempted, benefits taxed), TEE (contributions taxed, fund income exempted, 
benefits exempted), ETT (contributions exempted, fund income taxed, benefits taxed), 
TTE (contributions taxed, fund income taxed, benefits exempted) and EEt (as EET but 
with a tax-free lump sum payment). The chapter compares the five models, which differ 
in both efficiency and equity, from the viewpoint of encouraging saving for retirement 
in particular.
The fourth task in Chapter 5 is to compare the Degree of Fiscal Privileges of five 
financial assets (bank deposits, government bonds, private pensions, shares and houses) 
in China and five OECD countries. The five OECD countries selected for the 
comparison are France, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The 
objective is to examine, on one hand, to what extent private pension funds in OECD 
countries are more lightly taxed than other forms of saving and on the other, to what 
extent current private pensions in China are tax discriminated.
The fifth task is to compare the five tax models, EET, TEE, ETT, TTE and EEt, from 
the cost perspective. Chapter 6 estimates the size of the tax cost under each of the five 
different tax models in order to provide Chinese policy makers with a general picture of 
future tax expenditures resulting from tax deduction or exemption on pension fund 
investments, contributions or benefits.
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The final task, in Chapter 7, is to summarise the main analyses and findings in the 
previous chapters and draw some conclusions for future policy. In this chapter, an 
attempt is made to propose an appropriate tax model for private pensions in China. A 
recommendation is made of one of the five tax models previously examined, based on a 
comparative analysis from the perspectives of both individual savers and government. In 
order to implement an effective tax policy for promoting private pensions without 
causing enormous fiscal deficits, the final chapter will also provide some alternatives for 
dealing with the tax cost.
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n. STATE PENSION IN CHINA: HISTORY AND CHALLENGE3
2.1 Introduction
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China by the Communist Party in 
1949, the government has introduced a comprehensive social welfare system to both 
urban and rural populations. An important role is played by social assistance benefits, 
such as the Urban Minimum Income security system, and the so-called “Rural Five- 
Guarantees” scheme which guarantees the childless elderly the provision of food, 
housing, clothing, medical care, and burial expenses. For the mainstream of the urban 
working population, the social security system provides the main source of assistance 
for maternity, medical service, work injury and old-age pensions. This chapter focuses 
only on the old-age pension scheme.
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 briefly presents the 
historical development of the state pension provisions in China as an introduction to the 
discussions on the current pension system in later sections. Section 2.3 simply illustrates 
the current pension system, focusing on its coverage, contribution requirements and 
benefit entitlements. Section 2.4 addresses the key problems of the current pension 
system, especially its drawbacks of low coverage and high enterprise contributions. 
Section 2.5 highlights the implication of a high pension burden on enterprises, the State- 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in particular, and pressures stemming from an ageing 
population and demographic change. The final section draws conclusions on this 
chapter.
2.2 Historical Review of the State Pension
There were no formal arrangements for retirement in China until after l October 1949 
when the People’s Republic was established. This section describes the evolution of the 
state pension system from the first regulation in 1951, giving emphasis to the series of 
adjustments and fundamental amendments since the I980’s, especially in 1995 and
3 This chapter is largely based on the World Bank (1996) and Gong, S. (1999).
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1997. By doing so this chapter will help to provide an understanding of the changes to 
state pensions in China and put the later discussion into perspective.
2.2.1 The Creation of the Labour Insurance in the 1950s
The first regulation about labour insurance was issued by the State Council in 1951. It 
introduced an old age allowance, disability and survivor benefits as well as other 
insurance benefits for some management and workers (Song, Zhang and Zhen, 1998: 
42). The 1951 regulation only covered a few service sectors and industrial enterprises 
with more than 100 management and workers. The pension benefits were about 35 to'60 
percent of individual workers’ wages, depending on the length of service in the 
enterprises from which the worker retired.4 This level increased from 50 to 70 percent in 
1953, the first year of the first Five-Year Plan.5 The pension benefits and other 
insurance benefits were financed by enterprise contributions at a rate of 3 percent of 
wage bill. Because of the small number of retirees in relation to workers, the 
contributions were, of course, sufficient to finance the system on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
For example, in 1952, one year after the start of the program, there were only 8 million 
enterprise workers and 20,000 retirees, or over 400 workers per retiree. In 1958 the 
coverage was extended to enterprises with less than 100 management and workers and 
also government employees. However, few COEs joined the system because of a limited 
number of workers and small-scale of production.
The social insurance system was supervised by the Ministry of Labour and jointly 
administered by the Ministry of Labour and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU). In 1954 the administration was unified and totally transferred to the latter. It 
was required that 70 percent of the contributions were retained by the trade unions of 
individual enterprises while the remaining 30 percent were transferred to a national 
master fund and managed by the ACFTU. Pensions and other social insurance benefits
4 It is noticeable that in the 1951 regulation there was different treatment for management and workers: the 
benefit rates for the former was higher than that for the latter.
5 The first Five-Year Plan was 1953-1957; the second Five-Year Plan 1958-1962; the third Five-Year 
Plan 1966-1970; the fourth Five-Year Plan 1971-1975; the fifth Five-Year Plan 1976-1980; the sixth 
Five-Year Plan 1981-1985; the seventh Five-Year Plan 1986-1990; the eighth Five-Year Plan 1991-1995; 
the ninth Five-Year Plan 1996-2000.
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were firstly paid from the enterprise funds while the fund managed by ACFTU was used 
as a last resort. Under this arrangement, the fund could be balanced at the national level.
2.2.2 The Pension Provisions during the “Cultural Revolution”
The state pension system created in the 1950s continued its operation until the 
beginning of the “Cultural Revolution” that lasted for ten years from 1966. During the 
period of “Cultural Revolution”, the social insurance system, including pension 
insurance, was suspended.
At the beginning of the Revolution, the activities of trade unions and the Ministry of 
Labour at all levels were interrupted. In 1967, ACFTU passed the administration of the 
master fund to the Ministry of Finance. However, the fund became smaller and smaller 
due to decreasing contributions to the labour insurance funds and the misuse of those 
funds accumulated. In 1969 the Ministry of Finance had to transfer responsibility for 
pension provision to individual employers (“working units” in Chinese term). From then 
each employer paid pensions to its own management and workers. The social insurance 
system was, in fact, revised to an enterprise-insurance system.
Due to an absence of records, some employees did not receive their full entitlement 
whilst others received more than they should have. Many retirees in about ten provinces 
did not receive benefits regularly. In many factories and enterprises workers kept on 
working unless they were physically incapacitated. According to the statistics in 1978 
there were 2,000,000 management and workers in enterprises and 600,000 in 
institutions and organisations who should have been retired.
2.2.3 The Pension Revisions after the “Cultural Revolution”
In 1978, the State Council issued new pension regulations 6 for SOEs, government 
institutions, and non-profit organisations. It was reaffirmed that the retirement ages were 
60 for men (65 at executive levels) and 55 for women (50 for blue-collar workers) with
6 Document 104 of 1978.
12
Chapter 2
additional adjustments for those in arduous and unhealthy jobs (in which cases, 55 for 
men and 45 for women). Under the new regulation the pension benefits, about 60-75 
percent of the last month’s standard wage, depending on length of services, were 
payable after 10 years instead of 25 years under the old regulation. Those who had 
worked for at least 20 consecutive years would receive pension of 75 percent of their 
standard wage. Those who had worked for 15 to 20 years would receive 70 percent. 
Those who had worked for 10 to 15 years could expect 60 percent.7 There was a 
minimum guaranteed pension of 30 Yuan per month. Disability pensions were related to 
the final standard wage and the extent of care needed.
The government encouraged the COEs to provide pension benefits to their management 
and workers. Between 1977 and 1979 several documents were issued to recommend that 
the co-operative factories in light industry, transport, co-operative shops and collective- 
owned clinics follow the same rules as the SOEs in implementing the 1978 regulations 
on pension benefits. Those not covered could set aside a part of their pre-tax profits for 
social insurance benefits, including pensions, with approval from labour authorities and 
local taxation departments.
The merit of the 1978 reform lies in its reestablishment of a retirement system. 
However, the pension system had two core unsolved problems. The first was that of 
high pension costs. As mentioned earlier, due to the interruption of the retirement 
system during the “Cultural Revolution”, a large number of workers who had already 
passed their retirement age kept on working. This resulted in huge pension costs with 
the reinstatement of retirement at the end of the Revolution. Moreover, the cost 
increased as the 1978 regulation provided incentives for early retirement. The minimum 
number of years’ service required to qualify for a retirement pensions was revised from 
20 to 10 in order to create more job vacancies for the returning youths who had been 
sent to the countryside to receive “Re-Education from Farmers”. In addition, the cost 
increased even faster with a new regulation stating that the pension benefits were based 
on a worker’ last month’s standard wage. Thus, the 1978 regulation provided incentives
7 There were two different treatments in the 1978 regulations between those who were employed before 1st 
October 1949 and those who were employed after because those senior officials who had made great 
contributions to the revolution and construction thus being different treatment. Those employed before 1st 
October 1949 could get pensions of 80 percent of their last month’s standard wages.
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for enterprises to increase their workers’ final wages in the year before retirement. 
Given those incentives, between 1978 and 1985 the total number of retirees jumped 
fivefold and the pension costs rose from 2.8 percent of the urban wage bill to 10.6 
percent. It must be noted that enterprises also provided other in-kind welfare besides 
insurance benefits. Most enterprises provided welfare such as health care, housing, 
clothing, food, entertainment facilities, haircuts, showers and even kindergartens and 
schools. It was noted that enterprises were like mini-welfare states providing all the 
needs of their employees from “from cradle to grave”. The second problem was the 
uneven distribution of the pension costs between enterprises: costs were much higher for 
those with a higher ratio of retired to employed. Under the system in which each 
enterprise had to pay its own retirees’ pensions (since the “Cultural Revolution”), the 
question of how those enterprises financed their pension costs became crucial.
2.2.4 Recent Reforms since the Middle of the 1980s
Before the economic reform and the open door policy that started at the end of the 
1970s, enterprises were not concerned about the effect of their payments because their 
budgets were not completely separated from the government budget. With the deepening 
of enterprise and economic reforms, a frame of social security system in line with a 
market-oriented economy was strongly required. The government had to put further 
reforms on social securities at the top of its priorities. Since the middle of the 1980s, 
some fundamental changes have taken place in the pension system in China.
(a) Social arrangements or social pooling (1986)
In order to redistribute uneven pension costs across individual enterprises, the 
government had to encourage the pooling of pension liabilities. In 1986 the State 
Council (State Council, Document 77 of 1986) established a pooling system across 
SOEs, predominantly at the municipal level and, less importantly, in certain industrial 
sectors such as the non-ferrous industry and the coal industry. The pool operated by 
setting a contribution rate for participating enterprises. If the pension costs of an 
enterprise were less than the contribution rate, it would remit the difference to the pool,
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if pension costs were higher than the contribution rate, the pool would cover the 
difference for the enterprise.
The 1986 pension reform was accompanied by employment reforms that established 
contract labour. New workers were to be hired on a contractual basis while the current 
workers would continue as permanent workers. Separate city pension pools were 
established for contract/new workers and permanent/current workers. The contract 
workers made individual contributions while the permanent workers did not. Enterprises 
contributed to both pools. In the late 1980s the pooling plan was extended to COEs’ 
workers (separated from SOEs’ workers) in many cities.
It must be added that although enterprises retained the responsibility for distributing the 
pensions, the pooling system did help to redistribute the pension costs across 
enterprises, reducing the heavy pension burden of some enterprises. However, the 
pooling was operated on a very small scale and the rates of contributions still varied 
enormously across individual enterprises.
(b) Individual contributions (1991)
In 1991 the State Council8 called for individual contributions from all workers. All 
workers would be required to contribute 3 percent of their standard wages to the pooling 
funds in addition to enterprise contributions. It was also stipulated that the pooling 
system or the social arrangement should be partially funded. The funds in the pool were 
to be managed by the social insurance executive agencies, which were supervised by the 
Ministry of Labour. Funds had to be put in banks in a special pension insurance account 
and used only for paying pensions.
(c) Combinations of Social Pooling and Individual Accounts (1995)
Document 6 issued by the State Council in 1995 was a major guide for recent pension 
reform. It set up the following principles. First, the benefit level should be adapted to the 
social productivity of the country and should be sustainable. It addressed need for China
8 The State Council Document 33 of 1991.
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to draw lessons from European countries where pension expenditures had already been 
the heavy burden on the governments’ budgets. The replacement rate of state pension 
would be lowered gradually as the average wage level increased. Second, the pension 
system must combine individual rights and responsibilities. In other words, social 
mutual aid must be combined with self-insurance. This meant that the pension benefit 
would be based on the individual compulsory contributions during employment. Third, 
the pension costs would be shared between individual participants, enterprises and the 
government. It was required that China set up a three-tier pension system including a 
state pension, an enterprise supplementary pension and individual savings pension. 
Fourth, equity would be combined with efficiency. At the primary stage of social market 
economy in China the efficiency principle would be placed in a position of higher 
importance in order to enthusiasm for work. Fifth, administrative services would be 
separated from fund management. According the State Council, the administrative 
services, including collection of funds and benefit payments, should be transferred from 
enterprises to the executive agency at all governmental levels. Post offices and banks 
would assist with payment procedures and tax authorities with collection.
The State Council recommended two plans for the reform. The objective of the both 
plans was to combine the social pooling (state pension provision) and individual 
accounts.9 They combined in different ways with Plan 1 having emphasis on the 
personal saving account and plan 2 having emphasis on the primary social insurance 
account.
Under Plan 1, the state pension for new workers employed after the reform was 
completely based on individual accounts. A social pool was responsible for pensions for 
those already retired, for current workers not covered by individual accounts and for 
certain adjustments for the retirees drawing from individual accounts. Each local 
government set the rate of enterprise contributions to the social pool according to the 
number of retirees in their localities. Contributions credited into individual accounts
9 This idea was piloted in Fujian province in July 1989. Subsequently, from 1991 to 1992, two different 
approaches experimented respectively in Shenzhen and Hainan were approved by the State Council. In 
1993, Shanghai proposed a plan, which was accepted by the State Council as one of the two 
recommendations to the national wide in March 1995.
16
Chapter 2
were approximately 16-17 percent of the total wages and contained the following three 
parts:
■ an individual contribution of 3 percent of the individual worker’s total wages;
■ an enterprise contribution of 8 percent of each worker’s total wages and
■ an enterprise contribution of 5 percent of the average local wages.
Individual contributions were to be increased over time whilst enterprise contributions 
would decrease by 1 percentage point every 2 years for 10 years until individual 
contributions accounted for half of the total contributions to the individual account, 
about 8 percent of total wages.
A worker who having contributed to the new system for at least 15 years or having had a 
continuous employment tenure (including the contribution years) of at least 10 years 
before the reform would receive a monthly pension after retirement equal to 1/120 of 
total accumulated contributions to the individual accounts. Should the pension be less 
than the minimum pension, the government would make up the difference. The level of 
minimum pension was specified by local governments. It is estimated that a worker who 
contributes for 15 years will receive an average pension of 24 percent of the wages in 
his or her final working year. For those who contribute for 20, 25, 30, 35 and 40 years 
the replacement rate would be 32, 40, 48, 56 and 64 percent respectively.10 A worker 
with less than 15 years of contributions would receive the accumulations on his or her 
individual account in a lump sum on retirement. A worker who outlives the individual 
account would continue to receive a pension from the social insurance pool.
Plan 2, on the other hand, emphasised social pooling over individual accounts. The total 
cost of the state pension, including the social pool and individual accounts, was financed
10 Author’s calculation based on the following replacement rate formula:
Replacement rate = (0.005 Wt_} + 0.011 Wt_j )/n Wt_} (The Ministry of Labour, 1995: 139-144).
Where: n is the number of years of contributions;
Wt_} the social average wage in the year before the retirement; and 
Wt_j the individual’s wage in the year before the retirement.
Note: it is also assumed that
a) Individual’s wage base for the purpose of contribution is equivalent to the social average wage.
b) The growth rate of individual’s wage is equal to the growth rate of the social average wage.
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by individuals and their enterprises. Again local governments set up the rates of 
contributions for both individuals and enterprises. However, only 3 percent of 
individuals’ total wages were credited to individual accounts. For those whose payment 
period was longer than 10 years, the pension would consist of the following parts:
■ a social pension equivalent to 20-25 percent of the local average wage;
■ an eamings-related pension equivalent to 1.0-1.4 percent of average wage for each 
year of contribution;
■ an individual account pension equivalent to 1/120 of total accumulations on 
individual accounts to be drawn as a lump sum or annuities.
The Ministry of Labour (1995: 141) estimated that a worker who contributed for 15 
years would receive an average pension of about 38.5 percent of the previous year’s 
wage before his or her retirement. For contributions of 35 and 40 years, the average 
replacement rate would be 63.5 percent and 69.8 percent respectively11. A worker with 
less than 15 years of contributions would receive the amount in the individual account in 
one lump sum on retirement. As in Plan 1, there were special transitional arrangements 
for those who had already retired and for employees not fully covered by the new 
scheme.
By proposing two plans and allowing localities to choose between them or any 
combination of the parameters of the two, the 1995 reform opened up a “Pandora's 
Box”. With the right to select its own reform plan, each municipality attempted to 
differentiate its scheme from the others in order to retain control. Individual saving 
accounts and social pooling were combined in quite different ways, leading to the 
creation of different schemes all over the country. According to the Ministry of Labour 
statistics (1995), before July 1995 seven provinces, including Shanghai, preferred Plan 
1; eight provinces, including Beijing, preferred Plan 2; eleven provinces chose a 
compromise between Plan 1 and Plan 2; the remaining 4 provinces remained undecided.
c) The imputed rate to individual accounts is equal to the growth rate of the social average wage.
11 The calculation is based on the following replacement rate formula:
" AReplacement rate = y ,—  
t = ] l °
Where: n is number of years of contribution; A, is the rate of contribution (determined by the local 
government) credited into individual accounts in year t.
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(d) Unification o f the state pension (1997)
After two years of experimentation with the combination of social pooling and 
individual accounts, the relevant ministries finally realised how serious was the 
fragmentation of the pension system. This impelled them to make compromises between 
the two reform plans proposed in 1995. The State Council enacted Document 26 in July 
of 1997. At the end of July, only 15 days after the issue of Document 26, the State 
Council held a national work conference on the unification of the state pension system. 
In this meeting the State Council urged local governments and relevant departments to 
act immediately according to the new document and requirements of the meeting. Local 
governments and relevant ministries were required to make their own transitional plans 
for the unification and choose a date before the end of 1998 for the implementation of 
the unified plan. Thus the two plans proposed in 1995 were unified. Section 2.3 
describes the main features of the pension system after the unification.
2.3 Understanding the Current System
After 50 years of changes and reforms to the pension system, the current system in 
China is still dominated by the public pillar, a largely urban-based, contributory, 
partially funded and defined contribution system. The rest of this section describes the 
developments and main characteristics of the current urban state pension system.
2.3.1 Developments of the State Pension
As described in previous sections, the coverage of urban employees has increased since 
the early establishment of the pension system in the 1950s. The 1951 legislation covered 
all employees in large industrial enterprises. A separate system with slightly different 
provisions was established under the 1955 regulations on pension policy for 
organisations and institutions. Since the middle of the 1980s, there have been separate 
schemes for permanent state sector workers and for certain industrial sector employees, 
including coal miners and railway workers. Since the early 1990s, a scheme similar to 
that for State-Owned Enterprise has been extended to other ownership enterprises and
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self-employed urbanities. In principle, employees of all types of urban enterprises and 
the urban self-employed are covered by the old-age pension system in China. 
According to the Ministry of labour and Social Security, the number of enterprise 
workers covered by the state pension increased from about 56 million in 1991 to about 
104 million in 2000 (Table 2-1). By the end of 2000, more than 31 million retired 
workers had been receiving pension benefits under the system. During the ten years the 
accumulated funds increased six fold from 14.4 billion Yuan in 1991 to 94.7 billion 
Yuan in 2000, although the rate of growth shows a general decreasing trend in Table 2- 
2.
Table 2-1 Employees and Retirees Contributed to Pension Insurance (person)
Year Number of employees Number of retirees
1991 56,536,574 10,865,757
1992 77,746,588 16,814,953
1993 80,081,670 18,394,447
1994 84,941,412 20,794,000
1995 87,377,929 22,411,584
1996 87,584,105 23,583,113
1997 86,709,700 25,334,300
1998 84,758,275 27,273,130
1999 95,018,110 29,835,976
2000 104,474,965 31,699,347
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2001.
Table 2-2 Revenues, Expenses and Reserves of Pension Insurance (million Yuan)
Year Revenues Growth
(%)
Expenditures Growth
(%)
Balance Growth
(%)
1991 21,570.84 20.6 17,307.14 15.9 14,406.88 47.2
1992 36,576.60 69.6 32,191.45 86.0 22,060.83 53.1
1993 50,354.02 37.7 47,063.03 46.2 25,858.89 17.2
1994 70,742.45 40.5 66,109.02 40.5 30,476.62 17.9
1995 95,005.07 34.3 84,760.87 28.2 42,983.38 41.0
1996 117,176.39 23.3 103,186.89 21.7 57,856.04 34.6
1997 133,790.51 14.2 125,132.80 21.3 68,284.82 18.0
1998 145,897.37 9.0 151,162.67 20.8 58,783.32 -13.9
1999 196,511.51 34.7 192,485.43 27.3 73,354.16 24.8
2000 227,812.85 15.9 211,548.33 9.9 94,711.65 29.1
Average 27.92 30.19 22.19
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2001.
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2.3.2 The Mechanism of Social Pooling and Individual Account
As described in the previous section, individual workers did not start contributing to 
pension schemes until the middle of the 1980s. Since the 1986 reform, all workers 
covered by the state pension have to contribute a percentage of their earnings. Under the 
1997 regulation, contribution from individual workers was set at 4 percent of his or her 
monthly wage. This rate would increase at one percentage point every two years, from 4 
percent at the beginning of 1997 to 8 percent. The rate in 2001 was 6 percent.
11 percent of an individual’s total wages, financed by the worker (4 percent) and his or 
her employer (7 percent) was credited to an individual account. As mentioned above, 
contributions from the employer decreased over time from 7 percent to 3 percent until 
the individual contributed 8 percent. Interest set by the government is credited to the 
individual account each year, based more or less on bank interest rates. This fund can be 
used for the purpose of pension payment and no other. If a participant dies and 
accumulated funds are left, the portion from individual’s contributions can be granted to 
beneficiaries designated by the employee or legal heir. Should the pensioner outlive the 
accumulation of the individual account, the social pooling fund continues to pay pension 
until death. The accumulated fund in the account is also transferable when the 
participant changes jobs.
Enterprises are expected to contribute at least 13 percent and no more than 20 percent of 
total payroll to the social pool. The funds are used for the following purposes: pensions 
for those retired before the 1997 reform, a basic pension for new retirees, pensions for 
long-lived retirees and transition costs. The funds are also used for certain adjustments, 
mainly the automatic adjustments of all the benefits mentioned above.
An individual’s contribution is based on the average monthly wage in the previous year. 
The monthly wage includes basic wage, bonus, allowance and subsidies. Both a floor 
and a ceiling are set for contributions. For the low-income worker whose monthly wage 
is lower than 60 percent of the local average, the latter would be used as the basis for 
contribution from both employee and employer, no matter how low the individual’s 
actual wages. For the individual with a high income, monthly wages exceeding 200 or
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300 percent of the local average would not be met by contribution demands. Anomalies 
and exceptions are reported to and jointly approved by the Ministries of Labour and 
Finance.
Until the middle of the 1990s there had been no contribution requirements for the 
government. The State Council Document 6 of 1995 stipulated that local governments 
were responsible for making up any deficits of the social pooling systems at their own 
localities, the Central Government for any deficits of the pooling systems in central 
industrial sectors. Since the beginning of 1998, with the condition that all accumulated 
funds be used to buy government bonds, government at all levels would have to defray 
the cost of administration needed for social insurance executive agencies.
2.3.3 Pension Benefits
To qualify for the old-age pension, two requirements must usually be met: first, the 
attainment of a specified age and second, the completion of a specified period of 
employment contributions. As mentioned earlier, since the 1978 regulation old-age 
benefits generally become payable at age 60 for men, 55 for women. Workers employed 
in underground mines, high temperatures, low temperatures, poisonous and harmful 
conditions or engaging in especially heavy physical labour may retire ahead normal 
retirement age. In addition, employees working in insolvent SOEs of the 111 chosen 
pilot cities under the process of capital restructuring and capital disposal are allowed to 
retire up to 5 years earlier than the normal retirement age with full pension. Disability 
benefits are available for those who are totally incapacitated for work and survivor 
benefits are payable for dependants of the deceased.
In general, the state pension would provide a basic pension equivalent to 20 percent of 
social average earnings plus that based on the earnings of the accumulations of the 
individual account. Participants were divided into three groups according to the date of 
employment or retirement, namely new employees, current employees and current 
pensioners. New employees are those employed after the introduction of the 1997 plan; 
current employees were employed before the reform and are yet to retire. Current 
pensioners are those who began their employment before the reform and have already
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retired. According to Document 26 of 1997, there should be different formulae for the 
state pensions of the three groups. The new employee who contributes for at least 15 
years and reaches retirement age will receive a monthly pension equal to 1/120 of the 
total accumulation of the individual account at retirement plus a basic pension equal to 
20 percent of his or her own provincial average wage. Thus, a worker who contributes 
for 15 years receives an average pension of 36.5 percent of his or her final wage. Those 
who contribute for 20, 25, 30, 35 and 40 years, would receive 42, 47.5, 53, 58.5 and 64 
percent of their final year’s wage respectively.12 Current employees who contribute for 
at least 10 years, including the time before the introduction of individual contributions, 
receive the pension accumulated in the individual account, the basic pension and a 
transitional pension paid by the pool fund. The transitional pension is the benefit paid 
for the years of service before the introduction of the individual account system. For 
new employees who contribute for less than 15 years and current workers for less than 
10 years, no basic pension is paid while the individual account pension is granted in a 
lump sum. Current pensioners are paid benefits according to the original method before 
reform, based on the State Document 104 of 1978, the Ministry of Labour Document 
275 of 1973, the State Document 6 of 1995 and the State Document 26 of 1997.
2.3.4 Pension Administration and Fund Management
Before 1998 there were three ministries independently supervising and administering 
pension schemes for different population groups in China. The Ministry of Labour was 
responsible for the urban pension insurance system of enterprise workers; the Ministry 
of Personnel was responsible for employees of organisations and institutes and the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs for farmers’ pensions. In addition, 11 industrial ministries such 
as the Coal Industry were responsible for the administration or operation of pension 
schemes for their industrial sectors under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour.
12 Author’s calculation is based on the following replacement rate formula:
Replacement rate = n^-j^- + 20% , where n is years of contribution.
Note: it is also assumed that
a) Individual’s wage base for the purpose of contribution is equivalent to the social average wage.
b) The growth rate of individual’s wage is equal to the growth rate of the social average wage.
c) The imputed rate to individual accounts is equal to the growth rate of the social average wage.
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Under the 1998 institutional reforms all functions in the field of urban pensions were 
transferred to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS). While MOLSS is 
responsible for the general supervision, a separated agency, i.e. the MOLSS Social 
Insurance Administration Bureau, is an executive agency for contribution collection, 
benefit payment and organisation or even provision of personal social services. 
According to the principle that administrative service should be separated from fund 
management, the Ministry of Finance13 required that all contributions must be deposited 
monthly in the accounts of the finance authorities at all levels. All expenditures are 
supervised and approved by both finance and social security authorities. In view of the 
fact that the financial market in China is far from developed, i.e. few financial 
instruments exist and no normative market regulations prevail, all accumulated funds 
except the reserve funds (equivalent to two months’ benefits) are invested in 
government bonds, safe from the risks of the financial market.
2.4 The Problems of the Current System
After about 20 years of reform since the 1980s, a pension system fit for a market- 
oriented economy has taken shape in China. However, as reform, readjustment and 
restructuring are taking place in the politics as well as economy, the current pension 
system faces many problems that are examined next.
2.4.1 Limited Scale of Coverage
The state pension scheme covers only 20 percent of the working population, among 
whom 79 percent are urban employees. In rural areas most of the peasants and people in 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) are not eligible for pensions. The family unit 
is still the core welfare institution for the old, especially amongst farmers. Although in 
1991, a voluntary pension scheme was organised by the Ministry of Civil Affairs to 
cover farmers and workers in TVEs, the system in practice has not been effective. In 
1995, after three years of operation, the average accumulation per participant across all 
1,400 counties was 80 Yuan, about 2 percent of annual income of farmers (World Bank,
13 The Ministry of Finance Document 6 of 1998.
24
Chapter 2
1996: 6). The low coverage and fund accumulations were due to two reasons. First, the 
return from accumulated funds varied with investment performance and in some years 
was lower than the rate of price inflation. With such a low return, peasants and workers 
had no incentives to contribute to the scheme. Second, people in poor areas have 
difficulty joining the scheme because of their low income. Participation was highest in 
the richer areas such as Shandong and Jiangsu provinces.
Even in urban areas, most coverage is provided by the SOEs and COEs, mainly the 
SOEs. Although other ownerships such as Chinese-foreign joint ventures, joint stock 
companies, and foreign enterprises have to join the pooling plan regulated by the State 
Council (State Council, 1999)14, participation is still far from complete. The Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security estimated that the state pension covered 96.66 percent of 
staff and workers in SOEs by the end of 1997, but just 79 percent of total urban staff 
and workers. The rates of coverage were even lower in COEs and other ownership 
enterprises, 53.7 percent and 31.8 percent respectively (see Table 2-3). It must be noted 
that Table 2-3 does not take into account the rural population, which accounts for 80 
percent of total population in China.
Table 2-3 State Pension Coverage by Ownership (1992-1997 in %)
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total urban 
employment
68.07 70.03 74.69 76.89 78.40 79.00
SOEs 85.86 86.24 92.85 95.76 95.14 96.66
COEs 33.66 40.46 43.00 46.53 51.47 53.70
Others 20.64 18.48 21.91 27.03 27.48 31.80
of which FIEs15 21.25 21.27 24.15 25.00 31.87
Source: China Social Insurance Statistics Yearbook, 1997, Table 2-7.
14 According to the State Council, all enterprises in urban area have to join the social pool since 1999. In 
addition, the social pool now has to cover those peasants who work in cities.
15 FIE refers to “foreign invested enterprises”, which includes Chinese-foreign joint ventures and foreign 
enterprises.
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2.4.2 Low Level of Social Pooling
Due to the required pooling, under the current system responsibility for paying pensions 
is shifted from individual enterprises to groups of enterprises. It must be pointed out that 
the pooling system does help to share risk across enterprises and reduce the pension 
burdens of those enterprises with financial problems. However, the redistribution of 
pension costs was only amongst a relatively small number of enterprises, usually within 
a city. By the end of 1997, only fourteen of the thirty provinces had introduced different 
varieties of pooling plans; it is noteworthy that most pension pooling is conducted at the 
county, municipality or prefecture level. Also, many localities have separate pools for 
SOEs and COEs. Social pooling at provincial level is only experienced in four 
provinces, Fujian, Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. In fact, it is a county/city pooling 
scheme rather than a social/national pooling scheme.
Two reasons can explain the low level of pooling. The first is the highly decentralised 
social insurance system (each province and city has its own social insurance department 
to handle policy matters as well as its own labour bureau to administer social insurance 
funds) which readily lends itself to inconsistent enforcement. Many localities 
intentionally differentiate their schemes from others and introduce non-transparency in 
order to retain authority over their programs. The weak enforcement power of local 
insurance agencies makes difficult the tasks of collecting contributions or levying 
penalties. The second reason is the uneven development. In general, rich localities are 
unwilling to join the social pooling system due to the surplus in their pension schemes. 
On the other hand, poor localities have difficulty joining the pool because their 
provincial governments fear the heavy burden, described by them as “the pension 
bomb”. It is the above reasons that make city pooling difficult and provincial pooling 
even more so. Although the State Council required that all the pools be extended to the 
provincial level by the end of 1999, difficulties in reconciling inter-provincial interests 
will persist for some time and may impede the establishment of a wider pooling system.
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2.4.3 High and Variable Rates of Contribution
The limited scale of coverage and a low level of pooling result in a problem of a wide 
range of high contribution rates across provinces and municipalities as well as 
enterprises. Enterprises with larger proportions of retirees have higher contribution 
rates; old enterprises have higher rates of contributions than new enterprises because 
they have higher ratios of the retired to currently employed. According to the 1997 State 
Council Document 26, the rate of contributions from employers must be less than 20 
percent. However, the average rate of enterprise contributions in 19 provinces was much 
higher than the state regulation. Table 2-4 shows the rates of contributions for 30 
provinces for the year of 1996. There were 25 provinces and municipalities whose 
average rates of contribution were higher than 20 percent. In comparison to other 
nations those rates were very high. For example, in 1995 the tax rate was 12.4 percent in 
the United States, 18.6 percent in Germany, and 16.5 in Japan. For developing countries 
in Latin America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia the regional averages 
were about 10 to 12 percent (World Bank, 1996: 12). Singapore had an exceptionally 
high rate of 40 percent but the funds were mainly used for housing loans for workers. It 
can be seen from the table that the contribution rates vary across provinces, from 14.75 
percent in Hainan to 30.09 percent in Anhui. Even in each province the contribution 
rates differ across localities and different enterprises. In a province where the pooling 
schemes are still operated at the county or city level, the minimum contribution rate is 
11 percent while the maximum is up to 70 percent (World Bank, 1996).
2.4.4 Notional Individual Account
The current individual account in China acts as a bookkeeping device, keeping track of 
contributions plus imputed interest (at a rate determined by the government). Generally 
the money in the account is paid out to current pensioners as soon as it comes in. When 
an employee reaches retirement age, the accumulation in his or her account (in most 
cases just pension points rather than real funds) is converted into an annuity and paid to 
the retiree out of contributions by other, younger workers, who are building their own 
national accounts. In this sense, the present individual account is still on a pay-as-you- 
go basis. In fact, the funds in individual accounts are far from adequate in most
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localities and in many poor areas the individual account is just notional since there is no 
money in these accounts. Higher rates of contributions from enterprises can be expected 
when these people reach their retirement age. Otherwise the government would have to 
be responsible for part of the pension liabilities, increasing pressure on the future 
government budgets.
Table 2-4 Rate of Contributions by Provinces and Municipalities in 1996
Provinces/
Municipalities
Employer
contribution
Employee
contribution
Total Rate of 
Contribution
Anhui 27.66 2.43 30.09
Beijing 18.47 5.06 23.53
Fujian 22.07 2.40 24.47
Gansu 16.19 7.22 23.41
Guangdong 15.23 2.91 18.14
Guangxi 15.24 1.77 17.01
Guizhou 20.83 2.12 22.95
Hainan 12.64 2.11 14.75
Hebei 20.67 2.13 22.80
Heilongjiang 22.87 1.84 24.71
Henan 19.96 1.64 21.60
Hubei 14.08 8.19 22.27
Hunan 20.75 2.65 23.40
Jiangsu 18.52 3.12 21.64
Jiangxi 21.88 2.43 24.31
Jilin 24.69 1.56 26.25
Liaoning 24.92 2.36 27.28
Neimenggu 15.99 1.84 17.83
Ningxia 19.13 2.36 21.49
Qinghai 24.31 2.33 26.64
Shandong 23.09 2.49 25.58
Shanghai 21.96 3.80 25.76
Shanxi 20.37 2.45 22.82
Shanxi 22.10 2.02 24.12
Sichuan 21.73 2.20 23.93
Tianjin 20.02 4.00 24.02
Xinjiang 25.59 2.95 28.54
Xizang 18.41 0.57 18.98
Yunnan 22.01 2.71 24.72
Zhejing 23.24 3.36 26.60
Total 20.53 3.05 23.58
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data from China Social Insurance Statistics 
Yearbook, 1997.
Note: In bold, the municipalities whose average contribution rates are higher than the 
international norm of 20 percent.
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2.5 Challenges of the Pension System
Following a review of the development of the Chinese public pension system, this 
section examines the burden of the ageing population and demographic trends on 
enterprises and the pension system.
2.5.1 High Pension Burdens and SOEs Reform
(a) Increased pension costs
In China expenditures on pensions rose dramatically during the last 10 years of the 
twentieth Century. As stated earlier the total number of workers contributing to the state 
pension system doubled from 56 million in 1991 to 104 million in 2000. However, at 
the same period the total number of retirees receiving pensions grew threefold from 10 
million to 31 million . As result, the ratio of workers to retirees decreased from 30.3:1 in 
1978 to 3.3:1 in 2000 (Table 2-5). This means that in 1978, 30 workers supported one 
retiree, while in 2000 only three workers supported one retiree.
It can be seen from Table 2-2 that during the ten years between 1991 and 2000, the 
annual average increase in pension expenditures reached 30.19 percent. It is noticeable 
that during the same period the annual average increase in pension contributions was 
only 27.92 percent. In 1998, expenditure on pension payments to retired workers was 
even higher than contributions from employed workers. The pension burden shouldered 
by Chinese enterprises can also be explained by their high replacement rates. Depending 
on their former employment, a retiree can usually obtain 60 to 90 percent of his or her 
standard wage (Table 2-6), and in some areas the replacement rate can be as high as 100 
percent (World Bank, 1996). Compared with some industrial countries, China provides 
much higher pension benefits to pensioners covered under the state system, given the 
low level of GDP in China. Problems of high pension burdens on enterprises are 
discussed later.
29
Chapter 2
(b) Inadequate pension rights
Due to their heavy obligations, a more urgent and immediate problem is the crisis of 
pensions in the SOE sector. It can be seen from Table 2-7 that compliance rates declined 
from 90 percent in the early 1990s to 70 or 80 percent in 1994 and the first half of 1995. 
Compliance rate is defined as the percentage of enterprises contributing. As addressed in 
the previous section, most of the funds are organised at the county and city level, so 
there is no mechanism by which to balance the surpluses and shortages of funds 
between different enterprises or localities. It is difficult for the enterprises and localities 
with financial difficulties to provide enough retirement pension for their employees. In 
these areas, therefore, the basic rights of labourers could not be guaranteed. According 
to statistics from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, by the Spring of 1998, of 
2.83 million retirees 1.34 million had not been receiving any pensions for up to 6 
months and about 709,000 had not been receiving pensions for longer. Total pension 
liabilities reached 4.675bn Yuan. Thus the system is becoming both inefficient and 
unfair. Table 2-8 reveals the problem in some of the worst affected provinces.
(c) Hindrances to SOEs restructuring
Another associated aspect of the problem is the slowing of economic growth and 
enterprise restructuring resulting from the high pension burden and differing 
contribution rates from enterprises. First, the high and different pension contributions 
provide an unequal playing field for enterprises. For example, two enterprises in two 
provinces could pay widely different contributions ranging from 20 to 35 percent. This 
is equivalent to imposing a value-added tax at widely different rates for the same 
product. An enterprise may lose competitiveness not because of inefficiency in its core 
business but because it is in a locality with many retirees. Thus the system will end up 
allocating resources to enterprises that are not necessarily more efficient but have the 
advantage of a location with a younger population. China’s Northeast region (including 
the three provinces Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning) is already experiencing 
competitive disadvantage and low economic performance relative to other regions. 
Second, the bankruptcy or sale of SOEs raises the difficult issues of how the 
commitment to pensioners will be honoured (along with the other social obligations of 
the enterprises). When alternative arrangements are not available, the result is a slowing
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down of enterprise reform; neither liquidation nor joint ventures and mergers can 
proceed smoothly unless the issue of the social obligations of SOEs is settled. In 
addition, with the accumulated losses of enterprises, the banks are now facing an 
increasing burden of bad debts that hinder their commercialisation. Thus the dilemma of 
the policy-makers is increasingly evident: SOEs cannot be efficient unless they face 
hard budget constraint; the banks cannot be commercialised unless they can enforce 
hard budget constraints on their borrowers.
In a planned economy where the profits of enterprises were pooled and resources were 
allocated according to plan, the burden on individual enterprises was not a concern 
because enterprise budgets were part of the government budget. However, most 
enterprises are now facing the transition from a central-planed economy to a market- 
oriented economy. Individual enterprises are increasingly concerned with their profits 
and losses. Having a large proportion of pensioners will undoubtedly limit enterprises’ 
capacity for operation and expansion. High pension costs are becoming a heavy burden 
and weakening their competition in domestic as well as world markets.
Table 2-5 Ratio of Workers to Retirees from 1978 to 1996
Year Workers : Retirees Dependency 
ratio (%)
Year Workers: Retirees Dependency 
ratio (%)
1978 30.3 : 1 3.3 1990 5.4 1 18.6
1979 16.7 : 1 6.0 1991 5.2 1 19.2
1980 12.8 : 1 7.8 1992 4.6 1 21.6
1981 11.5 : 1 9.1 1993 4.4 1 23.0
1982 10.1 : 1 10.0 1994 4.1 1 24.5
1983 8.9: 1 11.2 1995 3.9 1 25.6
1984 8.0: 1 12.5 1996 3.7 1 26.9
1985 7.5: 1 13.3 1997 3.4 1 29.2
1986 7.1 : 1 14.1 1998 3.1 1 32.2
1987 6.7: 1 14.9 1999 3.2 1 31.4
1988 6.4: 1 15.6 2000 3.3 1 30.3
1989 6.2: 1 16.1
Source: Data for year before 1990 is from unpublished data supplied by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security, P.R. China. Data after 1990 is from Table 2-1.
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Table 2-6 Replacement Rates of the Public Pension from 1990 to 1996
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Replacement rates (%) 80.6 82.7 83.4 82.4 79.3 77.5 77.3
Source: Unpublished data supplied by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, April 1999, 
Beijing, China.
Note: Replacement rate is defined as average pensions of new retirees to their wages in the 
year preceding retirement. It also can be calculated as the proportion of average 
pensions of new retirees over the wages of total workers. The definition in this table 
needs to be identified in next fieldwork.
Table 2-7 Compliance Rates in Selected Municipalities
Municipalities/
Province
Contribution Rates ( %) Compliance rates (%)(2)
Employers(1) Employees Early 1990s 1995
Beijing 19-27 5 95 95
Changchun 21.5 2 91 76.9
Chengdu 22 2 n.a. 80
Chongqing 27 3 n.a. 70.2
Fuzhou 21-29 4 95 90
Guangzhou 21.5-24.5 2-3 96 n.a.
Hainan 18 3 n.a. 70
Nianjing 18,5 3 80-90 80
Shanghai 25.5 4 n.a. 90
Shenyang 18 3 n.a. 80
Taiyuan 18-25 3 n.a. 80
Tianjing 20-30 4 n.a. 95
Wuhan 26 3 n.a. 90
Source: World Bank, 1996
Note: (1) Contribution rates vary among different enterprises.
(2) There may be some overestimation since SOEs in financial difficulties can 
negotiate for delayed payment.
Table 2-8 Delays to Pension Payments in Selected Provinces and Industries
Provinces
Numbers of 
pensioners 
involved 
(in person)
Amount of delay 
on pension 
payments 
(million Yuan)
Accumulated 
pension funds 
in account
Proportion of 
pension delay to 
accumulations 
(million Yuan)
Coal mine industry 475,935 46,700 279,416 16.71
Hebei 139,173 29,404 291,476 10.09
Heilongjiang 455,483 142,506 363,703 39.18
Jilin 216,080 43,873 87,659 50.05
Liaoning 407,500 78,500 384,208 20.43
Shanxi 79,800 13,062 102,666 12.72
Sichuan 103,356 10,667 192,805 5.53
Xinjiang 119,606 22,101 58,648 37.68
Total 1,996,933 386,813 1,760,581 21.97
Source: Lu, H. P. (1998). Examining the Delay of Pension Payout in China (Yang lao Jin Wei 
He Hui Chu Xian Tuo Qian). China: Jilin Mei Shu Press.
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2.5.2 Crisis in Family Support
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the old-age pension system, despite decades of 
reforms, only covers 79 percent of the urban working population. The coverage is 
lowest for workers in COEs, TVEs and private businesses (or individual businesses). 
Peasants in general are not eligible for the formal state pension. As a result, the majority 
of elderly people have to rely on their family for financial support.
In a national survey in 1994 on the major sources of income for the elderly (aged over 
60 years old), 57.1 percent received financial support from their families, 24.8 percent 
from work, 15.8 percent from pensions, 1.2 percent from welfare relief, and 1 percent 
from other sources. For those over 80 years of age, some 86.2 percent had to rely on 
their families for economic support. About 7.8 percent or 9 million people claimed that 
they had to depend on others to take care of their daily living needs. Among this group 
of frail elderly, 88.9 percent had to rely on family for economic support (State Statistic 
Bureau, 1995: 66). Compared with the urban elderly, elderly people in rural areas are 
more economically dependent on their family members or they work to support 
themselves. Table 2-9 compares the different income sources of the elderly in cities, 
towns and villages for the year of 1987; it indicates that family support is very important 
for them all. However, unlike those in cities and towns, old-age people have little 
financial resource from pensions, which account for half of income for urban people.
Table 2-9 Source of Income for the Elderly in 1987 (%)
Income source Cities Towns Villages
Working income 6.8 7.1 26.2
Pensions 56.1 47.5 2.5
Spouses 13.0 14.3 3.0
Children 22.4 27.8 67.5
Relatives 0.3 0.6 0.8
Government 1.4 2.8 0.1
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Lei, J. Q. (1994). The New Changes of Marriages and Families in the Chinese 
Countryside Since the Reform of the Economic System (Gai Ge Yi Lai Zhong Guo 
Nong Cun Hun Yin Jia Ting De Xin Bian Hua). Beijing: Beijing University Press.
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However, family support is affected by a variety of social and economic changes, which 
invariably erode the capacity of Chinese families to provide care for their vulnerable 
members. The changing context centres on the following issues.
The first is the shrinking family size in urban areas. Recently, young married adults in 
cities have tended to prefer to live separately from their parents after marriage. 
Similarly, elderly people who are economically and physically more independent prefer 
to live separately from their children. According to the 1987 national survey, 82.2 
percent of the elderly population (aged over 60 years old) were living with their 
children, while that figure had dropped to 70 percent by the time of the 1990 census. In
1987,16.3 percent of the elderly people lived apart from their children (3.4 percent lived 
alone and 12.9 percent lived with their spouses). In the 1990 census the percentage of 
elderly people living apart from their children had increased to 25 percent. This resulted 
in a shrinkage in family size in China, decreasing from 4.29 persons in 1964 to 3.96 
persons in 1990 and declining further to 3.74 persons by 1995 (Tian, 1991). In 1998, the 
number of people in a household decreased to 3.16. In Shanghai, the household size was 
2.89 persons (National Bureau of Statistics, 1999). In terms of family structure, almost 
three-quarters of the families in China are now nuclear (a family with two adults and 
one child).
The second issue is that of increasing labour mobility in rural areas. The “Household 
Registration System” implemented in 1958 was effective in restricting rural peasants 
from entering cities for jobs. Due to a variety of factors including population increases, 
encroachment on farmlands by urban development, and the harsh living conditions of 
agricultural work, the problem of surplus labour in rural areas is becoming critical. At 
the same time, because of the requirement by the cities for cheap manual labour, the 
restrictions on peasants to move into cities and towns for jobs have been relaxed. Over 
100 million peasants are now working in cities. Most of them go to the cities by 
themselves, leaving behind their family members in villages. It can be expected that 
with the speed of urbanisation and industrialisation, as more young peasants go to cities 
for jobs leaving at home their aged parents, more and more old-age people will be 
“abandoned” (Leung, 1996).
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The changes in both urban and rural China described above imply that the government 
should consider the declining capacity of the family to support the elderly and recognise 
the emerging need for a new pension system to be developed.
2.5.3 Increasing Pressures from the Ageing Population
(a) Birth rate trends
High birth rates result in an ever-growing population, with the young outnumbering the 
old. Low birth rates, on the other hand, signify slower population growth or even 
contraction. If a population is growing slowly or contracting, the result will be a general 
ageing of the population. Since the 1970s the one-child policy has been adopted in 
China. Although the population control policy has faced a great resistance in rural areas, 
it has substantially reduced the birth rate from 39.1 per 1,000 in 1964 to 17.1 per 1,000 
in 1995. Likewise, the fertility rate for each woman has declined from 5 children in 
1970 to 1.7 children in 1995 (Leung, 1995). As a consequence, the natural population 
growth rate decreased from 27.6 per 1,000 to 10.6 per 1,000 over the same period and 
decreased further to 9.53 per 1,000 in 1998. As increasing numbers of women 
participate in the labour market and vigorous population control policy continues, 
fertility rates can be expected to decline further, which is to say, future generations will 
not raise enough children to support themselves.
(b) Life expectancy trends
In addition to the general decline in birth rate, extensions in life expectancy will drive 
up the number of elderly in both relative and absolute terms. Life expectancy increased 
from about 50 years in the 1950s to 76 years in 1995. The tremendous increase in life 
expectancy in China is the result of advances in medical science, improvements in 
public health services, particularly the control of infectious diseases, the reduction of 
infant mortality and a rapid rise in general living standards. As medical science devotes 
more resources to the studies of diseases of old age, further gains in life expectancy can 
be expected, to 80 years by 2040 (see table 2-10). For a public pension scheme, the 
increase in life expectancy at birth means that the government must take care of more
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old people, and increase in life expectancy in retirement means the government must 
look after the old for longer than before.
(c) Growth o f elderly population
As a consequence of reduced mortality and the continuing one-child policy, a long-term 
ageing process is expected in China. The speed of the increase in the proportion of 
elderly people is of great concern to the Chinese government. By the end of 1998, the 
population over the age of 60 was 83,620,000. The annual growth rate of the elderly 
population, aged over 60 years old, was 33.7 per 1,000, more than three times the 
overall population growth rate of 10 per 1,000 (China Population Statistics Yearbook, 
1999). Shortly after the turn of the twenty-first Century, members of the baby-boom 
generation will begin to reach their 60’s and a continued expansion of the elderly 
population in both absolute and relative terms can be expected. Table 2-11 shows the 
increasing trend of the elderly population over the age of 65 between 1953 and 2000 and 
the portion of this age group for selected future years until 2050, as projected by the 
People’s Insurance Company actuaries in China. It can be seen that during the second 
half of the twentieth Century the population over age 65 increased by approximately 2.6 
percent. However, there will be an average increase in this portion of the population of 
about 3 percent every 10 years after that. The number of the elderly is expected to rise 
from about 89 million in 2000 to 292 million by 2050. James (1997) states that it will 
take about 33 years for the share of population over 60 to double from 9 to 18 percent. 
However, similar increases took at least 80 years in other developed countries, 85 years 
in Sweden, 98 years in Denmark, 100 years in Italy, and about 140 in France.
The fast increase in population ageing will result in a fast increase in public pension 
expenditure. As the World Bank argues, in developed countries the ageing of the 
population usually came after industrialisation and the process unfolded at a slow pace. 
However, in China it comes at a time when the nation is industrialising and economic 
construction demands capital (World Bank, 1996). This makes allocating resources very 
difficult.
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(d) Increasing old-age dependency ratio
What worries the government most might be the increasing trend of the old-age 
dependency ratio, a numerical relationship of old people to those in employment. In 
Table 2-12, the old-age dependency ratio is defined as the population of 65 years of age 
and over to the population of those aged between 14 and 64. It shows that the labour 
force (the population between ages of 14 and 64) increases from 1953 to 2010. After 
that, the proportion of this age group in the total population will begin to decrease as the 
“baby boomers” bom in 1950s reach their retirement between 2010 and 2050. Likewise, 
the older group (age 65 and over) will increase steadily from 8.2 percent of total 
population to 20.6 percent at the same period. Therefore, a high increase in the 
dependency ratio is expected during the first half of this Century. We can see from the 
table that the ratio of labour force (age group 14-64) to pensioners (age group 65 and 
over) declines from 10 to 1 in 1995 to about 3 to 1 by 2050 (also see Figure 2-1). With 
the rising dependency ratio, the work force faces a heavy burden.
Unlike the pension dependency ratio described in earlier sections, the old-age 
dependency ratio used here does not necessarily represent the relationship between those 
who receive pensions and those who contribute to them. However, it takes into account 
the situation in the domestic labour market and more accurately represents the extent of 
the pressure from the burden of ageing, or the extent to which the total retirees have to 
be supported by working people.
Table 2-10 Life Expectancy at Birth and Age 60, Selected Years
Year Life expectancy 
at birth
Life expectancy 
at age 60
1995 69.9 16.6
2000 70.7 16.8
2010 72.2 17.4
2020 73.5 18.2
2030 74.8 18.9
2040 76.9 19.7
2050 78.3 20.1
Source: World Bank, 1996
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Table 2-11 Population of Age 65 and over for Selected Years
Year Population
65+
(10,000)
% of total 
population
Year Population
65+
(10,000)
% of total 
population
1953 2,504 4.4 2000 8,913 7.0
1964 2,458 3.6 2010 11,136 8.2
1982 4,928 4.9 2020 16,474 11.4
1985 5,557 5.3 2030 22,586 15.3
1987 5,866 5.4 2040 29,378 20.1
1990 6,319 5.6 2050 29,240 20.6
1995 8,091 6.7
Source: Cui, L. F. (1998), Fiscal Burden on Ageing Population (ed.). China: Jilin Mei Shi 
publishers.
Table 2-12 Population Rates and Dependency Ratios for Selected Years
Year 14-64 over 
total population 
(%)
65+ over total 
population (%)
Dependency ratio 
(%) 65+/( 14-64)
14-64 : 65+
1953 56.3 4.4 7.8 13: 1
1964 61.3 3.6 5.9 17: 1
1982 63.7 4.9 7.7 13: 1
1990 64.1 5.6 8.7 11 : 1
1995 66.6 6.7 10.1 10: 1
2000 67.7 7.0 10.3 9.7: 1
2010 71.1 8.2 11.2 8.7: 1
2020 69.3 11.4 16.5 6.1 : 1
2030 67.1 15.3 22.8 4.4: 1
2040 63.4 20.1 31.7 3.2: 1
2050 63.1 20.6 32.6 3.1 : 1
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Cui, L. F. (1998). The Fiscal Burden of 
Ageing Population (ed.). China: Jilin Mei Shi publishers.
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Figure 2-1 Projected Old Age Dependency Ratios from 2000 to 2075
Dependency ratio
800000
400000
200000
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 
Projected years
Source: Long-range World Population Projections (The United Nations, 2000).
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter described the fundamental changes in the Chinese insurance-based state 
pension system during the second half of the last Century. It also pointed out the basic 
problems of the current state pension system as well as its future difficulties arising 
from an ageing population.
Among the low-income nations, China is almost unique in having an extensive and 
generous programme of pensions for its urban work force. In the past, the enterprise- 
based social security pension was seen as an advantage of the socialist economy. 
However, it is now seen as being responsible for depressing economic growth as 
pension costs add to the burden of enterprises, especially the SOEs. With economic 
reform, problems with the generous enterprise-based pension system become evident. It 
is even more severe in older enterprises that face difficult financial conditions in their 
core businesses due to technical and economic changes. High rates of contributions and 
unfunded pension (and other social insurance) liabilities are seen as a financial 
impediment to enterprise reform and competitiveness. Therefore, a solution has to be 
found to detach the enterprises from their social welfare obligations, of which pensions 
are an important component.
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As China attempts to move towards a market-oriented economy, the issue of how 
pension policy affects the efficiency and productivity of enterprises becomes crucial. As 
the losses of SOEs mount, there is a great urgency for solving the pension problems. 
Also, profound social and economic changes have brought about a marked impact on 
the Chinese family units that provide traditional family welfare to the elderly. Moreover, 
the demographic changes and particularly the ageing population will put higher 
pressures on the existing pension system.
This thesis suggests that the responsibility for provisions of retirement income must be 
shared between the government, enterprises and individuals. In other words, the 
promotion of a funded private pension system in which current contributions are closely 
linked to future benefits is one of the possible solutions to the current pension problems 
in China. This suggestion is reflected in most proposed reform of social security systems 
in OECD countries, which seek to retain the basic state pension but reduce its scope and 
transfer some of the burden of providing retirement income to private pensions. The 
next chapter carries out a comparison between private and public pension systems.
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in . LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE ISSUE OF PENSION MIX
3.1 Introduction
The pension ideology aimed at promoting private pensions conforms to the principle of 
future pension reform required by the Chinese government as early as 1991 when the 
State Council issued Document 33. This document called for an establishment of three 
tiers in the pension system: a basic benefit, a supplementary benefit to be provided by 
enterprises in sound financial conditions and a benefit based on personal savings. 
Afterwards, several documents16 were issued by the State Council and the Ministry of 
Labour specifying the role of the supplementary pension system. According to the State 
Council, the supplementary pensions including those of enterprise supplementary 
pensions and individual saving plans should be an important complement to the state 
pension system; the latter being the principle part of the pension system providing 
benefits for basic living, the former aiming to improve the living standard of the retired 
population. Under the requirement of the State Council, by the first decade of the 
twenty-first Century, China must set up a pension system characterised as iow level, 
wide coverage and three tiers’.
The system would be ‘low level’ in that it cannot undertake the whole pension 
responsibility for employees and should aim only to meet basic protection requirements 
for retirement. Contributions from both employees and employers must be designed on 
the grounds of the national economic level, the capability of the government’s and 
enterprises’ budgets and the participants’ incomes. ‘Wide coverage’ includes 
enlargement of the pension scheme to each province, covering all employees of 
government body, institutions and organisations, State-Owned Enterprises, Collective- 
Owned Enterprises, Foreign-Investment Enterprises and the self-employed. The ‘three 
tiers’ include a basic state pension, a supplementary pension provided by enterprises and 
a savings-based individual pension. Local governments should encourage enterprises to 
arrange a certain pensions for their employees and guide individuals to save for their
16 Those documents include State Council Document 6 of 1995 and State Council Document 26 of 1997. 
MOL Document 164 of 1995 was by the Ministry of Labour to guide the establishment of enterprise 
supplementary pensions at the end of 1995.
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retirements through fiscal privileges. Under this principle the responsibility for pensions 
must be shared among the government, enterprises and individuals.
This chapter discusses the issue of pension mix as a background to the tax analysis on 
fiscal incentive, regulation, costs of tax incentives and policy choice conducted in the 
following chapters. This chapter has two objectives. The first is to compare the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of different pension schemes from the viewpoint of 
individual workers. The second objective is to analyse the impact of pension funds on 
capital markets, a very important issue for the Chinese economy. The discussion focuses 
on the long-term capital market and the financial market in general.
Chapter 3 is structured as follows: Section 2 examines the advantages and disadvantages 
of public versus private systems, defined benefit versus defined contribution plans and 
pay-as-you-go versus funded plans. The issues of potential risks, the expected rate of 
return to contributions, the rate of coverage and the incentive to save under each kind of 
pension plan are assessed. Section 3 addresses some important macro-economic issues 
relating to funded pensions, notably, the link to savings and economic growth and the 
interaction with the financial markets. The conclusion section follows.
3.2 How Would Private Pensions Affect Individual Workers?
This section compares the advantages and disadvantages between publicly managed 
programmes and privately managed programmes, defined benefit plans (DB) and 
defined contribution plans (DC), pay-as-you-go (PAYG) based plans and advance 
funded plans. The comparisons are based on the following assessment criteria: full 
coverage, low risk, high saving incentives and high contribution returns, chosen because 
of the problems inherent in the current Chinese pension system. As a way of social 
policy, the system does not provide the entire population with an equal opportunity of 
participating in the state pension and therefore is unsatisfactory in allocating income 
resources as well as eliminating poverty, especially among the elderly. As a means of 
saving, the current system fails to maximise returns on contributions. As a form of 
insurance, the system fails to minimise risks to contributors. Finally, the current system 
is not able to create high saving incentives for both employers and employees and is
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therefore not financially sustainable. The comparisons are summarised in the table 
below and discussed in detail in the rest of this section.
Table 3-1 Comparison of Different Types of Pension Programmes
Assessment
criteria
Public versus Private DB versus DC PAYG versus Funded
Public Private DB DC PAYG Funded
Coverage Higher Lower _  <]> - - -
Benefit
adequacy Higher Lower - - - -
Poverty
elimination Higher Lower - - - -
Return to 
contribution - - - - Lower Higher
Vulnerability to 
political risk Higher Lower - - Higher Lower
Vulnerability to 
investment risk Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower Higher
Vulnerability to 
inflation risk Lower Higher
Lower BR 
Higher AR
(3)
Higher BR 
Lower AR
Lower Higher
Incentive to 
save
Higher for 
low-income 
workers
Higher for 
high-income 
workers
Higher for 
workers with 
low job 
mobility
Higher for 
workers with 
high job 
mobility
Higher for
old workers
(2)
Higher 
for young 
workers
Source: This table is partly attributed to the 1994 World Bank publication: Averting the Old 
Age Crisis.
Note: (1) - indicates not comparable or no remarkable difference between the two types of 
plans in comparison. For example, there is no clear evidence that suggests that either 
public schemes or private schemes generate higher returns after adjustment for 
administrative costs.
(2) “old workers” refers to those who are in middle age and close to retirement.
(3) “BR” and “AR” refer to before retirement and after retirement respectively.
3.2.1 Pension Coverage
With regard to pension coverage there is no clear division between DB and DC, nor 
between PAYG financing and advance funding. Therefore, the discussion in this section 
takes place through a comparison between public and private pensions in general. It 
must be noted that private pensions discussed in this thesis include both voluntary 
private pension plans and compulsory, mandated occupational schemes.
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Public pensions in most industrialised countries cover almost the entire population. The 
flat-rate benefits are payable to retirees based on conditions of either citizenship or 
contribution record and the eamings-related plans cover all the economically active and 
their dependants. Private pensions, on the other hand, have not covered the entire 
population or even the entire labour force. Table 3-2 reports different rates of coverage 
between public and private pensions in some member countries of the OECD. It shows 
that, with the exception of Germany and France, all the observed countries have a basic 
public pension available for all citizens. While the percentage of employees covered by 
private pensions varies widely (from 23 percent in countries such as New Zealand to 
some very high rates of coverage in France and Sweden) it should be pointed out that 
none has yet achieved 100 percent coverage of total populations under private pension 
plans.
One important reason for the low coverage of private pension plans is the unequal status 
amongst workers with access to them. The inequality arises from the institutional 
features of private pensions. This is due to the non-government sponsored pension, 
especially the occupational pension, providing benefits which are conditioned by 
individual work histories (e.g. earnings and job tenure) and also are highly differentiated 
by both occupation (e.g. type of job) and workplace (e.g. sector). Those differences in 
occupation, earnings and job tenure, and also differences in mandation result in a 
disparity of pension coverage and participation between workers. The following are 
observations from the history of the private pension industry in some OECD countries 
which may have some implications for China.
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Table 3-2 Coverage of Public and Private Pensions in Selected OECD Countries
Country Public pension scheme(1) Private Pension scheme(2)
Compulsory Voluntary
Canada All citizens & employees 45% (in 1993)
Denmark All citizens & employees 80%
France Employeesa 100% 
ARRCO/AGIRC b
Germany Employeesc 50%
New Zealand All citizens & employees 23% (in 1987)
Sweden All citizens & employees 90%
(ATP; ITP/STP)d
UK All citizens & employees 50% (company) 20% (personal)
USA All citizens & employees 58.8% (in 1988)
Source: Selected from Davis 1995, Hansen 1998 and OECD 1998b: pp.46-48.
Notes of the author:
(1) The public pension in most industrial countries includes a basic provision for all citizens, 
and an additional public pension scheme which covers the economically active group. The 
definition of public pension includes social assistance.
(2) The proportion of employees covered by private pensions; the number in columns 3 and 4 
of the table indicates the coverage of labour force only.
a. French public pension provides eamings-related benefits for employees.
b. The ARRCO is a supplementary pension that regroups forty-six pension systems and the 
AGIRC a supplementary pension system for middle managers. Both are operated on PAYG 
defined benefit basis.
c. In Germany, the public pension is basically for employees in the private sector and specific 
groups of self-employed.
d. The ATP is a publicly directed ‘National Supplementary Pension Scheme’; it is a form of 
eamings-related social-security scheme. The ITP and the STP are supplementary private 
pension schemes which cover virtually the entire labour force. The ITP system covers white- 
collar workers, while the STP system is responsible for blue-collar workers.
(a) Inadequate coverage in small industries
Statistics show that coverage is higher in the public sector than in the private sector (see 
Dakin, 1994 and OECD, 1993b for detailed discussion Within the private sector, 
coverage is generally very high among large organisations and relatively low among 
small firms. Table 3-3 provides the statistics of participation by size of firms in two 
countries with well-developed private pension systems, the UK for 1987 and the United 
States for 1988. It shows that the rate of coverage increases with firm size in both 
countries. It ranged from 27 percent in small firms to more than 80 percent in larger 
organisations. This means that private pensions play a less important role for people 
who are employed in small enterprises.
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Table 3-3 Coverage According to Size of Establishment in UK and US
(Private sector, full time employees, in thousands)
Size of establishment 
(number of employees) Employees Members Percentage o f members
The United Kingdom
1-2 390 80 27
3-24 3,590 890 25
25-99 2,990 1,270 42
100-999 3,680 2,290 62
1,000 and over 1,250 1,040 83
The United States 
<100
100 and over
34,100
58,800
9,100
46,400
26.7
78.9
Source: (1) Dakin (1994: 21). Pension Provision in Britain.
(2) OECD (1993: 25). Private Pensions in OECD Countries: The United States.
(b) Inadequate coverage o f low-income earners
Another, almost universal, feature of pension participation throughout the world is that 
of the small percentage of lower-paid workers covered by private pensions. Because the 
system is voluntary, employees with higher incomes are more likely to receive private 
pension benefits at retirement, linked to their paid contributions. Thus private pensions 
are said to discriminate against low-income workers. In the United States, for example, 
private pension coverage rates increase steadily for workers with higher incomes, 
moving from 22 percent for those earning less than $5,000 to 80 percent for those 
earning $50,000 and over (Table 3-4). This indicates that private pension benefits are an 
important source of retirement income for highly paid people, while lower-paid workers 
rely on public pension schemes, especially social security programmes. In the United 
States, social security benefits replace a higher percentage of pre-retirement earnings for 
low-paid workers. Thus, the tilt in the private pension system towards higher income 
earners is offset to some extent, by the benefits provided through the Social Security 
system to virtually all workers at retirement.
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Table 3-4 Participation in Tax-deferred Pension Plans in the United States
(By level of Earnings, non-agricultural wage-and-salary workers, 1988)
Annual earnings ($) Percentage o f all workers Percentage o f eligible workers
1-4,999 1.0 22.2
5,000-9,999 3.5 32.5
10,000-14,999 8.0 41.7
15,000-19,999 14.3 50.6
20,000-24,999 20.1 56.8
25,000-29,999 24.0 58.5
30,000-49,999 33.1 67.0
50,000 and over 45.1 79.8
Source: Cited from Table 10 in the OECD (1993: 29) Private Pensions in OECD 
Countries: The Unites States.
(c) Inadequate coverage o f women
Table 3-5 provides the statistics of participation by gender in three countries, the UK for 
1991, the United States for 1988 and Germany at the beginning of 1990s. It shows that 
the United States had the highest overall rate of private pension coverage (58.8% of the 
total labour force) during the 1980s. More importantly, the different coverage rates 
between men and women show that women are less likely to be covered by private 
pension plans. The rate of coverage for men was highest in the United States (61%), 
followed by the UK (57%) and Germany (55.9%). However, all three countries had a 
rate of coverage of less than 50 percent for women. In Germany, private pension plans 
only covered 1/3 of those women in the work force. The low coverage rate for women is 
the direct consequence of their short job tenures and low earnings.
In the UK, although women’s membership of occupational pension schemes has risen 
since 1945, the gender gap in occupational pension membership remains marked and 
since the early 1980s, women’s membership levels have stagnated. In 1994, 38 percent 
of full time female employees were members of an occupational scheme compared to 56 
percent of males. However, the average payments that women receive from an 
occupational pension are low. Data suggest that the average amount received from an 
occupational pension by women was £31 a week compared to £71 a week received by 
men (Falkingham and Rake, 1999). As consequence of both lower membership of
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schemes and lower benefits at payment, women rely more on means-tested social 
security benefits and their husbands’ pensions.
In Germany, for another example, women’s economic position in the state system is 
most likely to depend on derived benefits from their status as widows. Some 40 percent 
of all female beneficiaries receive survivor benefits which have a lower value than 
earned benefits. But the size of women’s earnings in the labour market is hardly enough 
to earn them entitlement in the private occupational pensions - only 7 percent of women 
in the private sector have a private pension compared to 40 percent of male pensioners 
who worked in the private sector. Therefore it is argued that women do best financially 
in retirement if they marry well. The marriage market, rather then the labour market or 
the welfare state seems to assure women an adequate income in retirement (Rein and 
Wadensjo, 1998). At present, women’s issues present a continuing concern for many 
who are interested in pension policy.
By examining the experience in OECD countries, one can expect the same pattern in 
China - the higher the status and pay, the more likely it is that a worker will be 
contributing to a private pension plan. Membership of non-state schemes would also be 
higher in public than private sector employment, capital than labour intensive industries 
and large than small companies. Provision in the financial services, such as the banking 
and insurance industries, may also be better than in other sectors. Therefore, it can be 
expected that the private pension scheme in China, if voluntary, may benefit higher paid 
workers in large companies, with the lower paid in small companies least likely to be 
included. The rate of coverage in enterprises and areas with sound financial conditions 
would be higher than that in poor performing enterprises and less developed 
municipalities and provinces. Sufficient coverage of the small businessman and the self- 
employed would be typically difficult. In addition, those workers who are part-time, 
low-income earners and close to retirement may receive barely adequate benefits from 
non-government sponsored pension schemes, even when plans are mandated.
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Table 3-5 Pension Coverage as a Percentage of the Work Force
(by Gender, in the UK, the US and Germany)
Gender United Kingdom (1991) United States (1988) Germany
Men 57.0 61.0 55.9
Women 37.0 48.0 33.1
Total 48.0 58.8 48.5
Source: 1. OECD (1993). Private Pensions in OECD Countries: The Unites States, Paris.
2. Dakin (1994). Pension Provision in Britain, London.
3. Reynaud (1994). Comparing Social Welfare System in Europe. Oxford.
3.2.2 Risk and Uncertainty
Pension plans involve different kinds of risks arising from enormous uncertainties. This 
section tries to answer the following three questions: Which pension system is more 
susceptible to political risk? Which scheme is more vulnerable to investment risk? 
Which scheme is more effective in protecting benefits against price inflation?
(a) Political risk
It is not easy to give a clear definition about the concept of political risk. Put simply, 
political risks occur when pensioners do not receive benefits or receive less than they 
should have, due to the failure (or change) of government policy. Unlike any other risks, 
political risk is harder and more difficult to predict because each country has different 
traditions and institutions. The following are examples of political risks which can be 
found in any type of political or economic system.
• The state fails to make necessary and timely adjustments according to changing 
economic conditions, such as increases in inflation and labour productivity;
• Increases in contributions or taxes and cuts in benefits according to demographic 
trends of ageing population, longer life expectancy and high dependency ratio;
• Adjustments in pension policies that respond to developments not directly related 
to pensions, e.g. budget deficit;
• Pension rights are reneged or abolished due to political upheavals.
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Since public pensions are not usually funded and the source of benefits is from taxation 
or contributions of existing workers, it is generally believed that public schemes and 
especially PAYG schemes are more liable to political interruption. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, due to the changes to the state pension, those who entered the 
labour market in 1978 receive on retirement a state pension less than half that implicitly 
promised to them when they started work (Gary, 1999). In China the benefit rates of 
state pension have changed frequently over the past 50 years. Before the 1990s, the 
replacement rate increased from 35-60 percent in 1951, to 60-85 percent in the 1980s. 
Meanwhile, it decreased from about 83.4 percent in 1992 to 77.3 percent in 1996 (see 
Table 2-10 in Chapter two). According to government policy for further reform, the 
replacement rate will be decreased even further, to 58.5 percent by the year 2033 (Yu, 
1998). In the United States many of the younger generation are worried that Social 
Security will not provide currently promised benefits (Mitchell and Zeldes, 1996). 
Recent reforms in many OECD countries have substantiated this worry. These were 
aimed at returning to basic principles, such as focusing basic pensions on the very needy 
and making insurance-based schemes more dependent on contributions. The main policy 
options within the public and PAYG framework are decreasing benefit levels, reducing 
eligibility and increasing contributions (see Table 3-6).
The fundamental point is that public pensions do not always provide a secure income for 
pensioners, whilst private pensions are less vulnerable to political risks in which benefit 
promises may be reneged on. Under PAYG-based plans, changes such as increasing 
dependency ratio, high unemployment rate and low economic growth often lead to 
reductions in benefits. However, advance funded pension plans are less likely to be 
associated with political risk as they are generally funded (unless there are changes in 
government tax rules or serious political upheavals) but they are more likely to suffer 
from investment and inflation risks, which are discussed next.
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Table 3-6 Selected Recent Reforms in OECD Countries
Reduction in the generosity of pension payments Countries
Reductions in the final benefit available after the usual 
number of years of work and/or contribution
Canada Portugal 
Finland Sweden 
Germany New Zealand 
Italy UK 
Norway
Less generous adjustment of benefits to changes in 
inflation
Finland
Germany
Japan
Increases in the level of contributions and/or years of 
employment required to generate the same level of 
benefits
Finland
Portugal
Turkey
Increases in the number of years of earnings used to 
calculate final pension payments
France
Spain
Sweden
Change in the benefit calculation to adjust for increases in 
the average life expectancy of new cohorts of retirees
Sweden
Source: Selected from OECD, 1998.
(b) Investment risk
Both publicly and privately managed funds are subject to investment risk. However, the 
causes of the risk to the two funds may be different. Under publicly organised and 
administered programmes investment risk may result from the misuse of funds, e.g., 
state and local governments borrow from their pension funds to cover deficits (Munnell 
and Sunden, 1999). It may result from investment decisions guided by political, rather 
than economic considerations (Banks and Emmerson, 2000). Also, it may result from 
the failure to achieve portfolio returns on the risk-retum frontier. For example, public 
funds are often required to invest in government securities or used in failing state 
enterprises at low nominal interest rates that become negative real rates during 
inflationary periods (James, E. 1998).
In comparison to publicly managed pensions, privately managed funds would give 
households more control over how their retirement funds are invested and enable them 
to select a more efficient portfolio and to attain a better point on the risk-retum frontier. 
Because of differences in tastes across households, this would be superior to the 
implicitly uniform portfolio rule of the public trust. Although, in some cases, individuals
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are not well informed of, or have little to say about, their contribution allocation 
strategy, fund managers still invest pension funds following a high return principle, 
rather than being guided by political decisions. However, private pensions are also 
subject to investment risk for the following two reasons. First, in an environment with 
weak capital markets, less informed investors, less sophisticated experts and less 
regulatory capacity, privately managed funds may not perform as well as expected. The 
market may also perform badly. Also, they have the risk of fund abuse as well as 
company bankruptcy. This suggests that a privately managed fund may not involve 
smaller potential risks than one publicly managed. Therefore, many pension scholars 
such as Davis, E. (1995); James, E (1997) and Heller (1998) emphasise that government 
regulations are necessary to avoid investments which are overly risky and managers who 
are fraudulent. The problem of abuse and fraud should not be discounted, particularly in 
developing countries where capital markets are underdeveloped. Second, private 
pensions have higher administrative costs than public pensions. It is widely believed 
that pensions based on individual accounts have higher administrative costs than those 
based on group insurance. Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) argue that “...the rate of return on 
a funded private system is likely to be lower than under the public system because 
higher administrative costs reduce the net rate of return an individual receives.” The 
effect of administrative cost on return to both public and private pensions will be further 
discussed in Section 3.2.3. Third, company pensions are more vulnerable to the risk of 
misuse of funds and personal pensions have a risk of miss selling.
When a DB scheme is compared with a DC scheme the answer is rather complex. It 
depends on the risk-sharing features between pensioners and scheme sponsors. A DC 
scheme is a pension that provides benefits to pension members dependent solely on 
returns on assets invested, usually based on a regular contribution of a fixed proportion 
of salary. In contrast to a DC scheme, a DB scheme is independent of returns on pension 
assets invested. The benefits paid to pension members depend on a fixed amount or 
proportion of final salary in advance, usually based on years of service and average or 
final salary.17 The two schemes differ in the way in which benefits are calculated when
17 It must be noted that there is a targeted money purchase scheme. It provides minimum, rather than 
maximum, benefits to members. The amount of pension that exceeds the minimum benefits to pension 
members after their retirement depends on the investment performance of the pension fund operated by 
the manager. In addition, members can also gain the accrual of fund assets. This implies that pension
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the pension member retires. Most importantly, they are different in the distribution of 
risk between the pension member and the pension provider/sponsor (Blake, 1996: 4).
In the DC scheme the amount of pension benefits paid to the member is determined by 
the full value of the fund’s assets, which all depends on the investment performance 
operated by fund managers in the market. The member’s benefit varies with market 
returns. The higher the return from fund assets invested, the more the payments to the 
pension member and vice versa. This means that the pensioner’s benefit is not protected 
since the pension provider has no responsibility to make up the shortfall if there are 
severe market losses. Thus, there is no risk-sharing feature between the member and the 
sponsor in the DC scheme. The sponsor does not bear any risk from fund investments 
nor enjoy the high returns from the success of investments. Instead, the member must 
bear all the risks of fund investments though gain the whole returns generated from the 
market. In the case of a stock market crash just prior to retirement, the risk to DC plans 
may be severe. For example, pensioners in the UK who retired in 1974 often had 
pensions less than half the value of pensions received by those retiring in 1973 (Davis, 
1995: 7).
Whereas in the DB plan, the scheme sponsor pays benefits to the member based on 
factors such as the final salary, the length of pensionable service and the age of the 
member. Under such a pension scheme, the benefit that the member receives after his or 
her retirement is not calculated in relation to the value of the assets in the fund, it is 
fixed. Consequently, the member’s interests are protected. It appears that when there is a 
decline in the fund value or when the fund liabilities increase, the sponsor needs to top 
up the fund to keep it in actuarial balance. Therefore, in a DB scheme, again there is no 
risk-sharing character between the pensioner and the sponsor. The pensioner does not 
bear any risk from fund investments, nor can he or she benefit from the returns of fund 
investments. The scheme sponsor bears the whole risks of the fund’s investment, paying 
benefits to members even if the accumulated fund proves inadequate for all vested
benefits to the pension member have no ceiling but a floor. The higher the return from the market, the 
higher the pension received by the member. At the same time, the sponsor bears all risks from fund 
investment but does not enjoy any asset returns. This kind of pension plan is obviously preferable to 
members but not to sponsors since they are not in an equal position in risk-benefit sharing. This is why the 
TMP scheme is not very popular in the pension experiences of any country.
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rights. However, the sponsor also gains all market returns. In practice, most OECD 
countries such as the United States, Canada, France, Japan and Switzerland have 
insurance of DB pension rights against default risk for the sponsoring firm. Insurance of 
benefits of DC pension plans is not necessary as there is no fixed pension right to 
guarantee (Davis, 1995: 108). Therefore, in theory, from the point of view of individual 
workers a DB scheme is not subject to investment risk. In practice, however, a certain 
degree of risk still exists within a DB scheme. For example, the sponsor would probably 
change the types of pensions if there were any change in economic situation, tax 
regulation and investment policies on pension funds. For instance, due to the suspension 
of tax credits on dividends in July 1997, many employers in Britain have altered the 
benefits to their employees from a DB scheme to a DC scheme because of the rising 
costs after the tax change (Merrell, C. “Swift Response to Chancellor’s Raid”, The 
Times, 5 July 1997). If a DB plan is under-funded, the sponsor is allowed to change the 
rules of the scheme, including the benefit accrual rate.18
(c) Inflation risk
If pension benefits are not inflation-indexed, the nominal return from an investment will 
be eroded by inflation and will sometimes generate a negative real rate of return. If this 
happens, the purchasing power of the capital accumulation declines rather than expands. 
By the time the worker retires, the pension that can be paid will be far less than the 
retiree’s wage and will purchase far less than it could have if the money were spent in 
earlier years.
The risk from inflation is present in both public and private pension systems. However, 
the government and the private sector have different power or abilities in dealing with 
insolvency in relation to price inflation. Most countries, indeed, have introduced some 
sort of automatic benefit adjustment mechanism into the social security program to deal 
more effectively with the inflation problem. The table below (Table 3-7) reports the 
method of benefit adjustment for old-age protection in 14 members of the European 
Committee. All member countries have annual adjustments of pension benefits to either
18 It should be noted that all the changes only apply to new benefit accrued (World Bank, 1994: 187-198).
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prices or wages.19 The UK government has to adjust pensions by legislation at least once 
a year in line with the movements in the general level of prices. In Belgium and 
Luxembourg pension benefits are automatically adjusted whenever prices have 
increased to a certain level.
Table 3-7 Benefit Adjustment for State Pension in Selected Countries (1998)
Country Benefit adjustment basis Country Benefit adjustment basis
Austria Annual adjustment to 
change in net wage
Italy Annual adjustment based on 
the development of the cost 
of living
Belgium Automatic adjustment of 
2% whenever the average 
CPI varies by 2% in relation 
to the preceding index.
Luxembourg Automatic adjustment to 
price development 
whenever the index varies 
by 2.5% in relation to the 
preceding index.
Denmark Annual adjustment 
according to change in wage 
level
Netherlands Adjustment twice per year 
in accordance with the 
average development of 
contract wage
Finland Annual adjustment on the 
basis of the evolution of the 
cost-of-living
Portugal Annual adjustment to price 
level
France Annual adjustment to CPI Spain Annual adjustment to CPI
Germany Annual adjustment to 
change in wage
Sweden Annual adjustment to 
change in price
Ireland Increase once a year UK Adjustment at least annually 
in line with change in price 
level
Source: EC (1998). Social protection in the Member States of the European Union.
The degree to which pensioners’ benefits are protected against price inflation depends 
on whether pensions are indexed to price inflation or wage and also whether the 
indexation is full or partial. Under price indexation, pensions move with the level of 
prices so that the real values remain unchanged. Under wage indexation, two problems 
may arise - if wage increases do not keep the same pace with prices and if pensions are 
indexed in nominal terms rather than in real terms. In both cases, the real value of 
pension benefits declines during inflationary periods. The World Bank (1994: 85) 
estimated that the real value of a pension that is fixed in nominal terms is reduced to
19 In Switzerland, there is a fifty-fifty combination of wage and price indexation.
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only half the amount in seven years if the rate of inflation is 10 percent. And with 
annual inflation of 100 percent, the real value would be totally eroded in nine years.
In China, the pension formula of the current public scheme is defined in advance. The 
benefit depends on years of employment and salary over certain periods (i.e. credit to 
the individual account is based on each year’s personal wage), as well as the social 
average wage (20 percent under the new unified system). The benefit was indexed to 30- 
80 percent of growth of local average wage in 1994 and was revised to 40-60 percent in 
1997. This approach was justified on the ground that it allowed retirees to enjoy the 
benefits from the growth of labour productivity. It would maintain horizontal equity, 
thus the pensioners would not feel deprived in relation to the current workers. However, 
the wage indexation rather than price indexation is uncertain when the economy is 
unstable. As benefits depend on the pensioners’ wage, if the latter fails to rise as rapidly 
as expected, the benefits paid to the pensioner will be less than expected. More 
importantly, the benefits largely depend on the social average wage in the year before 
retirement: if the wage in that year falls due to any ad hoc changes in the government’s 
wage policy or the economic environment, the benefits will be commensurately less. For 
example, if the nominal wage rises by 20 percent and the overall price index by 12 
percent, a 50 percent indexation to wage growth means a reduction of 2 percent in real 
pension. Conversely, if nominal wage grows at the same rate, and inflation increases at 
only 8 percent, then, a 50 percent of indexation means that real pension rises at 2 
percent. In order to maintain pensioners’ purchasing power, a 50 percent indexation to 
nominal wage requires that the nominal wage have to grow at least twice as fast as the 
growth rate of inflation. The author has calculated (Table 3-8) the growth rate of 
pensions between the year of 1982 and 1996 with 30 percent and 80 percent wage 
indexation. The results indicate that under the 30 percent wage indexation, the pension 
benefits would have had a negative rate of growth in most of those years during 1982 to 
1996. The negative numbers are even higher in 1988 and 1989 when the growth rates of 
wages were below the rate of inflation. When pension benefits are indexed to 80 percent 
of nominal wage, the real pensions fall is smaller.
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Table 3-8 Growth of Pension Benefits in China from 1982 to 1996
(Different percentages of indexation to nominal wages)
Year Money 
wage % 
increase
CPI Pension growth at 30% 
indexation to wage
Pension growth at 80% 
indexation to wage
1982 3.4 2.0 -0.98 0.72
1983 3.5 2.0 -0.95 0.80
1984 17.9 2.7 2.67 11.62
1985 17.9 11.9 -6.53 2.42
1986 15.8 7.0 -2.26 5.64
1987 9.8 8.8 -5.86 -0.96
1988 19.7 20.7 -14.79 -4.94
1989 10.8 16.3 -13.06 -7.66
1990 10.6 1.3 1.88 7.18
1991 9.3 5.1 -2.31 2.34
1992 15.9 8.6 -3.83 4.12
1993 24.3 16.1 -8.81 3.34
1994 34.6 25.0 -14.62 2.68
1995 21.2 16.8 -10.44 0.16
1996 12.9 8.8 -4.93 1.52
Source: Author’s calculation. Data of wage and CPI are from China Labour Statistics 
Yearbook, 1999. CPI is urban Consumer Price Index.
Whether pension benefits should be indexed to wage or price is another issue. The key 
point is that, in general, retirement benefits paid through public pension schemes are 
price- or wage-indexed and to some extent are effectively insured against inflationary 
shocks. This is because public pensions are backed by the government, that has the 
power to tax and borrow from either domestic or foreign markets. However, private 
pension plans have not been effective in adjusting benefits in line with earnings or 
prices. In Canada, 93 percent of participants from the private sector have no formal 
inflation protection. In contrast, 30 percent of public-sector members benefit from full 
indexation, yet none does in the private sector. In Japan, only a part of the pensions 
replacing public social security is indexed. Indexation after retirement is a more 
controversial issue and has found to be far more difficult. As Bodie’s survey (1990: 36) 
mentions, “virtually no private pension plans in the US offer automatic inflation 
protection after retirement”. Even where regulations are permissive, benefits are rarely 
fully indexed. In some countries large private pensions and those with high return assets 
are more likely to have ad hoc pension adjustments to compensate for inflation. In the 
United States during the 1970s, 51 percent of all participants obtained ad hoc increases
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to compensate for the decline in purchasing power whilst in the 1980s this declined to 
27 percent (Ghilarducci, 1992: 138-139). Ghilarducci estimates that in the United 
States, pensioners who receive private pensions lost their real value between 1976 and 
1986. For example, women’s benefits from private pensions fell by 29 percent, whilst 
their social security benefits increased by 9.6 percent.
Why do private pensions fail to index payments? The answer to this is that sponsors or 
managers in private pension schemes are unwilling to make inflation commitments 
based on guesses about future price levels and fear that the cost of these adjustments 
may be too high. Barr (1998: 211) gives two reasons why the private market cannot 
supply insurance against unanticipated inflation. First, the distribution probability of 
different future levels of inflation is unknown. Second, there is no possibility of winners 
compensating losers because in the case of inflation the probability of pensioner ‘A’ 
experiencing a given rate of inflation is not independent of that for pensioner ‘B’ (the 
rate of inflation facing one pensioner will by and large face them all). Blake (1992), 
suggests that if real wages, and hence contributions, rise at 2-3 percent per year and fund 
managers can obtain real returns of 2 percent, indexation to prices should be attainable. 
However, according to Vittas (1992), real returns needs to exceed real earnings growth 
by 2-3 percent for indexation to be possible at a reasonable cost.
Prior to retirement, indexation of pensions is possible in a DB scheme because wages 
keep pace with general wage inflation if employees continue to work for the same 
employer. Davis (1995: 114) states that the move from average earnings to final salary 
in some countries in the 1970s can be seen as an attempt to correct for the effect of 
inflation. However, the indexation of pension benefits after retirement is easier in a DC 
scheme where fund managers or pension sponsors can seek to invest sufficient assets for 
indexation. Indexation of pensions is easier to achieve in a PAYG scheme than in a 
funded one. This is because a PAYG scheme can spread risks over a much broader 
population of potential contributors and beneficiaries, including workers across several 
generations, reducing the financial risks faced by covered workers. However, a funded 
scheme uses only financial assets to protect pensioners’ benefits against price inflation.
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3.2.3 The Return to Contributions
The issue of return is crucial to both individuals and society as a whole. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine which type of pension scheme has the ability to deliver higher 
returns to contributions. This section focuses on the comparisons between publicly and 
privately managed funds and also between PAYG based and pre-funded plans.
(a) Public management versus private management
The investment return depends basically on two factors: the relative administrative costs 
and the investment performance of funds. As to returns, international evidence suggests 
that the rate of return on publicly administrated funded schemes has been historically 
low. For example, the World Bank mentions (1994, Figure 3.7) that the real rate of 
return on many public trust funds was negative during the 1980s. According to the 
Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) calculation, although “the degree of shortfall is much less 
pronounced...the returns earned on public pension funds during the 1980s were indeed 
disappointing relative to risk-free market interest rates when they are compared with 
market interest rates”. As stated earlier, the low expected return of public pensions may 
result from lack of portfolio diversification - funds are required to invest in government 
securities or loans to failing state enterprises - and improper use of funds such as 
government borrowing to reduce deficit.
The case of social insurance reserves in China is one example. The present regulation 
requires that 80 percent of accumulated funds must be invested in government bonds 
and the rest kept as bank balances. Table 3-9 presents the nominal return from 
government bonds during the years of 1982 and 1996 and the real interest rates at the 
same period. It shows that the inflation-adjusted returns in 6 of the 15 years were 
negative. The low and even negative rate of return results in two negative effects in 
China. First, it seriously affects retirees who depend on their individual accounts. As the 
World Bank (1996: 19) concluded, although a zero rate of inflation is assumed with a 
contribution rate of 10 percent of wages, the replacement rates will be over 40 percent if 
real interest rates and growth rates of real wages are both 8 percent. However, if real 
wages grow at about 5 percent and real interests are 0 percent, the replacement rate will 
be only 10 percent (see Table 3-10). If the rate of return on the investment falls below
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the rate of wage growth, workers will be disappointed with the low replacement rate 
they get after years of retirement saving (the shaded triangle area in Table 3-10). They 
may lose their confidence to join the public pension scheme, thereby threatening the 
future popularity of the program. Second, the pension funds are not efficiently used on a 
national basis. Such a low rate of return creates strong incentives for localities to avoid 
the regulations and invest their pension funds in various local projects with, sometimes, 
a much higher rate of return. However, some of these projects are wasteful or can be 
duplicated across the whole economy. Thus, it fails to maximise the utilisation of 
pension reserves on a national basis.
However, the potential differences, if any, in expected investment returns between 
publicly and privately managed funds may be offset by the effects of high administrative 
costs in privately managed pension schemes. This lowers the pension benefits in the 
case of DC funds and increases the cost to the sponsor for DB funds. The administrative 
costs arise from a variety of expenditures on fund management and regulation, which 
includes marketing and advertising, keeping records, determining benefit eligibility, 
collecting and managing the funds and so on. According to Gary Reid and Mitchell 
(1995), the administrative costs in USA’s Social Security system are only one-quarter of 
those for private pension systems. This ratio is even lower in Diamond’s (1977) 
calculation; he estimates that the USA’s Social Security system spends about 2 percent 
of its income on administration, including sales, whilst the private insurance companies 
spend about 17 percent. As Boulding (1958) states: “If the cost of administering the 
insurance declines with every increase in the amount of insurance written, then a state 
monopoly will almost inevitably be cheaper than a number of competing private 
companies.” It must be noted that employer-based private schemes have lower 
administrative costs than pensions based on individual contracts. This is mainly because 
the latter loses economies of scale in operation. Davis (1995: 130) quotes that various 
fees and costs account for 30 percent of contributions in the United States and 35 
percent in Chile. In the United Kingdom the costs are even higher, between 40 and 45 
percent of the value of individual accounts (Orszag and Stiglitz, 1999).
In conclusion, privately managed schemes may have higher expected returns than 
publicly managed ones but when administrative costs are taken into account, the answer
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is not obvious. Further studies and more evidence from international practice are 
needed. Although there is evidence suggesting that the cost for DB is higher for DC20, it 
is unable to conclude which one provides higher returns in general.
Table 3-9 Nominal and Real Returns of T-bond in China Between 1982 and 1996
Year T-bond nominal 
interest rate (in %)
CPI T-bond real 
interest rate (in %)
1982 8.0 2.0 6.0
1983 8.0 2.0 6.0
1984 8.0 2.7 5.3
1985 9.0 11.9 -2.9
1986 10.0 7.0 3.0
1987 10.0 8.8 1.2
1988 10.0 20.7 -10.7
1989 14.0 16.3 -2.3
1990 14.0 1.3 12.7
1991 10.0 5.1 4.9
1992 10.0 8.6 1.4
1993 15.2 16.1 -0.9
1994 12.2 25.0 -12.8
1995 14.3 16.8 -2.5
1996 12.0 8.8 3.2
Source: Author’s calculation. Data of CPI are from China Labour Statistics Yearbook, the 
1999 version. CPI is urban Consumer Price Index. T-bond nominal interest rates are 
from The People’s Bank of China Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, 1999.
Table 3-10 Replacement Rate From a 10% Contribution Rate
Real wage Real interest rates (%)
growth 0 2 5 8
( % ) Replacement rates (%)
0 22 40 103 225
2 16 L 27 65 
16 34
160
5 10 78
8 7 11 21 43
Source: World Bank (1996).
Notes added by the author: It is assuming that: (1) individual works for 40 years and has 20 
years of expected retirement; (2) zero rate of inflation; (3) no administrative cost; (4) real 
wage growth = wage growth plus age-eamings growth for the individual worker.
20 For example, Davis (1995: 130) reports that with the same amount of assets, $lm, DB funds costs 2 
percent of total assets in 1995, while DC funds cost 1.4 percent.
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(b) PAYG financing versus advance funding
It is argued that a funded scheme results in more generous pensions than a PAYG 
scheme; some studies21 have shown a return on pension funds exceeding the return 
implicit in a PAYG scheme.
Samuelson (1958) and Aaron (1966) showed that the implicit real interest rate (R) paid 
on contributions under a PAYG scheme should be equal to the sum of annual growth 
rates of the covered population (L ) and annual growth rate of the real average wage 
(W ) of contributors22, that is R= L+ w .In a PAYG system, if income and population 
are growing, workers can pay a more generous pension to current pensioners than those 
received by the previous generation. However, if the real rate of return (r) on savings is 
larger than the income and population growth rate then the pre-fiinded scheme has the 
potential to pay a more generous pension than a PAYG arrangement. Therefore, by 
measuring the real rate of interest r under a funded scheme and the implicit real rate of 
interest R under a PAYG scheme, the return on contributions under the alternative 
schemes can be compared. If the interest rate r is higher than the sum of the growth rate 
of the average wage and that of contributors (r > L +  iv) then funding offers higher 
return to individuals. If it is the other case (r < L + W )  then a PAYG arrangement makes 
pensioners better off.
Table 3-11 shows the annual and average nominal rate of return from the public PAYG 
system in China between 1982 and 1996. The calculations show that during this period 
the average growth rate of the labour force and nominal wage was 3.9 percent and 15.2 
percent respectively, giving a nominal return of 19.1 percent under the current PAYG 
programme. Chou (1999) suggests that the invested assets in the stock market could 
obtain nominal returns between 15-30 percent during the last ten years of the twentieth 
Century. This implies that during this period, had a funded scheme been created, it 
would have been more advantageous than a PAYG scheme.
21 See the Davis’ study for the US, the UK, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and Australia (Davis, 1995), 
the Burtless (2000) and Leimer (1994; 1995) study for the US and the Disney and Whitehouse (1993) 
study for the UK.
22 Supposing both population and wage are evenly growing, there are administrative costs and reserve 
funds in a PAYG scheme with benefits-in-payment adjusted according to average wage growth.
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Table 3-11 Return23 on Contributions to the State Pension in China
(1982-1996)
Year Labour force 
growth rate 
(in %)
Money wage 
growth rate 
(in%)
Nominal return 
from PAYG 
(in %)
1982 6.5 3.4 9.9
1983 3.7 3.5 7.2
1984 7.8 17.9 25.7
1985 4.5 17.9 22.4
1986 5.1 15.8 20.9
1987 5.0 9.8 14.8
1988 3.6 19.7 23.3
1989 3.1 10.8 13.9
1990 2.2 10.6 12.8
1991 1.2 9.3 10.5
1992 6.0 15.9 21.9
1993 3.0 24.3 27.3
1994 2.8 34.6 37.4
1995 2.5 21.2 23.7
1996 2.2 12.9 15.1
Average 3.9 15.2 19.1
Source: Author’s calculation. Growth rates of labour force and money wage are from China 
Labour Statistics Yearbook.
Gong (1997) has calculated the Aaron condition under the public pension systems of 
four OECD countries, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
(see Table 3-12). He has found that there was a large decline in the growth rate of total 
population in the 1960s and 1970s. Although this rate rose slightly after 1979, it shows 
an overall decreasing trend in each of the countries from 1960 to 1994. A similar trend 
on the growth rates of real wages is also seen in the four countries during the period of 
observation. As regards the long-term interest rate, it declined in all four countries 
between 1960 and 1979. After that, it performed a steady increase in the United 
Kingdom and Sweden but decreased again after 1990 following a large increase for 
approximately ten years in the United States and Germany. As a result, the difference 
between long term interest rates and the sum of the growth rates of real wages and of 
population were basically negative before 1979 but positive thereafter. This calculation
23 Since the real rate of return from stocks in China is still unavailable, the comparison is based on the 
nominal term.
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indicates that PAYG systems provided higher returns to individuals than funded systems 
in the 1960s and 1970s, with the situation reversing from the 1980s.
Table 3-12 The Aaron Conditions in Observed OECD Countries 
(B etw een 1960 a n d  1994)
1960-1968 1968-1973 1973-1979 1979-1990 1990-1994
Average growth rate of population
Germany 0.9 0.8 -0.2 0.3 0.5
Sweden 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.7
United Kingdom 0.7 0.4 <0.05 0.2 0.4
United States 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1
Average growth rate of real wages
Germany 5.1 6.4 2.6 1.5 1.5
Sweden 4.8 4.2 2.1 0.4 -0.5
United Kingdom 2.4 4.0 0.7 2.4 2.0
United States 2.2 1.3 -1.3 0.4 0.2
Average Iong term real interest rates
Germany 3.9 3.2 3.2 4.9 4.1
Sweden 1.8 1.1 -4.0 4.0 5.6
United Kingdom 2.6 1.5 -2.0 3.7 5.8
United States 2.2 0.9 -1.1 4.9 4.2
Differences between the long term interest rates and the
sum of the growth rates of population and of rea wages
Germany -2.1 -4.0 0.8 3.1 2.1
Sweden -3.7 -3.7 -2.8 3.3 5.4
United Kingdom -0.5 -2.9 -2.7 1.1 3.4
United States -1.3 -1.5 -0.8 3.5 3.0
Source: Gong, S. (1997). “Defined Contribution Pensions in a Changing World: An Evaluation 
of the World Bank’s Pension Reform Proposals”. Tables 4, 6, 7 and 12. Unpublished 
Paper.
3.2.4 Incentive to Save
In general, high-income workers are more likely to save in private schemes (the saving 
incentive is higher when given tax incentives, which is the focus of the next chapters) 
while low-income workers are basically dependent on public pensions. People who are 
relatively older and need welfare transfer from younger generations may prefer a PAYG 
programme, whereas young workers may prefer a funded scheme. People who have 
lower job mobility may favour a DB plan whilst people who have higher job mobility 
may consider a DC plan superior.
(a) Public schemes versus private schemes
64
Chapter 3
A public pension system usually has the ability to redistribute income from the rich to 
the poor. It provides a safety net for those who are physically weak (sickness and 
invalidity) and financially weak (low-paid workers, women and the elderly). This 
provides some intergenerational risk sharing not found in a private scheme.
Redistribution can be made through either universal or means-tested cash benefits. In 
the universal approach, which pays benefits to all retirees, the benefit level is fixed on a 
digressive scale, i.e. a flat-rate, rather than one linked proportionally to former income 
or to contributions paid. The redistributive effect is even stronger with means testing. 
The benefit is not based on the number of years of employment and previous earnings 
but rather on individuals’ present income. More specifically, the benefits are targeted 
only at those in absolute need, having no or very low incomes thus requiring the 
redistribution of resources across individuals and generations. Even in some countries 
where the employment record is the basis of benefit entitlement, crediting has been 
introduced for periods in which people are caring for children, elderly or disabled or 
other family members. One example is Germany where taking care of one’s own 
children corresponds to previous employment of up to three years in the calculation of 
pensions (Ginn & Arber, 1992). Typically, it is women who undertake these caring 
tasks. Thus, a public pension is regarded to be more desirable than a private one in 
securing women’s economic status. In other words, unlike private pension systems, 
public systems provide for social solidarity and protect against the risk of personal 
misfortune.24
There are many examples of public pension systems, particularly in industrialised 
countries, which have been effective in eliminating or greatly reducing poverty among
24 However, it is worth noting that the effect of redistribution inherent in public schemes may be partially 
offset by differential mortality (Barr, 1998: 219). Some statistics report that people who are ‘lifetime 
poorer’ are less likely to live longer. In the United States, the mortality rate of working age persons in the 
lowest income group is five times that of workers in the highest income group (Pappas et al, 1993). In 
Netherlands the highest income group lives seven years longer than the lowest (Davis, 1995: 32). This 
means that even when a scheme is set up where redistribution is based on earnings and the pension 
received is flat rate, redistribution from rich to poor may in fact be relatively lower. The reason for this is 
that richer people tend to live longer than poorer people and thus receive a pension for a longer period of 
time. For example, it has been found that once differential mortality is taken into account the current state 
pension scheme in the UK (including SERPS) does little to alleviate lifetime income inequality (Stears, 
1999). This may be largely because workers in high-paid occupations have substantially lower mortality 
rates than workers in low-paid occupations (Creedy, Disney and Whitehouse, 1992).
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the elderly and in providing workers with an adequate degree of income replacement in 
old age (Barr, 1998: 218-220; Beattie and McGillivray, 1995: 6). Due to the difficulties 
in searching data for both public and private pension schemes on a comparative basis, 
Table 3-13 shows only the replacement rates of public pension programmes in a number 
of OECD countries. It is noticeable that the data in the table is still not completely 
comparable for many reasons. For example, data for some countries overstates public 
benefits when mandatory supplementary pensions are included. The general conclusion 
from the replacement rates is that public pension schemes in most countries provide 
replacement rates in the region of 60-80 percent. According to Schulz (1980), to 
maintain a living standard as that of before retirement, the elderly need a pension that is 
almost equal to 75 percent of former earnings. From this point of view, it can be 
calculated that the public pensions in all selected countries provide more than 50 percent 
of adequate incomes for the old. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden public pensions can provide adequate incomes of 
80, 106.7, 104, 93.3, 80, 90.7, 93.3, 93.3 and 93.3 percent respectively for the old. That 
is, income maintenance in these nine countries becomes mainly the state’s 
responsibility. The Danish and French Governments have the largest responsibility. Due 
to the generosity of the public system, it is reported that the old are no longer poor in 
comparison to children and young working adults with children in the majority of 
industrialised countries. According the World Bank report in 1994 (The World Bank: 
78-80, Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2), in Australia, Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom poverty rates among children are higher than those of the elderly. In France, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden current income is lower and poverty higher among 
working age adults and children than among the elderly. This means that a public old 
age pension programme is an effective way to reduce poverty among the old aged.
In contrast to public programmes, private pensions fail to provide for any income 
redistribution and intra-generational solidarity. Section 3.2.1 shows that private pensions 
typically favour workers who are highly paid, whilst leaving low-income workers, the 
poor, the elderly and women with inadequate coverage and benefit after their retirement. 
This feature is present in personal pension schemes in particular.
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Table 3-13 Replacement Rate of Public Pension in Selected OECD Countries
Country Replacement rate and description Adequacy of Income(%)
Belgium 60% previous earnings for single person 80.0
Canada 40% for single person including flat rate and 
earnings related pension
53.3
Denmark 80% for single person including basic and 
supplementary pension
106.7
Finland 40-50% actual maximum for 37-42 years of 
coverage
53.3 - 66.7
France 78% of former income including mandated 
occupational pension (private sector 1993)
104.0
Germany 70% after 45 working years 93.3
Italy 60% of previous earnings 80.0
Japan 68% of covered earnings 90.7
Netherlands 70% previous earnings for single person 93.3
Norway 70% for single person including basic and 
supplementary pension
93.3
Sweden 70% including basic and compulsory 
supplementary pension
93.3
UK 40% of former earnings 53.3
US 40% of previous earnings 53.3
Source: Column 1 is selected from Kalisch, David. W. and Aman, T. (1998). “Retirement 
Income Systems: The Reform Process across OECD Countries”, Table 3. OECD 
Ageing Working Paper. Replacement rate for the UK is from Pestieau (1992). Column 
2 is calculated by the author.
(b) PAYG based schemes versus funded schemes
In general, the incentive to save in a funded scheme is larger for young workers than for 
their elder counterparts. There are two reasons. The first is that observed evidence from 
some OECD countries shows that earlier generations do best out of a PAYG scheme. A 
measure to evaluate the monetary worth from a PAYG scheme is referred to as ‘the 
internal rate of return’ by Leimer (1995). The internal rate of return measures the 
interest rate that individuals would have to receive on their contributions to a PAYG 
scheme in order to generate benefits equal to those they would receive under a private 
funded scheme. If the internal rate of return is larger than the interest rate available to
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individuals for their own investments then they receive more than their money’s worth 
from such a PAYG scheme. That is, they receive a higher interest rate or internal rate of 
return from the PAYG scheme than from their same savings in a funded scheme. 
Conversely, if the internal rate of return is smaller than the actual market rate that 
workers can earn privately then they do not get their money’s worth from the PAYG 
programme. Table 3-15 illustrates the internal rate of return under the British social 
security pension scheme and American Old-Age and Survivor Insurance by measuring 
the average returns to each of the selected cohorts. Under the UK system, with price 
indexation under the present law, younger cohorts do considerably worse than older 
cohorts, with those in 1955 and 1960 seeing negative returns on average with continued 
price indexation. Even with earnings indexation, the last two cohorts would see positive 
returns, but only just. Also, under the OASI programme, there is a steep decline in the 
internal rate of return across American cohorts. The estimated internal rate of return 
declines from 36.5 percent for the 1876 cohort to 4.8 percent for the current retirees and 
declines further from 2.2 percent for the cohorts now reaching retirement age to 
approximately 1.9 percent for the cohorts now entering the labour market.
Table 3-15 Internal Rate of Return under the UK and the US’ State Pensions
(Inflation-adjusted)
The UK state pension The US OASI plan
Birth Price indexed Earnings indexed Birth Rate of return
cohort rate of return rate of return cohort
1935 2.4 4.0 1876 36.5
1945 0.4 1.7 1900 11.9
1955 -0.2 0.9 1925 4.8
1960 -0.3 0.8 1950 2.2
1975 1.9
Source: Disney and Whitehouse (1993) and Leimer (1994).
Johnson, Conard and Thomson (1989) conclude that: “The workings of social security 
have created considerable injustices between different generations. If perceived as such, 
this injustice between the generations could foster discontent with future social policies 
and finally, undermine the ‘implicit contract’ between generations on which the welfare 
state is based.” If younger generations see their return eroded relative to their parents’ 
and their predecessors’ they will see funded schemes as being more attractive.
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Second, the ever improving financial markets with more financial instruments, higher 
competition, higher interest rates and new indexed securities will offer better portfolios 
with lower risks to investors. The younger generation, as they obtain more experience 
from security markets and become sophisticated investors, will prefer to have higher 
returns from the financial market, instead of putting money in PAYG pension schemes 
that provide them with unsatisfactory yields.
In China the financial market is constantly improving, thanks to the changes occurring 
in the management mode, from a planned and administrative management to that of a 
market-oriented system and in the investor structure, from a retail to an institutional 
investor-orientation. Furthermore, great changes have already taken place since 1999, 
with the adoption of a string of important measures. These include the lifting of the ban 
on financial companies from accessing stock markets and the participation of insurance 
and social funds as well as SOEs in the market in addition to the setting up of securities 
investment funds. At the same time, China has released or is about to release some 
regulations on the financial market, including the implementation of Securities Law, the 
growing internationalisation of the stock market and soon, the launch of a second board 
similar to the American Nasdaq. At present the listing of rules for the second board has 
been approved by the State Council. It is predicted that the second board will make its 
debut earlier next year (Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao (China Securities), December 
2000). As a result, more financial instruments and higher competition from domestic as 
well as international markets will offer a better investment environment for funded 
pensions in China.
(c) DB versus DC
The question of whether a DB scheme is more attractive than a DC scheme to an 
individual depends on so many factors including the individual’s age or number of years 
of service for the same employer. It also depends on the growth and stability of the 
macro-economy, whether the financial market performs well or badly and how the 
individual trades off between return and risk. In general, a DB scheme is a better choice 
for people who have lower job mobility. There are four important characteristics that 
distinguish a DB scheme from a DC scheme. First, as mentioned earlier, unlike in a DC
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scheme, the individual gains higher return when the economy is booming but suffers a 
loss when the economy is declining; the individual’s return does not reflect market 
returns in a DB scheme because his benefit is predetermined. It is the employer who 
undertakes to top up the fund to keep it in actuarial balance. Therefore, in comparison to 
a DC scheme, a DB scheme involves lower investment risks. Second, a DB scheme can 
provide employees inflation-indexed benefits before their retirement by increasing their 
wages in line with price inflation. Third, a DB scheme provides better insurance than a 
DC scheme due to stricter regulations such as minimum funding rules, premium for 
benefit guarantee, vesting rules, etc.. Some DB schemes also provide non-retirement 
income insurance such as ill-health benefits, death-in-service and survivors’ benefits, 
which are rarely available from any DC schemes (Davis, 1995: 233). Fourth, the pension 
benefits are related to final salary that tends to increase with years of service. Thus, the 
longer the period an individual works for an employer, the higher the pension paid; 
consequently, should he leave employment early, he would lose his pension value.
However, people who have high job mobility may see a DC scheme as more attractive. 
This is because a DC scheme has three main advantages over a DB scheme. First, the 
function of individual account has higher labour flexibility. Workers do not have to 
transfer their retirement accounts into other retirement saving vehicles when changing 
jobs. They can quickly transfer to growing industries or areas away from twilight ones. 
Second, the contribution rate is clearly defined, thus the relationship between the fund’s 
earnings and expected benefits is plain to see. Therefore, a savings account balance is 
easier to understand, as workers know exactly how much is in their individual savings 
account. Third, as future benefits are determined by investment returns, individual 
savers have higher incentive to participate in portfolio management such as choosing 
between assets such as stocks, mutual funds, local or government bonds, industrial 
securities and other financial instruments.
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3.3 The Impact of Funded Private Pensions on Economic 
Development and Growth
This section focuses on two macro-economic issues of pension reform that attract much 
debates: the role of advance funding in generating long-term capitals and increasing 
national saving and in stimulating the development of financial markets.
3.3.1 Funding and Long-term Capital Resources
The question of whether funded pensions increase savings at national level is unclear. In 
the United States, for example, “the extent to which that private pensions have created 
new savings by US households has become polarised. At one end of the spectrum the 
work of Poterba, Venti and Wise has suggested that funds in the schemes have come 
almost entirely from new saving. At the other end of the scale, Engen, Gale and Sholtz 
claim that new saving accounts for almost nothing and that all funds were coming from 
the reshuffling of the assets of the previously wealthy” (Banks, 1996). In China the 
potential effect of private pension funds on national saving has not received much 
attention from the government or economists. This is because China is one of those 
countries that have a substantially high savings rate. The ratio of private savings to GDP 
was between 35 to 40 percent in 2000. The question of how to direct a portion of 
savings flow from other financial assets to private pension assets is the concern of this 
thesis. As Davis (1995: 15-16) puts it “pension funds may have a minor effect on total 
saving, but their crucial effect on the capital markets may be indirect effects in changing 
the composition of saving towards long-term financial saving.”
China has enormous needs for infrastructure and other long-term investments. The 
present pension system in China, which is mainly operated on a PAYG basis, does not 
contribute to this purpose. By the end of 1997, the reserved pension funds were only 
about 78.45bn Yuan, which accounted for 0.11 percent of China’s GDP of that year. On 
the other hand, the World Bank in 1995 projected the demand for infrastructure 
investment for 1995-2004 to be as high as $744bn or 7.4 percent of GDP. Although the 
rate of saving accounts are 35-40 percent of GDP, because long-term saving instruments 
are not available, most household savings are in short- and medium-term deposits,
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which do not provide a good match for long-term lending. The lack of reliable long-term 
financial instruments means that infrastructure investments have to rely on foreign 
financial resources that may require higher interest rates.
Funded pension funds can provide enormous long-term capital funds, thus efficiently 
allocating domestic resources. This is because pension funds have three peculiar 
characteristics: first, inflows and outflows of funds are rather stable and predictable; 
second, liabilities are non-tradable, which means that they have lower withdrawal risks, 
and third, the return on investment can be maximised with a long-term perspective 
(Franco, 1996).25 These features imply that in pension funds the portfolio share of liquid 
assets can be small, while that of long-term bonds and equities can be relatively high. 
The high demand for bonds and equities by pension funds exerts positive effects on 
investment and economic growth, providing more risk-capital to firms and reducing 
long-term interest rates. Therefore, channelling savings into pension funds may be 
beneficial to growing enterprises and long-term investments in China. As Davis (1993) 
argues, this “is seen as beneficial in providing risk capital for growing enterprises, as 
well as offsetting the potential fragility and/or dependence on bank finance which stems 
from high debt/equity ratios”.
The experience from Southeast Asia and Latin American countries shows that funded 
pension schemes contribute to rapid accumulations of long-term financial resources. 
Vittas (1996) reports that the resources of the Central Provident Fund in Singapore rose 
from 28 percent of GDP in 1976 to 73 percent in 1986 and 76 percent in 1990. In 
Malaysia provident fund assets grew from 18 percent of GDP in 1980 to 41 percent in 
1990. In Chile pension funds increased from 1 percent of GDP in 1981 to 9 percent in 
1985, 26 percent in 1990. In both the United Kingdom and the United States pension 
funds, $750bn and $6,000bn respectively, own over 30 percent of their stock market 
values and are equivalent to about 60 percent of their GDP. Some other OECD countries 
also have experienced a pronounced development in pension funds for decades. For 
example, in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Japan pension fund assets as a 
share of GDP, reached 117 percent, 87 percent, 45 percent and 42 percent respectively 
by the end of 1996 (OECD 1998). In industrialised countries pension funds have already
25 Also see Blake, 1995.
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become an important mechanism for capital accumulation. As Minns (1996) observes, 
by the end of 1993, the investment assets (stocks, shares, bonds, cash and property) of 
funded pension schemes throughout the world had amounted to around $10,000bn. This 
figure is larger than the combined total market value of the entire world’s industrial, 
commercial and financial corporations quoted on the three largest world stock markets, 
those of the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.
However, it must be pointed out that the extent to which a move from the current PAYG 
public system to a funded private system would provoke response by Chinese 
individuals may be influenced by the following factors: A: whether pension saving is 
compulsory or voluntary -  mandating saving can overcome the problem of myopia and 
moral hazard, thus increasing savings by those who do not save or do not save enough; 
B: whether pension benefits from public programme are so high that there is no need (or 
income resources) for individuals to save more; C: whether pension funds are provided 
with tax incentives - preferential tax treatments on pension funds may encourage 
taxpayers to save more. These three issues will be dealt with in the remaining chapters, 
although other factors such as the rate of unemployment, rate of growth of wages, 
demographic trend and individuals’ choice between current and future consumption also 
affect individuals’ saving decisions. For instance, Schieber and Shoven (1994) point out 
that the ever-increasing dependency ratio in the United States will make private saving 
fall. According to their estimation, private pension assets in the United States will reach 
their peak in 2030 and fall sharply thereafter.
3.3.2 Funding and Financial Market
Fennell and Zhu (1996) claim that setting up a privatised pension system is possible in 
China. Likening a private funded pension to a boat and a developed financial market to 
water, they argue that “like a boat which is useless without water, private pension funds 
can not run well without an open and functioning financial market”. However, Vittas 
(1996; 1999) suggests that private pension funds are not only a source of long-term 
savings for supporting the development of bond and equity markets. They are likely to 
have a beneficial impact on financial market development once they reach massive size: 
they have a positive force for innovation, for corporate governance and for financial
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market modernisation. Therefore, pension reform need not be delayed until capital 
markets are well established. The positive impact of private pension funds on financial 
markets is evident in some countries that have implemented systemic pension reforms. 
For example, in Argentina financial innovation has been promoted by the newly created 
private pension funds. Chile has seen many developments and improvements in the 
financial sector after the introduction of their new pension system. The financial market 
has become more fluid as the number of traded shares on the stock market and their 
turnovers have increased. Information disclosure and credit rating institutions have 
developed. Varieties of financial instruments including indexed annuities, mortgages 
and corporate bonds have grown and asset pricing has improved (Diamond and Valdes- 
Prieto, 1994: James, 2000). International experience proves that the development of 
pension funds can contribute to at least the following three qualitative developments in 
financial markets:
The first positive effect of pension funds (and other institutional investors) is their 
advantages over corporate governance. Although pension funds have been accused of 
“short-termism” and disrupting the market26 in, for example, the United States 
(Ghilarducci, 1994) and the United Kingdom (Davis, 1993), their character of collective 
management may be superior to individual management. There are three reasons. First, 
the former has the economies of scale in transaction costs in collecting and managing 
information, as well as risk pooling. Second, the institutionalisation of asset 
management may also produce positive effects on corporate governance. Unlike 
individual investors who are passive participants in corporate governance because they 
lack the power or knowledge to delve into the analysis of reports and accounts, 
institutional shareholders can put pressure on firms to focus on return on equity and 
provide more and better quality information to shareholders. This is because they are 
rich in funds and have potential power to exert substantial influence on firms’ 
management (Charkham, 1994). Third, institutional shareholders can better monitor the 
performance of firms and be more effective in replacing persistently poorly performing
26 With the growth of asset accumulation, pension funds will become the dominant shareholders of 
companies. If they are not happy with corporate performance and exercise the exit option, market share 
price will suffer a big fall.
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companies.27 Franco (1996: 12) concludes that “there might be a reason to provide 
incentives (to build up pension funds) where the financial markets are rather 
underdeveloped and there is a need to accelerate the development of institutional 
investors”.
The second positive effect is that the development of pension funds and other 
institutions increases demands for futures and options in response to price volatility in 
financial markets (Bodie, 1990). The need by pension funds for hedging against 
shortfalls of assets relative to liabilities has encouraged the development of 
‘securitisation’ and stimulated the modernisation of capital markets.
Finally, the development of pension funds and other institutions is likely to promote 
competition and efficiency in the financial system. In a bank-based financial system, 
borrowing through commercial banks is the traditional way for companies to finance 
their business. However, security markets develop, companies can access funds through 
non-bank financial intermediaries or directly borrow from security markets. This will 
force all bank and non-bank financial intermediaries to become more competitive. The 
well-developed financial system with high competitions will in turn offer investors the 
opportunity for better portfolio returns and risk management.
As Vittas argues (1999), the stability of the overall economy, low level of inflation and 
effective regulatory and supervisory agencies will determine whether pension funds can 
operate efficiently. This precondition is important, especially for developing countries 
with weak regulatory structures. Also, the development of private pensions requires 
sound, prudent and efficient financial institutions, such as banks and insurance 
companies, to conduct and manage pension contributions and funds. However, it does 
not depend on the prior existence of well-developed security markets.
27 One of the examples is the British company, The Body Shop. See Financial Times, 10 April 1996 and 
13 May 1998.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter compared different pension schemes with particular reference to risk, 
return and incentives to save. It has also addressed the positive effect of funded pensions 
on the Chinese economy and the financial markets.
Public pensions are widely seen as an effective means of income redistribution among 
pensioners, especially through their ability to transfer welfare from rich to poor. They 
can provide generational solidarity through the indexation of pensions to wages. They 
are more efficient in providing insurance against inflation risks. Public pensions 
therefore have the economic benefit of correcting market failure whilst the private sector 
is unable alone to alleviate poverty and to promote social welfare, stability and 
solidarity. Due to the above advantages, public pensions are seen to be more important 
than private pensions by people who do not save or do not save enough in private 
pension schemes because they are low-income earners, short-term workers or physically 
weak. However, public pensions are more vulnerable to political risks. Also, the 
investment of reserves, if any, is more likely to be influenced by political decisions 
rather than returns. On the other hand, privately managed schemes are less likely to 
suffer from political risks. They give individuals more freedom to decide on where and 
how much to save and sometimes, their portfolio management. More importantly, they 
provide people, especially high-income earners, with enough financial resources to 
maintain their standard of living after retirement. However, they are not superior to 
public pensions in terms of protecting investors against financial risks, including 
investment risks and inflation risks. Moreover, world-wide they have shown to have low 
coverage and a non-redistributive nature, failing to transfer income from the rich to the 
poor. With regards the issue of returns, there is no clear answer to the question of 
whether public or private schemes generate higher returns after adjustment for 
administrative costs. International evidence suggests that privately managed pensions, 
especially individual pension contracts, have much higher administrative costs than 
publicly managed ones.
In relation to DB and DC schemes, for the former, benefits paid to pensioners are, in 
general, predetermined whilst for the latter, the pensions’ benefits are dependent on
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returns on assets invested. Therefore, the investment risk is much higher in DC schemes 
than in DB schemes. As regards inflationary risk, indexation of pension benefits is 
easier in DB schemes before individuals’ retirement. However it is easier in DC 
schemes after. Although individuals’ decisions on which type of scheme to save depend 
on many factors such as age, consecutive years of service for the same employer, 
financial market conditions, and attitudes towards risk and return, this chapter suggests 
that DB schemes benefit those who are less likely to change jobs, while DC schemes are 
a better choice for those who expect to change jobs frequently during their working 
lives.
PAYG programmes have financial advantages while the population is growing and, in 
particular, while the number of active workers making contributions is growing more 
quickly than the number of pensioners for whom they must provide retirement benefits. 
However, it is because of this nature that PAYG programmes are financially vulnerable 
to increasing dependency ratio, high unemployment rate and low economic growth, 
which often lead to reductions in benefits. Funded programmes, however, can avoid 
those risks but are more likely to suffer from risks associated with investment and price 
inflation. Funded pension schemes are more attractive than PAYG schemes to young 
workers due to the following two reasons. Individuals see contributions in PAYG 
schemes as taxes because the link between contributions and benefits is not clear, that 
is, contributions paid are not closely related to the pension that is eventually received. In 
contrast, people in funded schemes are less likely to regard their contributions as taxes 
because there is a closer relationship between contributions made and the pension that is 
subsequently paid. Therefore, a close relationship between contribution and benefit in 
funded schemes reduces saving disincentives, especially to younger generations. Funded 
schemes are also seen to be able to generate higher rates of return to contributions than 
PAYG schemes in an era when population growth is slowing down while financial 
markets are improving. However, a move from PAYG to funded systems may not 
necessarily increase the rate of return to individual workers. This is because such a 
move could substantially redistribute the resources away from the transition workers 
who pay twice - that is to save for their own retirement and to pay for current 
pensioners. Also, the increased rate of return from the extra funding may be offset by 
the cost of financing the transition cost. Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) point out that if the
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transition cost is financed by borrowing rather than raising taxes, the interest paid for the 
debt will exactly offset the increased return to the individual accounts. In this case, a 
move toward a pre-fiinded system may not generate a higher rate of return to future 
generations than a PAYG system. However, funded pensions have positive effects on 
the broader economy. They can accumulate long-term savings and also contribute to 
developments and formation of financial markets.
In light of the discussion in this chapter a mixed system is considered to be best for both 
individuals and the economy -  as is recognised by the Chinese government. The next 
two chapters move on to the question of how to promote in China through taxation a 
private pension system, including occupational pensions and personal saving plans. The 
costs of tax incentives to private pensions are estimated in Chapter 6.
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IV. HOW SHOULD PRIVATE PENSIONS BE TAXED?
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapter, within this first decade of the twenty-first 
Century China has to set up a pension system with ‘three tiers’, i.e. a state pension, an 
enterprise supplementary pension and a personal (individual) pension. According to the 
government, the private pension, which includes the enterprise supplementary pension 
scheme and the individual’s saving plan, must become an important component of the 
entire Chinese pension system as the state pension provides pensioners with benefits for 
only basic living. Although the government has been encouraging both enterprises and 
individuals to set up private pension schemes since as early as the beginning of the 
1990s, there has not been much response. In contrast to many industrialised countries 
where private pensions are playing an increasingly important role in providing 
retirement incomes for the elderly, the state pension in China still dominates the pension 
mix. As addressed in the introductory chapter, many reasons could account for the fast 
and high development of private pensions in the majority of industrialised countries, 
such as the relatively low level of public benefits, well-developed financial markets and 
compulsory retirement saving schemes, to mention but a few. This chapter, however, 
examines the way in which most OECD countries promote private pensions through 
taxation.
Chapter Four is structured as follows: the second section studies the general pattern of 
taxation on private pensions in 20 OECD countries and analyses the paramount 
importance of tax incentives to the development of private pensions. The consequence 
of the cut back on tax benefits in New Zealand is also addressed. The third section 
discusses the taxation of return on savings on both equity and efficiency grounds. Two 
fundamental tax systems are compared - the Expenditure Tax system and the Income 
Tax system - focusing on the issue of whether people should be taxed on income or 
consumption. In the following section is addressed the question of whether private 
pensions (savings for retirement) should be taxed differently from savings in general. 
The fifth section discusses the taxation of lump sums and is followed by the conclusion.
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4.2 Tax Experience in OECD Nations
4.2.1 Taxation of Private Pensions in OECD Countries
Andrew Dilnot (1992) suggests that funded private pensions can be taxed at three points 
of their activity: when contributions are paid into the fund from employer or employee; 
when income is earned from the investment of contributions by the fund and when 
retirement benefits are paid from the accumulated fund. Each of these three basic 
transactions can be the object of tax treatment. Dilnot has developed a useful shorthand 
describing the pattern of tax treatments based on each transaction being taxed (T) or 
exempted (E) from taxation. According to this taxonomy, the fiscal treatments of private 
pensions in 20 OECD countries are summarised in Table 5-1. It shows that the general 
feature of the tax treatment in the countries studied can be classified into three main 
regimes. The first regime is “TTT” in which taxes are levied on all three points of 
activity - pension contribution, fund accumulation and benefit distribution. Of all the 
OECD countries observed, Australia is the only country that collects revenues from all 
three transactions.28 It must be noted here that the tax treatment of private pensions in 
China follows the regime mentioned above. In the second regime, returns to pension 
funds are taxed and either contributions or pension payments also are taxed. This tax 
regime can be characterised as “ETT” or “TTE”. Nations following this pattern include 
New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden, Japan and Belgium (for self-administered funds). The 
third regime may be simplified as “EET” or “TEE”, in which either contributions or 
pension benefits are taxed while fund incomes are not. It can be seen from the table that 
this is the most common regime of the OECD countries studied including Finland, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. However, as noted by Dilnot (1993: 6), the shorthand 
“is inevitably a heroic simplification”. One of the remarkable reasons is that in some 
countries where private pensions are taxed, they tend to be taxed more lightly than 
ordinary labour income (when contributions and benefits are compared) and other 
capital income (when fund returns are concerned). Therefore, the shorthand “E” or “T” 
may overstate the degree of taxation in many cases. In table 4-1 “t” (lower case) is used
28 Regime TTT is also operated in Russia for some pension schemes (Vittas, 19980).
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to describe the more generous tax treatments (lower tax rates) of private pensions than 
that of other incomes from labour or capital. Therefore, “t” indicates that either 
contributions to and benefits from pension funds (schemes) are taxed at rates lower than 
marginal income tax rates or funds’ investment incomes are more lightly taxed than 
other forms of saving. Although the simplified regime based on the taxation pattern (T 
or t) and tax exemption (E) can give a general profile of private pension taxation in the 
OECD countries, it is still not possible to interpret the complexity of tax regimes in 
practice. The complexity mainly results from the following four elements: a) enormous 
variations of funding arrangements, e.g. pay-as-you-go or funded, b) limits on 
contributions that can be made while enjoying tax deductibility, c) limits on benefits 
from pension funds and d) different treatments of lump sum payments, e.g. taxed the 
same way as annuities or more generously treated. It is because of the above reasons that 
we turn to a more detailed descriptive analysis of the taxation of pensions in the 
following OECD countries.29
In Australia employee contributions are not deductible but a 10 percent rebate applies to 
the first A$ 1,000 of contributions by employees, subject to an income test. This test 
phases out rebatable contributions by 25 cents for each dollar of income over A$27,000. 
Investment income of the fund is taxed at 15 percent. Capital gains are taxed at the same 
rate after adjustment for inflation. Most pension benefits are included in the recipient’s 
assessable income and taxed at the individual’s marginal rate but a 15 percent rebate is 
available in respect of pensions paid from taxed funds. Lump sum benefits from a fund 
after age 55 are taxed at the rates of zero for the first A$90,474 and 15 percent for 
amounts in excess of this threshold. Therefore, there remains a degree of fiscal privilege 
as the tax rates on labour income (marginal tax rate is 47% for top income earners) and 
other forms of saving (interests and dividends are received as gross and taxed as 
ordinary income) exceed these levels. Thus, the Australian tax regime may be 
characterised as ttt rather than TTT.
In Austria, 25 percent of employee contributions to pension funds are deductible with a 
ceiling of the deduction of Sch10,000 for incomes below Sch700,000. Pension benefits
29 The descriptive analysis is based on three main references. They are Dilnot, A. and Johnson, P. (1993), 
The Taxation of Private Pensions; Davis, E. P. (1995), Pension Funds: Retirement-income Security and
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are taxed as labour income but only 25 percent of the employee’s contribution is taken 
into the tax base. Returns to funds are not taxed. The tax pattern thus characterises TEE 
orEET.
In Belgium there are two different ways of funding a pension scheme - through group 
insurance contracts or self-administered funds - and they are taxed separately and 
differently. Employee contributions to self-administered funds are tax-exempt up to a 
limit. There is a tax on all returns to liquid assets at a rate of 10 percent on interest 
income and 20 or 25 percent on dividends and income from property, as applied to 
investments by other individuals and organisations. In addition there is a 0.17 percent on 
the total fund. Premiums paid from employees to group insurance contracts are subject 
to a special 4.4 percent tax, however, the returns are in general not subject to tax, 
although there is a special tax on returns above the insured minimum needed to cover 
benefit liabilities. This tax is levied at a rate of 9.25 percent with 50 percent deductible 
against profits taxes. Retirement benefits paid from both funds and group insurance 
contracts are taxed as earned income if paid as pensions. However, 80 percent of 
retirement benefits can be paid as lump sums which are taxed at a reduced rate of 16.5 
percent. Lump sums paid from self-administered funds are fully taxed whilst only three 
quarters of total payment are subject to this tax, the rest are taxed at 9.25 percent. 
Therefore, the taxation on the Belgium supplementary pensions can be simplified as tET 
regime (for group insurance contracts) and ETT regime (for self-administered funds). If 
the tax treatment of lump sums is considered, the regimes can be described as tEt and 
ETt respectively.
In Canada, which follows the EET approach, contributions to all types of pension 
fimds, 18 percent of earned income, are tax deductible subject to a maximum of 
C$15,000. Fund incomes are also tax-free. Pension benefits are taxed as ordinary 
income while lump sums are forbidden.
The tax pattern of private pensions in Denmark has followed the ETT model since 
1984. Both employer and employee contributions to supplementary pension schemes are 
fully deductible for tax purposes, though for capital schemes only up to a combined
Capital Markets', and OECD (2000), Tax Database.
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limit of DKr28,400 per year. Since 1984, investment incomes of pension funds are taxed 
if the interest exceeds 3.5 percent of real returns, including realised and unrealised 
capital gains. The tax rate varies year-by-year and is calculated annually; for example, it 
was 44 percent in 1990, 40 percent in 1991, 50 percent in 1993 and 26 percent in 2000. 
Pension payments from supplementary pensions are taxed as earned income while lump­
sum retirement benefits are taxed separately at a flat rate of 40%.
The taxation in Finland also follows the EET regime. Contributions paid for voluntary 
pension insurance of the tax payer and his/her spouse up to Fmk50,000 are deductible 
for both state and municipal tax. However, the amount deductible is subject to certain 
restrictions concerning, for example, the level of forthcoming pension insurance benefit. 
Investment income is free of tax whilst benefits are subject to income tax.
France is another example of the EET tax treatment of pension. The compulsory PAYG 
supplementary private pension schemes are conceded relatively favourable tax 
treatment. Tax exempted contributions to collective pension plan earn points for 
employees. At retirement the points thereby accumulated determine the pension which 
the employee will receive; benefits are paid out of contemporaneous contributions and 
hence there is no funding of future liabilities. Both employer and employee 
contributions are tax deductible up to certain limits above which employer contributions 
are treated as salary. Pension benefits are taxed as income after allowances similar to 
those applied to ordinary income. There are no assets to pay as lump sums benefits. 
Funded pension plans enjoy similar treatment while book reserves are fiscally 
discouraged.
The taxation of private pensions in Germany depends on the method of funding 
occupational pensions. The main type of method is through the use of “book reserve” 
accounting which has no special fund. A company establishing a pension plan and 
promising benefits sets up a reserve in its books and can claim a tax deduction each year 
for allocation to that reserve. Prospective pension liabilities are charged each year 
against the company’s profit and loss account and balance sheet. Charges computed in 
accordance with bases agreed by the tax authorities can be deducted in assessing 
corporation tax liabilities. Scheme members rank with other creditors in the event of
83
Chapter 4
insolvency of the parent company; hence legislation requires that benefits and pensions 
in payment should be insured through membership of the solvency insurance scheme, 
“Pensionsicherungsverein For the book reserve type of pension there is no tax charge 
to employees until pensions are paid. So, a book reserve type of supplementary pensions 
follows the common EET pattern of taxation. For the direct insurance funds and 
provident funds, the taxation is rather different. Contributions are considered as taxable 
income while pension benefits are taxed very lightly if paid as a pension (only interest 
earned after pension payments have begun is subject to tax) and not at all if paid as a 
lump sum. Generally speaking, direct insurance and provident pension funds are subject 
to TEE type of tax regime. However, book-reserved funds and support funds account for 
more than 60 percent of pension liabilities.
Ireland has a well-developed private pension system as in other English-speaking 
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Contributions from both 
employers and employees are fully tax-deductible up to a maximum of 15 percent of 
annual salary. Fund incomes are free of taxes and pension benefits are taxed as ordinary 
income. Therefore the system is the EET regime. However, lump sum payments made 
under approved superannuation schemes are not taxable up to 1.5 times of final salary. 
This treatment does not apply to other forms of saving. Thus, the realistic tax system 
may be an EEt.
Supplementary private pensions in Italy are minimal due to the existing generous public 
pension programmes. The current small number of funded schemes is taxed very similar 
to regime EET or EEt. Employer contributions are tax deductible if satisfying certain 
conditions such as being a collective agreement and being run by a clearly defined 
separate legal entity. Employee contributions are limited up to L2.5mn. Benefits are 
taxed as ordinary income while lump sums are more lightly taxed.
In Japan, employee contributions into Employees’ Pension Funds (introduced in 1966 
for large firms with 500 or more employees who can contract out of earnings related 
social security) can be fully deductible from their income. Employees’ contributions for 
Qualified Retirement Pension Funds (introduced in 1962 and available to small firms) 
are deductible from income up to a ceiling of Y50,000. A rate of 1.127 percent special
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tax is levied on the proportion of the stock of assets of the fund contributions by the 
employer. There is a tax-free allowance for Employees’ Pension Funds but not for 
Qualified Retirement Pension Funds. Lump sums are more lightly taxed than annuities. 
Thus the tax regime basically follows the regime of EtT or Ett.
The tax system in Luxembourg is close to the TEE regime. Employee contributions to 
supplementary private pension schemes are deductible up to an annual ceiling of 
LUF48,000. However, these contributions are taxed by a withholding tax of 25 percent 
paid by the employer. The pension annuity and lump sums paid under the pension 
scheme are exempted of income tax. However, contributions to voluntary pension 
insurance are deductible up to an annual ceiling of LUF48,000. Pension annuities are 
taxed as ordinary income. The tax regime is accordingly EET.
In New Zealand, the reform in the late 1980s and the early 1990s brings the tax regime 
from EET to TTE. Neither employee nor employer contributions are deductible but 
pension benefits are exempted from income taxes. Investment incomes on funds are 
currently treated as all other forms of saving, taxed at 33 percent.
The tax system of private pension schemes in Norway characterises the EET regime. 
Contributions to individual pension agreement schemes (IPA) are deductible up to a 
maximum amount of NOK40,000. Premiums and contributions to occupational pension 
schemes in the private and public sector are unlimited. Investment returns are not 
taxable while benefits are subject to income tax.
The Spanish supplementary pension schemes are currently taxed under the EET type of 
treatment, subject to some conditions. Under the current law contributions to funds are 
not taxed if funds satisfy some criteria including immediate vesting, full external 
funding, non-discriminatory coverage of all employees and a high degree of workers’ 
participation. For example, unfunded liabilities of PAYG and book reserve schemes, 
which do not comply with the conditions, are not deductible for tax purposes. Fund 
returns are not subject to tax while benefits are taxed as ordinary income.
85
Chapter 4
Until 1991, pensions in Sweden were taxed under a regime very close to EET. The 1991 
reform entails all annual earnings on private pension funds subject to tax in order to 
improve equity with other forms of saving though contributions to pensions remain tax- 
exempt. The tax rate is 10 percent for the compulsory pension schemes FTP and STP 
and 15 percent for foreign insurance and individual insurance contracts. However, it 
must be noted that returns on other forms of saving are taxed at 30 percent in Sweden. 
Therefore, the Swedish tax regime of supplementary pension funds is EtT rather than 
the standardised ETT.
In Turkey, private pensions are fiscally privileged. According to the OECD surveys 
(OECD, 1994; 2000), there was no tax imposed on Turkish private pension schemes. 
Employee contributions were fully deductible from the wage income.30 Employer 
contributions were considered to be part of the employee’s wage income and were fully 
deductible from the business profits of the employer. Interests accruing in pension funds 
were exempt from tax.31 Annuities and lump sums made by private pension schemes 
were exempt from personal income tax. This means that private pensions were treated 
under the EEE model.32 However, in Turkey other savings instruments were also lightly 
taxed. For example, bank interests were subject to withholding tax at 10.5 percent. This 
tax rate was lower than the top marginal income tax rate of 40 percent. Moreover, 
although investing in government bonds and treasury bills was subject to withholding 
tax the rate however applied to assets was 0 percent. In addition, saving through life 
insurance companies was treated similar to private pensions. Employee contributions 
were deductible33 and annuities were tax-free.
The United Kingdom follows the EET or the EEt regime. As noted in Chapter 4, under 
the current law pension contributions to “tax-approved” personal or occupational 
pension plans are tax-free up to certain ceiling. Income generated by pension funds from 
the accumulation of the returns on assets is also exempt from tax. When a pension is 
paid it is treated as earned income and taxed accordingly. Part of an individual’s pension
30 With ceilings.
31 Subject to some restrictions.
32 Apart from Turkey, Singapore and Malaysia also implement the EEE regime with no taxes on any 
pension transactions (The World Bank, 1994: 215).
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rights, equivalent to 25 percent of accumulated value, can be paid out as a tax-free lump 
sum. However, non-approved schemes are taxed separately. There are no limits on 
contributions, but no tax relief is given for non-approved schemes. An employer can 
obtain a deduction from profits only if the employee is taxed on their own contributions. 
All income of non-approved schemes derived from holding investments will be taxable 
in the hands of the scheme managers at the basic rate only. Pensions and annuities are 
taxable at the scheme member’s marginal tax rate. Lump-sum benefits are tax exempted. 
Attention must be paid to the fact that all benefits (including lump-sum payments) from 
non-approved unfunded occupational schemes are liable for income tax.
In the United States, tax privileged ‘qualified retirement plans’ are defined by the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA). Employer contributions are tax-deductible up to certain limits and 
income on investments is deferred until the pension is paid out. The overall tax 
advantages to pension savings have led to enormous growth in pension funds. Since 
employee contributions are not tax-exempt, there are very few contributions made from 
employees. Therefore the actual tax pattern of employer pension in the United States 
may be an EET regime rather than a TET regime. However, employee contributions to 
personal pensions, i.e. the Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) in the States, are 
deterred until pensions are paid at retirement. There is no tax levied on accumulated 
funds. Thus IRAs follows the EET regime.
Following these general description four important points must be addressed. First, most 
OECD countries have tax deduction for pension contributions from both employers and 
employees. Only a few countries impose taxes on employee contributions although 
employer contributions are tax-deductible up to a ceiling. In countries where employee 
contributions are deductible, deduction is always subject to limits or conditions in order 
to prevent abuse by high-income earners. At present the tax arrangement of enterprises 
supplementary pensions in China discriminates against employee contributions. 
Employer contributions made on behalf of employees may be deductible, but employee 
contributions are not in general deductible. A sensible policy change would be the 
introduction of employee contribution deductibility, in which case it would not matter
33 Also subject to some limits.
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whether contribution were from the employer or the employee as they would receive the 
same tax treatment. Such an arrangement would also serve to encourage higher 
employee contributions and thus improve compliance rates.
The second point is the tax treatment of unfunded pension plans. In Japan contributions 
to unfunded schemes are only partly deductible while in the United Kingdom unfunded 
schemes would not gain any tax privileges. Book reserves and PAYG plans were 
outlawed in Belgium in 1985 and in Spain in 1987. Only few countries such as France 
(PAYG) and Germany (book reserves) support unfunded pension schemes by tax 
privileges similar to that of English-speaking countries with employer and employee 
contributions and investment incomes exempt. An unfunded pension scheme based on 
either a PAYG system or book reserve accounting has at least three disadvantages. First, 
there is a lack of employee protection in the event of bankruptcy; second, it exacerbates 
the difficulty of portability of pensions from one employer to another (in a DB scheme 
in particular); last, but not least, it does not contribute to long-term capital 
accumulations. The issue of whether unfunded plans should be tax-supported must be 
carefully considered.
Third, most countries exempt investment income from income tax. Only six countries 
studied subject to tax any investment income; they are Australia, Sweden, Denmark, 
Japan, Belgium and New Zealand. However, in the first three countries, at least, the 
taxation arrangements are in fact considerably more generous than other forms of 
saving. As noted in the case of Australia, returns on pension funds are taxed at 15 
percent whilst returns on other forms of saving are taxed as ordinary income on which 
the tax rate can reach as high as 47 percent for top income earners. In Sweden the tax is 
levied at just 10 to 15 percent against 30 percent on other forms of capital income. In 
Denmark the tax rate is 26 percent for fund returns, while it could be as high as 57 
percent for income from bank deposits and government bonds (dividends are taxed at 
25%). Obviously this tax system most benefits taxpayers at the highest income-tax 
bracket. It is worth noting that in Australia investment income is taxed after being 
adjusted for inflation. In Denmark this takes the form of upper limits on real rates of 
return (i.e. any investment income in excess of a specified limit of real returns is liable
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to tax). The question of whether to tax investment income of private pensions is 
discussed in Section 4.4 of this chapter.
Fourth, lump sum payments from pension schemes are taxed more lightly in one third of 
the OECD countries studied, among which United Kingdom and Ireland allow tax-free 
lump sums of about 1.5 times the final salary. However, most countries treat lump-sum 
payments in the same way as pension annuities. Noticeably, in Canada and France lump 
sum payments from tax-privileged pension regimes are not allowed. In many OECD 
countries lump sum payments are an increasingly common cause of diminishing pension 
funds and payments as they are used by individuals for home purchases, medical, 
educational and holiday expenses. So how should lump sums be taxed? Should they 
enjoy more generous tax treatment than pension annuities or be taxed more heavily to 
ensure that the retirement income stream lasts throughout the life span of the 
beneficiary? Policy issues concerning the tax treatment of lump sums are discussed in 
Section 4.5.
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Table 4-1 Fiscal Treatment of Private Pensions in some OECD Countries
Employee Fund Benefits Simplified tax regime
contributions(a) returns Pensions Lump sum(b) Excluding 
Lump sum
Including 
Lump sum
Australia Taxed at low rate Taxed 
at 15%
Taxed at low 
rate
More generous ttt ttt
Austria 25% deductible Exempt 25% taxed As annuities EET(TEE) EET(TEE)
Belgium Exempt/Taxed Taxed/
Exempt
Taxed More generous ETT/
tET
ETt/
tEt
Canada Deductible Exempt Taxed Not permitted EET EET
Denmark Deductible Taxed 
at 26%
Taxed Taxed at 
40%
EtT -
Finland Deductible Exempt Taxed As annuities EET EET
France Deductible Exempt Taxed Not permitted EET EET
Germany Deductible/T axed Exempt Taxed/ 
Lightly taxed
As annuities EET/
TEt
EET/
TEE
Ireland Deductible Exempt Taxed 1.5 times of final 
salary tax free
EET EEt
Italy Deductible Exempt Taxed More generous EET EEt
Japan Deductible Taxed 
at 1.127%
Taxed More generous EtT Ett
Luxembourg Deductible/T axed Exempt Exempt/
Taxed As annuities
TEE/
EET EET
New
Zealand
Taxed Taxed 
at 33%
Exempt - TTE -
Norway Deductible Exempt Taxed As annuities EET EET
Portugal Deductible Exempt Taxed More generous EET EEt
Spain Deductible Exempt Taxed As annuities EET EET
Sweden Deductible Taxed at 
10 or 15%
Taxed As annuities EtT EtT
Turkey Deductible Exempt Exempt - EEE -
U.K Deductible Exempt Taxed 25% total values 
tax free
EET EEt
U.S Deductible/T axed Exempt Taxed As annuities TET/
EET
TET
EET
Source: (1) OECD (2000: 14; 60-66) The OECD Tax Database.
(2) Dilnot, A. and Johnson, P. (1993: 7-16) The Taxation of Private Pension.
(3) Davis, E. P. (1995: 88-88) Pension Funds: Retirement-income Security and Capital 
Markets.
(a) In most countries, employer contributions are deductible up to certain ceilings. This 
table summarises the tax status of contributions from employees to private pensions 
only.
(b) Compared to pension benefits.
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4.2.2 Tax Incentives and Pension Development
A considerable body of empirical work has proved the significant effect of personal 
income tax on the individual’s portfolio composition. Studies by Feldstein (1976) and 
Hubbard (1985) for the US, Dick-Mireaux and King (1983) for Canada, King and Leape 
(1984) for the UK, and Agell and Edin (1990) for Sweden have unexceptionally found 
strong effects of tax on the decisions of households as to what assets to hold. Tax 
privileges afforded pension funds make them an attractive means of saving for workers 
and have thus inspired their development in OECD countries. In assessing public 
policies underlying the expansion of pensions in the United States, Ippolito (1986: 16) 
points out that the US pension asset is not subject to a natural rate of growth. Its 
development and even its existence depend on an underlying demand for pensions by 
workers and enterprises, heavily influenced by the tax advantages afforded those 
pensions. He estimates that for workers earning the median wage, 20 percent of pension 
income during retirement would otherwise be taken in higher taxes if preferential tax 
status were not afforded to pension plans. For workers earning more than the median 
wage, the tax benefit could amount to 40 percent of their retirement income. According 
to him, the tax theory of pension fund growth would be quite a powerful predictor of 
their development. More specifically, pension coverage would be greatest for those 
facing the highest tax rates, as would pension fund growth which would be greatest 
when tax rates are highest. A regression analysis conducted by Davis (1995: 58) has 
found that a deviation from favourable tax treatment of pensions (i.e. EET or TEE) is 
related to a 21 percent higher funding. He suggests that the tax advantage afforded to 
pension funds would be the main reason for their growth or even their existence (1995: 
23).
Although more empirical researches are required to prove a causal connection between 
preferential tax treatments and developments of private pensions, it is clear that saving 
flows are very sensitive to tax incentives, given the experience in some OECD 
countries. The United Kingdom saw far-reaching changes in the supplementary pension 
system after the introduction of the 1986 Social Security Act, which aimed at 
encouraging the growth of defined contribution pension plans and personal pensions. In 
1987 tax-privileged assets attracted about three-quarters of the total flow of UK savings
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(Leape, 1990). By 1994 two-thirds of employees in Britain were covered by private 
contracted-out pension schemes (Barrientos, 1998). In the United States Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) were first introduced in 1974 to provide a tax-preferred 
saving program for employees without pension plans. The tax advantage was the ability 
to defer paying taxes on the pension contribution until the assets were withdrawn at 
retirement, with no taxes being paid on accumulated funds. In 1981 eligibility was 
increased to all households and limits were increased under the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act. In one year contributions rose from $5bn to $28bn and by 1986 IRA saving 
represented about one fifth of aggregate personal saving. In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
high income tax payers with employer-provided pensions were excluded from making 
tax-deductible contributions. Total contributions immediately fell by 62 percent in 1987 
and since then have remained low (Hubbard and Skinner, 1996).
The sensitivity of saving flows to tax incentives is also evident from the changes in tax 
policies in New Zealand. Historically tax privileges were given to private pensions 
especially occupational pensions, in almost all industrialised countries. In other words, 
OECD countries employed broadly the same tax rules: no taxes applied to contributions 
and fund income until pensions were paid out, i.e. the EET type of tax system. However, 
since late 1980s and early 1990s some countries, including Sweden, Denmark and New 
Zealand, have made radical changes by taxing fund returns. It is noticeable that New 
Zealand has taken the boldest steps by taxing all contributions and fund incomes under 
the same tax rate as other forms of saving.
In New Zealand from December 1987, employee contributions were made from after­
tax income to superannuations (private pensions); since 1989 employers’ contributions 
have been taxed at 33 percent and since 1990 asset returns have also been taxed at 33 
percent.34 Pensions are thus treated exactly the same as all other forms of saving. 
According to Stephens (1993: 54), ‘The real reason was a desire to bring forward tax 
revenue for budget deficit purposes.” Another main purpose of the reform, explained by 
the OECD (1993a: 10), was to improve the neutrality of the tax system by no longer 
selectively favouring one form of savings over another.
34 See Dilnot (1992), Stephens (1993). The reform is extensively examined in OECD (1993).
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It is not surprising that the New Zealand pension industry saw a great deal of response 
by sponsors and pension companies immediately after the tax reform. Some pension 
schemes, including the Government Superannuation Fund (GSF) and those offered by 
the National Provident Fund (NPF)35, reduced pension benefits to existing and future 
pensioners. Personal pension schemes, such as those offered by Life Offices that had 
been proved to be a useful and tax-effective way for individuals to supplement their 
state pensions, were closed to new members following the 1987 reform. The ability of 
members to transfer funds to another scheme declined sharply from 50 percent of 
surveyed schemes in 1989 to only 24 percent in 1990. The trend away from defined 
benefit schemes to defined contribution schemes accelerated sharply in 1989-1990 in 
response to the increased cost of private pension provision brought about by the tax 
changes. According to data from the Government Actuary, the relative size of private 
pension funds fell from 18 percent of GDP in 1987 to 16 percent in 1990. On the other 
hand, due to the preferential tax treatment on house purchases, which provides imputed 
income tax-free together with a tax-free capital gain, the most important form of savings 
by individuals in New Zealand has been the purchase of a house. It is reported that the 
percentage of elderly people living in mortgage-free owner-occupied housing has been 
quite high: in the 1986 census 73 percent of those aged 60 and over lived in their own 
mortgage-free houses (OECD, 1993a: 27).
The New Zealand story has proved the assertion by Ippolito (1986), Davis (1995) and 
Clark and Wolper (1997) that were the preferential tax status of employer-sponsored 
pension plans removed by taxing the earnings of those pension funds, the price of a 
dollar of retirement income for a pension participant would increase sharply. The 
increase in the price of retirement benefits to workers would be expected to substantially 
reduce the demand for employer-provided retirement plans.
Some other countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway and the 
Netherlands also have considered or been considering reforming their pensions tax 
systems by introducing the tax regime of ETT or TTE in attempt to make them less 
generous. However, no propositions have been put into force. In Norway, for example, a
35 GSP covers central government employees. NPF covers local government employees, and also provides 
superannuation for individuals, companies, and industries in the private sector.
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commission was appointed in 1993 to investigate the tax issue under the proposal of 
subjecting pension funds to a wealth tax (plus a capital gains tax on the interest in the 
fund). Although the commission found no strong savings arguments for continuing to 
treat private pensions more favourably than other types of savings, the tax preferences 
are still maintained (Overbye, 1999). One of the important reasons for this policy 
decision is that during the 1990s there were a series of mergers between banks and 
insurance companies, reducing pressures from banks to equalise tax treatment of 
pensions and other financial assets. In Canada, for another example, considerations of 
whether to continue the preferential tax treatments for Registered Pension Plans (RPPs) 
and Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) under the present income tax 
structure are controversial. They have always been the concern of policy actors and 
experts. Due to the high income tax in Canada36, it has been believed that removing tax 
privileges for private pensions by taxing fund incomes can broaden the annual income 
tax base and bring the personal income tax rates down. This has been argued to be good 
policy under the assumption that it would be fair and efficient. However, due to the fact 
that taxation of saving would bring other forms of inequality and inefficiency to the 
economy, it is hard to conclude that a broad-based income tax with low rates is efficient 
or fair. Therefore, whether the preferential tax treatment on pension funds should be cut 
in Canada is still an open question.
Should private pensions be taxed as other forms of saving (referred to as ‘levelling 
down’ in the UK) or should other forms of saving be taxed as private pensions (referred 
to as ‘levelling up’ in the UK)? This is a question of whether it is generally a good idea 
to tax return on savings (i.e. is EET/TEE better than TTE/ETT, or vice versa?), which is 
discussed in the next section.
36 In Canada, the standard federal tax rate is 29 percent (on taxable income in excess of C$6000). A 5 
percent high-income surtax also applied to basic Federal tax in excess of C$15500. Thus the combined 
Federal top rate is 30.45 percent. The average rate of Provincial income tax is 18.1 percent, not deductible 
for Federal tax purposes. Thus, the combined top income tax rate is 48.6 percent (OECD, 2000).
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4.3 Should Savings be Taxed?
This section focuses on the tax treatment of savings in the light of debates and reforms 
on tax advantages to private pensions in some OECD countries. It compares the two 
alternative models of personal income taxation that are usually considered as terms of 
reference in the analysis of the tax treatment of savings: the Income Tax system and the 
Expenditure Tax system. The comparative analysis centres on the taxation of return on 
savings on the grounds of economic equity and efficiency.
4.3.1 Equity
An income tax system (IT) aims at taxing all forms of income equally. Income is usually 
defined in a very broad sense that includes capital gains. According to Schanz-Haig- 
Simons and many other supporters of the income tax system37, income is the accretion 
to power to consume. It consists of a person’s actual consumption (Ct) plus or minus 
any increase or decrease in the value of his power to consume in the future as measured 
by his net worth (AWt). Therefore the tax base for IT can be expressed as the algebraic 
sum of (Ct + AWt). Income consists of wages, interest receipts, dividends, rents and 
capital gains. Alternatively, income may be defined as potential consumption, i.e., actual 
current consumption plus consumption forgone, as reflected in increased net worth. An 
expenditure tax system (ET), advocated by Kaldor in 195538, is equal to the Schanz- 
Haig-Simons income less net saving. Net saving is equal to the increase in a person’s 
net worth. The tax base of ET is equivalent to IT excluding the yield of capital (Rt), 
which is (Ct + AWt - Rt). Under the ET system savings are exempt while only 
consumption expenditure is taxed. A tax on expenditure could be implemented through 
three approaches. The first way of taxing only expenditures is through indirect tax, such 
as VAT. The second is a pre-paid expenditure tax (PET). Thus, interest receipts, 
dividends, rents and capital gains would all be exempt. The third is referred to as
37 See Goode, ‘The Economic Definition of Income” in Comprehensive Income Taxation edited by 
Pechman in 1977. According to Musgrave (1968), the concept of income was first proposed by George 
Schanz in 1896. It was developed systematically by Henry Simons in 1938 in Personal Income Taxation.
38 The introduction of the idea of an expenditure tax may have been earlier than income tax. Earlier as in 
the Seventeenth Century Hobbes argued that equity requires taxing people in accordance with what they 
consume rather than what they earn (Kaldor, 1955: 11).
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registered-asset expenditure tax (RET). This approach, which taxes economic activities 
on cash-flow basis, postpones the taxation on amount saved until it is spent, at which 
point the savings and the return are taxed.
The relative merits and demerits of IT and ET have been extensively examined in the 
literature.39 Advocators of the ET regime put forward three main justifications. First 
they argue that the taxpayer must be taxed in line with what he “takes out of the social 
pot” and not what he “contributes to society” (Kaldor, 1955). Second, the ET regime 
does not cause double taxation of savings involved in an IT regime. Under ET tax is 
payable only when consumption occurs hence no tax is due on the part of income that is 
saved. Under IT, on the other hand, the taxable income includes not only the receipt of 
income but also the return obtained by lending or investing any savings made out of 
after-tax income. Therefore, under the ET system a man who lives on a certain scale and 
obtains his income from work is not more severely taxed than another man who secures 
the same standard of living from capital (ibid: 89). Finally, ET is better than IT if it is 
believed that a tax system based on lifetime income generates higher equity than one 
based on annual income (Goode, 1980: 55).
The supporters of an Income Tax system build their arguments upon the following three 
main aspects. First, they believe that an equitable tax system must take proper account 
of ability to pay. IT is better than ET in measuring a person’s ability to pay because the 
total increase in a person’s power to consume is a better indicator of ability to pay than 
the exercise of the power to consume. A person’s decision to save a portion of his 
income is an individual choice and does not lessen his capacity to satisfy his private 
wants (Goode, 1980: 52-53). Exempting returns on savings results in an incomplete 
measure of ability to pay which would lead to greatly enhanced savings by the richer 
classes, and thus to an even more unequal distribution of wealth in the long run. The 
second argument for IT as a model for personal income taxation states that private 
investment is a withdrawal from the common pool, therefore private savings should be 
taxed in order to restrain the private use of economic resources (ibid: 53). The third 
argument against the exemption of savings (perhaps not so convincing) is that savings
39 Among the most influential works see Kaldor (1955); Mead (1978); Pechman (1980) and Auerbach & 
Kotlikoff (1987).
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result in the ownership of property. The services provided by the state to property 
owners are more extensive and cost more than those provided to the community at large. 
Therefore it is fair to require property owners to pay more taxes than others (Kaldor, 
1955: 88).
4.3.2 Efficiency
Although there are arguments for equity from each side, however, the Income Tax 
regime causes economic inefficiency that does not occur in the Expenditure Tax regime. 
In other words, it discourages private savings by a distortion of the choice between 
current and future consumption.
The distinct effects of the two systems on the timing of consumption can be illustrated 
algebraically. Suppose that an individual has an income that amounts to Y and tc is the 
current rate of income tax (tax rate on goods under an ET). His current consumption CC 
can be expressed mathematically as follows:
CC = ( l - f c )x F
Suppose that the same individual decides to postpone his current consumption by 
investing or lending the post-tax income and earns interest i, interest i being the 
premium for deferring consumption. Since saving is not taxed under an ET system, the 
future consumption FCet will be
FCfj = ( l - t c )x Y x ( l  + i)
In this case, the individual can choose between consuming now (1 - t c )x Y  or deferring
current consumption by saving and having an extra-value of ( l - t c ) x Y x i  to spend in
future. With the interest i he can earn from his saving, the individual would evaluate 
current versus future consumption at the rate of:
CC _ ( l - f c ) x y  
FCct ” ( l - r c )x 7 x ( l  + i)
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It can be seen from the above equation that the ET system is fiscally neutral between 
consumption now and consumption in future. Therefore it does not affect the 
individual’s decision on when to consume.
However, under an IT system the situation is different owing to the tax u imposed on the 
interest i, in which case future consumption is:
FCn  = ( l - f c ) x r x [ l  + ix ( l- f ,) ]
Under these circumstances, the individual can only have an extra value of 
( l - t c ) x Y x ix ( l  + )  on his future consumption. It is apparent that the individual now 
evaluates current versus future consumption at the rate of:
CC ^  (1 - t c )x Y
FCn ~ ( l - / c )x y x [l + i x ( l - f i)]
If the individual would prefer to consume in the future ( l - f c )x F x ( l + i) to the 
detriment of current consumption ( l - r c )xT  but at the same time he would rather 
consume in the present instead of consuming in the future an amount of 
( l - r c )x 7 x [l + i x ( l - r i.)], then the tax on the interest will have been the cause of an 
economic inefficiency.
A numerical example may demonstrate the different effects of the two tax systems upon 
the return on the individual’s savings (Table 4-2). Suppose that an individual has earned 
$100 of dispensable income and that there is a tax on either his income or consumption. 
It is assumed that the tax rate, 50 percent, is identical under the two tax systems. The left 
part of Table 4-2 shows that without saving the individual would add the same amount 
of value to his current consumption ($50) after paying either of IT or ET taxes. 
However, instead of spending the $100 he saves his income, postponing his 
consumption tax payment until the savings are consumed. He can lend or invest his 
savings and obtain a return of 10 percent by doing so. The right part of the table is clear 
that, with a 50 percent tax rate, under the IT regime the individual has the choice of 
spending on consumption a single lump sum of either $50 now or $52.5 in future and
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under the ET regime (either under the RET tax method where the return to saving is 
allowed to be exempt or the PET tax method where the taxation on the amount saved is 
postponed until consumption), a choice of spending on consumption a single lump sum 
of either $50 now or $55 in future. Thus, if the individual decides to save rather than to 
spend he will obtain a return of only 5 percent on his postponed consummation under 
the IT regime but a full 10 percent on his postponed consumption under the ET regime.
The above example shows that there is a fundamental difference between the two tax 
systems upon the return to savings. Under the IT system the after-tax rate of return (5%) 
is lower than the pre-tax rate of return (10%). Under the ET system, on the other hand, 
he can obtain an after-tax return from saving which is equal to the pre-tax rate of return 
on loans or investments (10% for both). Kaldor states that when one consumes an 
income from saving, he consumes more than he would have consumed if he had spent 
the original money instead of saving it. The income from saving is the economic reward 
of “waiting” or compensation for “abstinence”. The Income Tax system “reduces the 
economic ‘reward from waiting’ not only absolutely but relatively to other things; it 
disturbs the relationship of prices between present goods and future goods, in favour of 
present goods” (Kaldor, 1955: 87). The Expenditure Tax system (on either a PET or a 
RET tax basis), on the other hand, generates a post-tax return to the investor on any 
asset which is identical to the pre-tax return; that is, the set of investments that are 
privately worthwhile in the presence of the tax is exactly the set that would be 
worthwhile in the absence of the tax. The PET method, i.e. the pre-paid expenditure tax, 
even “imposes an effective zero tax rate on the returns to savings in all forms...the 
government is effectively a ‘sleeping partner’ in every act of saving and does not 
decrease the return to the saver”. (Capital Taxes Group, 1989: 17). Therefore, as far as 
saving is concerned the difference between pre- and after-tax rate of return to 
individuals under the IT system creates an inefficiency that does not occur under the ET 
system. It discourages private savings, indeed, it encourages individuals to consume 
rather than to save. To what extent the Income Tax regime discourages savings would 
depend on the elasticity of individual saving with respect to the rate of return received 
by savers. The more elastic the saving to return, the lower would be the level of private 
saving resulting from the taxation on returns.
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Turning to private pensions, an IT system would require the taxation of investment 
income earned by the fund plus either contributions paid to the fund or pensions paid 
from the fund. Within the tax regimes in OECD countries studied at the beginning of 
this chapter, ETT model (or EtT in Belgium, Denmark, Japan and Sweden) and TTE 
model (New Zealand) are consistent with the IT approach. On the other hand, an ET 
system would require the taxation of contributions (PET) or, alternatively, the taxation 
of pensions (RET). Therefore, the choice must be between the TEE or EET models.
Table 4-2 Tax Treatment of Saving under the IT and ET Systems
With 0% saving With 100% saving
Tax regime IT ET Tax regime rr ET(RET) ET(PET)
Gross income 100 100 Gross income 100 100 100
Tax on IT 50 0 Tax on IT 50 0 0
Tax on ET 0 50 Tax on ET 0 0 50
Net consumption 50 50 Post-tax saving 50 100 50
Gross return (10%) 5 10 5
Tax on IT 2.5 0 0
Tax on ET 0 5 0
Increased 2.5 5 5
consumption 
Net consumption 
Rate of return on
52.5
5%
55
10%
55
10%
postponed
consumption
Source: Author’s calculation.
4.4 How Should Saving for Retirement be Taxed?
Noting that returns from most forms of saving are treated as taxable income in most 
world nations (basically the ETT/TTE model), the current tax treatment of private 
pensions in the majority of member countries of the OECD implies that pension funds 
are given fiscal privileges. In other words, retirement savings are taxed more lightly than 
other forms of savings flows. This section therefore discusses the issue of whether 
private pensions be treated more favourably than other forms of saving. Section 4.4.1 of 
this section provides arguments for preferential tax treatments for private pensions, 
while the issue of distortion between different forms of saving is addressed in Section 
4.4.2.
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4.4.1 Justifications for Providing Tax Privileges to Private Pensions
In the 1980s governments of many OECD countries made statements that fiscal 
neutrality between different forms of saving is an important goal but only New Zealand 
made dramatic change towards it by removing tax advantages to private pension 
schemes. Why should private pensions be treated more favourably? Individuals have 
different options between different forms of saving. They may put part of their income 
in a pension plan during their working life to receive annuities after retirement or can 
put money in banks for contingencies, buy government bonds, invest in stocks or buy a 
house. In other words, individuals save not just for retirement but also to cover sickness, 
unemployment, years of child-bearing, purchase of goods or assets etc.. So why should 
saving for retirement be specially favoured? The preferential tax status of private 
pensions may be justified on the grounds of economic and social objectives that cannot 
be achieved with other means.
(a) Maintaining Post-retirement Living Standards
It is suggested that people are generally myopic/ irrational and/or there is a form of 
moral hazard/super-rationality40. The myopia or irrationality argument rests on the 
grounds that individuals are ignorant and do not foresee their needs in old age. They can 
not make accurate estimates of how much they need to save to provide a given post­
retirement standard of living. Accordingly, the most effective response may be for 
government to step in to ‘save’ people from their own ignorance, by distorting choices 
to ensure adequate savings for retirement (Dilnot, 1997). Economists also argue that 
people may be extremely smart or super-rational and know that if they do not take care 
of their retirement savings society will do it for them. As Boadway (1997: 62) states: 
“people are essentially correct in predicting the consequence of their behaviour. 
Governments universally do, in fact, come to the rescue of those who do not provide for 
themselves”.
As pointed out by Diamond (1977), some people do not make enough provision for their 
retirement. Samuelson (1987) also noted that in the century before 1937 Americans
40 See Diamond (1977) for the classic discussion of government intervention in pension provision. And 
also see Dilnot (1992; 1997), Boadway (1997), Davis (1995) and Barr (1998).
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were the richest people on earth but most died destitute or dependent on children, state, 
or charity. He argues that most individuals do not possess consistent ex-ante and ex-post 
preferences for judgements regarding the future. If the existence of this 
irrationality/super-rationality hypothesis is accepted, it can form the basis for 
paternalism in the form of requiring individuals to purchase more insurance cover than 
they would otherwise have chosen by giving them more tax privileges when buying the 
“special good” (insurance) for retirement. The role of government is to avoid such a 
situation by using the tax system in an attempt to induce saving for their retirement. 
Boadway adds that this argument “lends itself to a reasonable justification for public 
intervention ..., and ... is perhaps the single most important reason for public 
intervention in the provision of pensions”. Therefore, it can be concluded that providing 
tax incentives to encourage private pensions would solve the problem of myopia and 
moral hazard and thus would reduce old age poverty.
(b) Reducing Government Spending on State Provision
Welfare programs such as Supplementary Security Insurance (SSI) and Medicaid in 
United States, means-tested state pensions in Australia and the United Kingdom, as well 
as the Urban Minimum Income social assistance in China, to mention but a few, are 
designed to assist people, including the elderly, with limited assets and income. 
Encouraging people to contribute money to private pension schemes could save the 
government money in the long-term by reducing the chance that individuals would 
qualify for social assistance.
Although in western countries much efforts has been made in past decades to find 
acceptable ways to contain or reduce the growth in public pension costs, the reductions 
in public pension benefits and tax burdens have not also reduced the number of retirees 
or their needs. If individuals fail to save for their old age, the state will have to provide 
for them during that period. If governments can encourage more people to save for their 
retirement and also encourage those who already are saving to save more, expenditures 
on public pension benefits to the retired will fall (Dilnot, 1992). In defence of retaining 
tax benefits, the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) argues that the 
government should set out a tax “league table” of pensions, savings and investment
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vehicles, so that the tax regime can make the greatest contribution to removing people 
from dependency on state social security benefits. Thus, in the long run dependency on 
state benefits and government expenditure on welfare will be reduced while the 
Exchequer will benefit from higher pensions in payment (NAPF, 1998 and 1999).
Saving through private pension schemes, unlike other forms of saving, is most 
appropriate for retirement income provision because saving flows are tied-up until 
individuals reach retirement age. However, they are a priori less attractive to individuals 
and therefore need some fiscal privileges. Different forms of savings are often close 
substitutes in three ways - risk, return and term. The three attributes of different savings 
instruments are closely related. A risky asset must offer a higher expected rate of return 
to induce individuals to save in that form. An investment instrument that cannot be 
withdrawn until long into the future should have to offer a higher expected return than a 
short-term asset. Pensions contracts in general have long term (as long as 40 or 45 years) 
and high liquidity constraints (not redeemable before retirement) and high risks 
(investment risk or company insolvency). Therefore, pensions are not ideal assets for 
individual savers unless they offer higher expected returns. Due to the fact that other 
savings instruments also have certain tax preferences, individuals might not necessarily 
save in private pensions. Johnson (1999) states that: “it is hard to imagine why anyone 
would voluntarily lock their money away in a pension fund rather than save it in another 
flexible form - unless there are some fiscal privileges to doing so”. This view is clearly 
expressed by Davis (1993: 44), who suggests on this ground, “pension funds should be 
tax advantaged even if other forms of savings are not.” That people do not save 
sufficiently when not encouraged to do so is confirmed by the Diamond (1977) study for 
the United States and the clear evidence in New Zealand.
4.4.2 The Distortionarv Effects of Tax Privileges of Private Pensions
It must be pointed out that an explicit encouragement of one form of saving by means of 
tax privileges through tax exemption or deduction creates a range of tax privileges and 
penalties for different assets. Economic efficiency in the taxation of saving requires that 
taxation should generate a ‘level playing field’ in the sense that savings in the form of 
different assets should be taxed in the same way. The potential problem with taxing
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different forms of savings differently is that it results in different economic entities 
facing different costs of capital. If other financial assets are taxed, for example under an 
Income Tax system (either ETT or T IE  model), an Expenditure Tax treatment on 
private pensions, i.e. either the EET model or the TEE model, would result in a 
distortion of the choice between saving through private pensions and other forms of 
saving. Thus it would affect individuals’ decisions in allocating their income to different 
investments.
Dilnot (1992) suggests that “contributions to private pension represent a major part of 
private-sector savings flows, and thus their taxation must fit sensibly with the taxation 
of other forms of savings. Where private pensions are advance funded... the pension 
funds are of enormous importance as supplies of capital to industry; any taxation must 
aim to avoid distortion of the capital market. Taxation of benefits should aim to distort 
choice as little as possible for the retired”. However, this is not the case in reality 
because we observe a wide range of tax treatments for different forms of saving, such as 
bank, equities, bonds, pension funds and house, in almost every nation of the world. 
This will be the focus of the next chapter.
Taxes inevitably distort economic behaviour so the best we can do is avoid unnecessary 
deviations from neutrality and choose those which are least damaging in their overall 
economic effect. The distortion of choice between savings for retirement and savings for 
other purposes might be seen as acceptable if considered necessary in order to achieve 
wider economic and social objectives or to correct for market failure in retirement 
savings, as has been addressed in this chapter.
4.5 The Tax Treatment of Lump Sums
Chapter 4 has noted that most OECD countries treat lump-sum payment the same way 
as pension annuity. However, it is taxed more lightly in some countries, especially in the
A
United Kingdom and Ireland where about 1.5 times of final salary can be paid free of 
income tax. There should not be any doubt about the positive effect of EEt on 
encouraging saving for retirement through private pensions. However, this tax model 
may not have the expected effect in terms of guaranteeing adequate retirement benefits.
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Young (1992: 59) suggests that people are very likely to take lump sums when offered, 
especially if no deterrent exists. Therefore, the issue as to whether a portion of the 
benefit entitlement may be taken as a lump sum rather than a pension is applicable to all 
plan designs as it can affect the adequacy of retirement incomes. He adds that the lump 
sums that people receive are often not used for the explicit provision of retirement 
income, although it is possible (but questionable) that they go into home ownership or 
are used in other ways that effectively support living standards in retirement. The ability 
to choose lump sums instead of pensions also undercuts optional protection for spouses. 
Furthermore, a large portion of the plan’s investment may have to be in liquid assets in 
order to be available for lump sum withdrawals; this is likely to reduce investment 
returns. Thus he concludes that the inclusion of lump sum benefits in a pension scheme 
reduces the scheme’s ability to provide lifetime benefits to the retiree and spouse and 
also reduces the adequacy of retirement incomes of retirees {ibid.).
The tax treatment of lump-sum payments is always a contentious issue in OECD 
countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, there always have been critiques on tax- 
free lump sums. As it is pointed out in the Wilson Committee report (1980): “Under 
whatever conceptual framework one considers pensions, the tax-free nature of lump sum 
is anomalous. It is difficult to justify this on logical grounds.” Dilnot (1992) also argues 
that “There seem to be no strong reasons for treating the lump-sum more favourably 
than pension payments for tax purposes.... Arguments for supporting retirement savings 
... do not imply encouraging lump-sum provisions, rather the reverse”. A more 
generous treatment than the expenditure tax is not justified - either by the impact on 
national saving or the effect on public pension and social assistance liabilities 
(Whitehouse, 1999).
Although in the UK there have been strong arguments for the removal of tax-free lump 
sums, it is a concern of some that two problems might arise from the change in the 
current treatment. First, the introduction of a desirable transitional arrangement is 
necessary so as not to penalise the expectations of current pension scheme members 
who are nearing retirement and who have made plans that take into account the receipt 
of tax-free lump sums. Second, if lump sums were treated wholly as taxable income in 
the year of receipt some people would find themselves paying higher tax rates in that
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year (Benjamin, B. et al, 1987: 118). Therefore, as it is written in the Wilson Committee 
report (1980): “it [the tax free lump-sum payments] has become such an accepted part of 
the present arrangements that its removal could not be regarded as equitable in its 
effects”. In 1985, the Chancellor of the Exchequer raised the possibility of taxing the 
lump sum but it was not accepted.
In conclusion, the introduction of tax concessions to lump sum payments cannot be 
justified on the grounds of encouraging savings for retirement. It is not an appropriate 
tax incentive but a waste of resources in terms of the loss of government revenues which 
would otherwise be raised. Experience tells us that it is difficult to change a policy, 
especially in removing fiscal privileges, once it has been put into practice for any length 
of time. Thus, the tax treatment of lump-sum payment should not be considered in 
China.
4.6 Conclusion
Private pensions play an important role in the retirement income systems of OECD 
countries. In most countries, the tax preference takes the form of exempting pension 
contributions and pension asset incomes while pension payments are subject to taxes. 
This pattern is characterised as the EET tax model. The consideration of increasing 
revenues as well as achieving tax neutrality between different types of saving raises 
objection to providing tax incentives for private pensions. Some OECD countries have 
made significant changes by moving from the EET/TEE regime to ETT/TTE regime but 
certain privileges still remain. New Zealand is the only country that treats private 
pensions in the same way as other savings instruments. Not surprisingly this adjustment 
has reduced the popularity of pension schemes. Australia has also made some 
fundamental changes to its taxation treatment of pension plans whilst maintaining some 
taxation support and compulsory contribution help.
The chapter has highlighted the arguments on the Income Tax system and the 
Expenditure Tax system with respect to taxation on savings. Although the literature 
regarding the taxation of savings from the equity point of view has been unable to solve 
the issue of whether people should be taxed on their full income, including income from
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capital, or on their expenditure on goods and services, the Expenditure Tax system 
seems the better for encouraging savings. It is neutral between present and future 
consumption by providing investors the same pre- and post-tax return on savings. 
However, it also has been addressed that a wide range of tax treatments for different 
forms of saving inevitably distorts economic behaviour because investors’ decisions on 
what to save will more likely be influenced by tax treatments than other economic 
factors such as market returns.
This chapter puts forward rationales for providing preferential fiscal policy to private 
pensions. It argues that private pensions should be tax advantaged even if other forms of 
savings are not because without tax incentives a proportion of the population may not 
save adequately for their retirement. This is due to the fact that they either are short­
sighted and unable or unwilling to see far enough into the future to plan for their own 
retirement or they are free-riders and anticipate that the government will provide for 
them if they do not save for themselves. Therefore, adequate retirement saving through 
tax advantages afforded private pension schemes may fulfil at least two important 
economic as well as social objectives -  the reduction of old-age poverty and the 
reduction of public expenditures on the old. Finally, this chapter concludes that 
exemption on lump sum payments is not an appropriate tax policy for the purpose of 
encouraging retirement saving.
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V. THE DEGREE OF FISCAL PRIVILEGES UNDER DIFFERENT TAX 
SYSTEMS
5.1 Introduction
In theory, the decision of an investor to invest in a specific asset depends on the 
investor’s preferences about the term, flexibility and interest rates of that asset. It also 
depends on the systematic risk and historical performance and also the way the asset is 
treated by tax codes which determine the return the investor can expect to receive thus 
affect his or her investment incentives. The preceding chapter has stated that 
governments in most OECD countries have been providing certain preferential tax 
treatments on private pensions by giving exemptions to employers/employees and/or 
private pension funds. The value of these tax incentives has been an important factor in 
the development of these pension schemes. This chapter provides further empirical 
evidence of how saving for retirement through private pensions is more lightly taxed 
than other forms of household saving in some OECD countries. By comparing the 
Degree o f Fiscal Privilege of private pensions in China and in five selected OECD 
countries, this chapter examines one of the important obstacles to the development of 
private pensions in China - the tax system. In addition, this chapter highlights the 
possible impact of tax incentives on individuals’ saving behaviours if the tax rules of 
private pensions of some OECD countries were to be introduced in China.
The structures of the rest of this chapter are as follows. Section 5.2 presents the 
derivation of the formulae employed in calculating the Degree o f Fiscal Privilege. 
Section 5.3 studies in detail the tax systems in China and five OECD countries. It then 
sets up the assumptions for the calculations of DFiP and analyses the sensitivities of 
DFiP values to the changes in those assumptions. Section 5.4 compares the DFiP of 
private pensions under the differential tax treatments in China and five countries. 
Section 5.5 attempts to recommend some important policies as supplementary 
approaches to tax incentives for promoting a private pension system in China. In 
addition, the equity implications of the tax concessions on private pensions are also 
addressed. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
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5.2 The Concept of the Degree of Fiscal Privilege
In 1984 professor John Hills developed the Degree o f Fiscal Privilege (Hereinafter 
“DFiP”) as a measure of fiscal privilege. According to his definition, DFiP is the 
difference between an investor’s marginal income tax rate and the effective tax rate on 
the real returns of the asset in question. If the former is higher than the latter (a positive 
DFiP), then the asset is fiscally privileged. In other case (a negative DFiP), the asset is 
fiscally discriminated. The effective tax rate is defined as the tax paid on the asset 
expressed as a proportion of the real pre-tax return on the asset. Therefore, if an 
individual’s marginal rate of income tax is fixed, then DFiP will be wholly determined 
by the effective tax rate of the asset. This section briefly describes how the effective tax 
rate of an asset is calculated; the OECD 1994 report has a fuller derivation of the 
formulae (OECD, 1994: 89-95; Annex 2).
5.2.1 The Minimum Post-tax Required Rate of Return
If an investment is very profitable or very unprofitable then taxes are unlikely to affect 
saving incentives. The basic idea that is considered here is the effect of the tax system 
on the borderline between investments that are viable and those that are not - the effect 
on marginal investment, which generates net return just sufficient to make the 
investment worthwhile. It is assumed that an additional $1 is considered by the saver to 
be invested in a particular asset, for instance, shares or a private pension. It is assumed 
that all cash-flows (return received or taxes paid) of the investment take place at the end 
of a period. The expected net present value of the investment of the additional $1 is:
R —T
NPV = - l  + ^ - f  u-  (1)
u=o(l + P )
Where Ru is the expected gross cash-flow, or pre-tax return, at the end of year u, Tu the 
expected flow of tax payments at the end of year u, and p the discount rate. Since this is 
the case of a “marginal” investment, one that is on the borderline of economic viability, 
the net present value is zero, hence:
109
Chapter 5
y \ R u ~ T u _ J
u= o ( l  + p )u (2)
In each period the asset earns a given pre-tax minimum required rate of return on the 
start of period asset stock which is denoted as P. This rate of return P may be obtained 
as a combination of income and a change in the asset value (e.g. capital gains) and is 
represented in the following equation:
p = y»+g« * (3)
1 + 7Z
where yu is cash income in current prices as a proportion of the asset stock, 
denominated as gross return for the rest of the Chapter, gu is the nominal rate of growth 
of the asset over year u in current prices and n is the rate of inflation. This equation can 
be arranged as:
yu = P(l+n) + n - g u (4)
For any given required pre-tax rate of return P and holding period, one can calculate the 
growth of the asset stock gu and the gross cash-flow yu through a fixed ratio of gu to yu. 
To simplify the calculation, it is assumed that the total expected rate of return P and the 
ratio of gu to yu remain constant over the holding period, ignoring the variation of the 
level of income and gains over the holding period.
If the asset is held for period n (and there are no cash-flows after), the investor receives 
cash income during the holding period and a consideration on sale but may be liable for 
taxation. The net present value of this possibility Vn is given by:
v„=yji(i-arl
n=l
± y ( l + g r ‘ ( l +g  
< i + p ) u U + p .
-  1 - T* n (5)
In the above equation:
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/  J  n
• —— ——  is the expected present value of cash income received at the end of year
a+P)u
u.
K1 + p, 
year n.
is the expected present value of the growth of the asset stock at the end of
• a is a fixed turnover rate with which the asset will be sold in each period. For 
example, if the asset in question is sold a year after the purchase, then a = 1. If the 
asset is sold after five years of holding period, then a = 0.2. The term a ( \-a )n~x 
(and a < 1) indicates the probability that an asset will be sold at the end of n periods.
• Tn is the expected present value of all taxes due. It should capture all kinds of taxes 
and allowances but for simplification in the calculation, all taxes considered here are 
incorporated into five broad categories, i.e., the tax on cash income, the tax on 
realised capital gains (with or without indexation), the tax on gross asset purchases 
(e.g. stamp duty), the tax on sales of the asset and the tax on the stock of the asset 
(wealth taxes). Thus,
• tyy( 1 + g)“-1 is the flow of tax on cash income in each period u that the asset is held, 
where t y  is the tax rate on cash income.
• tw(l+ g)u is the flow of tax on asset stock in each period w, where tw is the tax rate 
on wealth as a proportion of market value.
• tp is the flow of tax on purchase levied on the acquisition cost in the period 0 when 
the asset is purchased.
• t s (1 + g)n is the flow of tax on sale in the period n when the asset is sold, where ts is 
the rate of tax on gross sales.
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• fg[(7+g)" -(7+<frr)n] is the flow of tax on capital gains in the period n when the asset
is sold, where tg is the statutory rate of capital gains tax and d is set to 1 for an 
indexed tax system and 0 for an unindexed system.
• tc is the flow of tax deduction on saving which is the statutory rate at which 
investments or contributions can be deducted.
Applying these tax treatments to equation (5) yields:
p a+pr  V + p ) a+pr
Arranging (6) for V = 0 and assuming the geometric series yields a value for the 
discount rate:
P = y(l-ty )~tw( 1 +g)+g-Zg(g-dn)-Zs( 1 +g)-(T -tc+tp)[p-g+a( 1 +g)] (7)
ta {  1 + p)
Where: Z = ----- 8— — —-----
p + a - d n ( \ - a ) .
Zs = a s^
T = Tn
n=1
T is the expected present value of special taxes less allowances, while Zg and Zs can be 
interpreted as accruals rates of capital gains tax and sales tax allowing for the possibility 
of indexation to inflation. Thus, the discount rate p is the marginal condition for an 
investment with zero present value after taking account of all tax treatments.
5.2.2 The Five-step General Procedure for Calculating DFiP
(a) To calculate interest income and capital gains (y and g)
It is assumed that the yield is split between the interest income y and capital gain g while 
y + g = P(l+ n) + 71. Equation (4) gives the relationship between the pre-tax required
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rate of return P and the gross rate of return, that is the sum of income and capital gain. 
The ratio of y to g is fixed for each of the assets examined at the start of holding period 
(in Table 4-1) and remains constant over the holding period. Therefore the interest 
income y and capital gain g can be solved combining the following equations with the 
split:
y = P(l+ 7i) + n - g  
g -  P(l+ ji) + 7i-y
(b) To calculate the discount rate (p)
The general equation for calculating the discount rate is given by equation (7) in which 
all the tax treatments are incorporated.
p = y(l-ty )-tw( 1 +g)+g-Zg(g-dn)-Zs( 1+g)-(T -tc+tp)[p-g+a(l+g)]
(c) To calculate the post-tax required rate o f return (S)
The required post-tax rate of return is given by the equation:
(d) To calculate the effective tax rate (%)
Divide the difference between pre-tax and post-tax rate of return (tax wedge) by the pre­
tax rate of return, giving the effective tax rate:
P - S  
*= —
(e) To calculate DFiP
The DFiP is the difference between an investor’s marginal rate of income tax (m) and 
the effective tax rate ( t ) on the return of the asset.
DFiP = m - x
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5.2.3 The Discount Rate of Private Pensions
In the case of pension funds, the calculation becomes less straightforward due to the 
existence of the investment intermediary. The calculation can be divided into two 
stages. The first stage obtains the post-tax return to the fund pf. The second stage finds 
the post-tax return to the individual saver p, assuming that the fund’s post-tax rate of 
return is equal to the saver’s pre-tax rate of return. Therefore, the minimum required 
return p (post-tax return to the saver) is given by:
p =
( l - t y  ) ( 1  +  P f ) n - l (8)
Where: pf  is the post-tax return to the fund;
n is the number of years that the saver is contracted to reinvest in the fund;
tc is t he rate at which the individual saver’s contributions to the fund are 
deductible; and
ty is the saver’s marginal rate of income tax.
When equation (8) incorporates the cases that either full (or part of) contributions, or 
full (or part of) pension pay-out can be tax-free, the discount rate will be:
p =
l ~ t r
- l (9)
Where: Cy is the fraction of the income within the fund which can be paid out tax
free;
Cc is the fraction of contributions which can be paid out tax free; 
[(l+pf)n-l]  is the income within the fund;
[1-(1-Cy)ty] [(l+pf)n-l ]  is the saver’s after-tax return on the yields of the 
fund and
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[1-(1-Cc)ty] is the saver’s after tax return on the contributions adjusted for 
contributions deductibility.
Equation (9) can be simplified to:
P =
[ 1 - ( 1 -  Cy )ty ](1 + P f )n + ( C C-  Cy )t y
l ~ t ,
- l (10)
5.3 Tax Treatments of Financial Assets and Assumptions for the 
Calculations of DFiP
This section gives a detailed description of the tax treatments of five financial assets, i.e. 
bank deposits, government bonds, shares, private pensions and owner-occupied houses 
in China and five OECD countries. It then sets up assumptions for the calculations of 
DFiP under each of the tax systems in order to examine the extent to which, if any, 
private pensions are granted tax privileges in these countries. The five OECD countries 
chosen in the comparison are France, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. The reason for this choice is that their tax treatments on private pensions are 
different, as examined in the last chapter. France has the EET model, Germany has the 
TEE model (for pension funds), Sweden has the ETT model, New Zealand has the TTE 
model and the United Kingdom has the EEt model.
5.3.1 Tax Treatments of Financial Assets in Sample Countries
Table 5-1 shows the marginal rates on labour income for standard rate and top rate 
taxpayers in both China and selected OECD countries. For the five OECD countries, the 
top marginal rates of tax come from the 2000 edition OECD Tax Database and for the 
year of 2000. The standard marginal rates of income tax relate to an ‘average production 
worker’ and come from the 2000 edition of the OECD’s Taxing Wages and for 1999. 
Columns 4 to 7 of the table present the tax treatments of the five financial assets. 
Information for China comes from the 1996 edition China Taxation Handbook. Tax 
rates on income of interest and dividend in OECD countries are obtained from the 2000 
edition OECD Tax Database, while that of capital gains come from “Tax and the
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Economy: A Comparative Assessment of OECD Countries” in OECD Tax Policy 
Studies, No. 6, 2001. The “other taxes” in the last column includes wealth tax and taxes 
on asset purchases and sales, which can be found in the OECD 1994 report. Finally, the 
tax treatments on private pension in the OECD countries are not shown in this table, but 
in Table 4-1 of the last chapter. These follows the general picture of tax systems in the 
six countries.
(a) China
Bank deposits: Before an amendment to the Personal Income Tax Law was adopted after 
much debate, eliminating personal savings accounts from the list of non-taxable income, 
interest income were free of tax. According to the State Tax Bureau Document 180 of 
1999, a 20 percent rate is imposed on interest income from bank deposits.
Bond ownership: The government bond is the most privileged asset in terms of fiscal 
treatment. As in most countries of the world, there is no deduction on purchasing 
government bonds. However, income from both interest and accruals of capital gains are 
free of personal income tax as well as capital gains tax, nor is tax applied on the 
disposal of bonds.
Share ownership: The tax rate on dividend income is 20 percent. For each instance of 
buying and selling shares the total cost is 0.75 percent of traded value (the State Council 
Document 11 of 1988), which includes 0.4 percent of stamp duty and 0.35 percent 
agency charges. Thus, the total tax liability on shares is 1.5 percent. There are no other 
tax liabilities.
Private pensions: In fact, there has not been any formal regulation on the tax treatment 
of membership in China. Employee contributions to enterprise supplementary pension 
schemes are not deductible form income tax liability.41 Similarly, contributions from 
both employers and employees to individual saving plans through insurance companies 
and commercial banks are fully taxed. Fund investment incomes are subject to 
corporation tax at 33 percent except returns on government bond investments. Benefits
41 5 percent of total wages from employer contributions is treated as labour cost.
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are also taxed under labour income at individuals’ marginal rates. Therefore, the current 
tax model on private pensions is TTT.
Home ownership: The tax treatments on properties are under the regulation of the local 
governments and vary across provinces and municipalities. For example, a stamp duty 
ranging from 3-5 percent is levied on the market value of house purchases. The rate in 
Beijing is 4 percent, while in Shanghai it ranges from 0.75 percent to 1.5 percent. The 
calculated DFiP later in this chapter is for the city of Beijing. According to the 
regulations by the Taxation Administration of Beijing, buying and selling a house/flat in 
the city of Beijing incurs 4 percent stamp duty and 5 percent on the market value of the 
house sale. Capital gains are taxed at 20 percent for individuals.
(b) France
Interest income on bank deposits and government bonds are withheld at 15 percent, 
creditable against income tax liability. Capital gains are taxed at 26 percent. Shares are 
taxed under an imputation system under which dividend incomes are taxed as labour 
income but receive a tax credit of 33.33 percent. Also, sale of shares is taxed at 0.3 
percent. A 1.5 percent wealth tax is levied on asset holdings by top-rate taxpayers.
Private pensions: contributions to pension funds (and PAYG schemes) are tax 
deductible up to certain limits. There are no taxes on pension fund asset holdings. 
Pension payments at retirement are taxed at individuals’ marginal rates. The tax model 
is EET as defined in Chapter 4.
There is 25 percent tax relief on debt finance for owner-occupied housing. Capital gains 
are exempted if the owner occupies for at least two years. House sales are taxed at 8 
percent. Wealth tax is 0.3 percent and 1.8 percent for basic- and top-rate taxpayers 
respectively.
(c) Germany
In Germany the tax treatment on bank deposits and government bonds is the same. 
Interest income is taxed as labour income at marginal rates. The rate of capital gains tax
117
Chapter 5
is 0. The taxation of share ownership is also under an imputation tax system. The rate of 
tax credit is 48.47 percent. Also, a wealth tax is levied on the ownership of bank 
deposits, government bonds and shares at a rate of 0.5 percent. However, this is only 
applied to top-rate taxpayers.
Private pensions: As stated in the last chapter, the taxation of private pensions in 
Germany depends on the method of pension funding. For the book reserve type of 
pension there is no tax charge to employees until pensions are paid - a book reserve type 
of supplementary pensions follows the common EET pattern of taxation. However, the 
taxation is different for the direct insurance funds and provident funds, subject to the 
TEE model. There are no taxes levied on fund income. Contributions are considered as 
taxable income while pension benefits are taxed very lightly if paid as a pension (only 
interest earned after pension payments have begun is subject to tax) and not at all if paid 
as a lump sum. Book-reserved funds and support funds account for more than 60 
percent of pension liabilities in Germany.
Debt finance for owner-occupied housing is fully deductible at personal marginal rates. 
Capital gains are exempted if the owner occupies for at least two years. House sales are 
taxed at 2 percent. A 0.3 percent wealth tax is paid by top-rate-paying owners, while a 
0.2 percent is paid by standard-rate taxpayers.
(d) Sweden
In Sweden, all capital income including capital gains is all taxed at 30 percent. The rate 
on sales of shares is 1 percent. In addition, a 1.8 percent of wealth tax is levied on the 
ownership of bank deposit, bonds and shares for top rate taxpayers only.
As defined in Chapter 4, the Swedish tax regime of supplementary pension funds is EtT 
rather than the standardised ETT as returns on pension funds are taxed at 10 percent. 
Contributions to pension funds are tax exempt but pension benefits are taxed at 
individuals’ marginal rates.
Debt finance for house purchases is deductible at 30 percent. Capital gains are exempted 
if the owner occupies for at least two years. House sales are taxed at 11.5 percent. House
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ownership is taxed at 1.1 percent and 2.9 percent for standard- and top-rate taxpayers 
respectively.
(e) New Zealand
In New Zealand the tax treatment on bank deposits and government bonds is the same. 
Interest income is taxed as labour income at marginal rates. Capital gains are not taxed. 
The asset of Shares is taxed under an imputation tax system with a 33 percent 
imputation credit on dividends received. There are no taxes on owner-occupied housing 
except that the value of house purchase is not deductible for income tax purposes.
The tax model on private pensions is TTE. Contributions are not deductible but pension 
benefits are exempted from income taxes. Investment income on funds including bond 
interest and dividend on shares are taxed at 33 percent.
(f) The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom interest income on bank interest and government bonds are 
taxed at 20 percent for low and basic taxpayers and 40 percent for top rate taxpayers. 
However, capital gains are subject to income tax at marginal rates for all taxpayers.
Share ownership: Dividends on shares are taxed as ordinary income but credited at 10 
percent against income liability. However, the low rate and basic rate taxpayers’ tax 
liability has also decreased to 10 percent, while top rate taxpayers’ liability has 
decreased to 32.5 percent. So, the tax liability on dividends for low and basic taxpayers 
is zero but is 22.5 percent for top rate taxpayers. Again, capital gains are subject to 
income tax for all taxpayers. The tax rate on share purchase is 0.5 percent.
Private pensions: In the United Kingdom contributions to occupational pensions are 
exempted from personal income tax while withdrawals of pensions are taxed at the 
marginal income tax rate of 20 percent (for lower and basic rate taxpayers) and 40 
percent (for higher rate taxpayers). The tax-free lump sum is 1.5 times of pension
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members’ final salary.42 Contributions to personal pensions are exempted from personal 
income tax, subject to age-related limits. Regular pension payments are taxed at 
marginal income tax rates except 25 percent tax-free lump sums. Investment income of 
pension funds is not taxed in either case. Therefore, the tax model of private pensions is 
EEt (“t” indicates a portion of total benefits that is free of tax liability).
Home ownership: Mortgage interest tax relief was given at the basic rate of income tax. 
Since 6 April 1994 it has been reduced first to 20 percent, then 15 percent and 10 
percent in 1999. It was abolished after April 2000. Property tax is levied at about 1 
percent (this is Council tax and the rate varies across areas). Capital gains are exempted.
42 It includes an annual pension of 50 percent of final salary and a tax-free lump sum of 3 times of annual 
pension. This is equivalent to 25 percent of total benefits received by pensioners.
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Table 5-1 Taxes on Labour and Capital Income in China and Selected Countries
LABOUR
INCOME
CAPITAL
INCOME
Basic
rates
Top
rates Interest Dividend
Capital
Gains Other taxes
China 20 45 Deposits: 20 Bonds : 0 20
House: 20 
Others: 0
Purchase of shares: 0.75 
Sales of shares: 0.75 
Purchase of house: 4 
Sales of house: 5
France 21.4 54 Deposits: 15 Bonds : 15
Taxed as labour 
but receives 
33.3 percent 
imputation 
credit
Bonds: 26 
Shares: 26 
House: 0
Sales of shares: 0.3 
Sales of house: 8 
Wealth tax on the owner of 
bonds and shares (top 
rate): 1.5
Wealth tax on house 
Basic rate: 0.3 
Top rate: 1.8
Germany 34.9 51
Interests on bank deposits and 
government bonds and shares are 
taxed as labour income but 
dividends receive 48.47 percent 
imputation credit
0
Sales of house: 2 
Wealth tax on the owner of 
bonds and shares (top 
rate): 0.5
Wealth tax on house 
Basic rate: 0.2 
Top rate: 0.3
The UK 23 40 Basic rate: 20 Top rate: 40
Basic rate 10 
Top rate 32.5 
lOpercent 
imputation 
credit for all
Bonds and 
Shares: as 
labour 
House: 0
Purchase of shares: 0.5 
Purchase of house: 1 
Wealth tax on house: 1
Sweden 29.7 53.25 30: deposits, bonds and shares
Bonds: 30 
Shares: 30 
House: 0
Sales of shares: 1 
Sales of house 11.5 
Wealth tax on the owner of 
bonds and shares (top 
rate): 1.8
Wealth tax on house:
Basic rate: 1.1 
Top rate: 2.9
New
Zealand 21 33
Interests on bank deposits and 
government bonds and shares are 
taxed as labour income but 
dividends receive 33 percent 
imputation credit
0 0
Source: (1) China (1996). China Taxation Handbook. The State Administration of Taxation.
(2) OECD (2000). Taxing Wages.
(3) OECD (2000). The OECD Tax Database. Table 3; Table 5A.
(4) OECD (2001). “Tax and the Economy: A comparative Assessment of OECD 
Countries”, OECD Tax Policy Studies. No. 6. Paris.
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5.3.2 Assumptions for the Calculations of DFiP
A zero rate of price inflation is assumed to calculate the DFiP of all the five assets. This 
assumption is due to three reasons. First, for the past few years the rate of inflation in 
China has been very low or even negative. Second, without the effect of price inflation 
DFiP values will reflect only the tax effect on the assets. Finally, a zero rate of inflation 
can simplify the DFiP calculations. However, when calculations take account of 
inflation factors the DFiP value will be lower. In general, the higher the inflation rate 
used in the calculation, the lower values of the DFiP obtained.
To concentrate on the tax system per se, the same pre-tax rate of return P is used across 
all assets ignoring variations in the pre-tax yield on the five different assets. The 
objective of this approach is to examine the pure tax effect on the different assets if they 
had yielded an equal pre-tax rate of return. Given the same pre-tax rate of return (10%), 
the minimum required rate of return p on each of the assettcan be obtained.
It is assumed that different assets, except bank deposits, have different ratios of interest 
income to capital gains. The ratio for government bonds, 4:1, is the highest, assuming 
that 80 percent of the total yield results from interest and 20 percent from capital gains. 
The ratio of 1:2.33 for shares is the lowest, 30 percent of the total yield on shares 
coming from interest and 70 percent from capital gains. House ownership has a ratio of 
1:1.22, assuming 45 percent yield from services while the remaining 55 percent from 
capital gains. This is because most Chinese people buy a house to live in (or let). The 
yield for equities and bonds held in pension funds are the same as above. However, the 
calculation assumes that 40 percent of pension fund assets are bonds while the 
remaining 60 percent are equities, although in reality pension funds can invest in other 
assets such as properties. The bond to equity ratio assumed here is due to two reasons. 
First, it reflects international experiences. In the majority of industrialised countries 
more than half of pension fund assets are in equities. The pension fund in the United 
Kingdom has the highest portion of equity holdings in comparison to funds in other 
OECD countries. Equity assets account for about 70 percent of funds’ total assets. 
Second, from a long-term perspective, equities have higher returns than bonds.
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The turn over rate a, as defined earlier, is the proportion of an asset that will be sold in 
each period. Therefore the length of holding the asset is determined by the turnover rate 
which is fixed at the start of holding the asset. The higher the rate assumed the shorter 
the period of holding the asset and vice versa. It is assumed that a is 0.2 for the 
ownership of government bonds and shares. However, the turnover rates for assets held 
by pension funds, where the term of a saving contract is assumed to be 15 years, are 
assumed to be 0.0667 for both bonds and shares. The same rate is also assumed for 
owner-occupied housing.
The calculations are done for two hypothetical individuals in China: the taxpayer who 
pays income taxes at a marginal rate of 20 percent and one who pays income taxes at a 
marginal rate of 45 percent.43 It must be noted that the calculations of DFiP under the 
current tax systems in China are rather straightforward but not so under the tax systems 
in the five OECD countries. In view of the fact that the objective is to measure the 
degree of fiscal privileges of the five financial assets under the scenario that the tax 
systems in the five countries are transplanted to China, the DFiP are calculated by using 
the tax rules on the assets in the OECD countries but not their real tax rates. Therefore, 
the application of the tax rates to China can be divided into two cases. If the capital 
income on an asset in question is taxed as labour income (under the same marginal 
rates) in the five countries, then the marginal tax rates of 20 percent and 45 percent are 
used in the calculation. For example, in New Zealand interest income on bank deposits 
is taxed as labour income. However, the marginal tax rates used to calculate the DFiP on 
bank savings under the tax rules in New Zealand are 20 percent and 45 percent 
(marginal tax rates in China) instead of 21 percent and 33 percent (marginal income tax 
rates in New Zealand). Alternatively, if the capital income on an asset in question is 
taxed separately from labour income or at a different rate, then the ratio of the capital 
income tax rate to individuals’ marginal income tax rate on labour income is applied. In 
this case, the tax rate on the asset used in the calculation is the above ratio as a 
proportion of the marginal rates of income tax in China. One example of this is in 
Sweden where labour income and capital income are subject to two different tax 
systems. Therefore if the Swedish tax systems were introduced in China, then the tax
43 45 percent is the highest bracket of personal income tax in China. As the majority of taxpayers face the 
20 percent bracket, this rate can be regarded as a standard rate.
123
Chapter 5
rates on capital income for Chinese standard and top rate taxpayers would be 
respectively 20.2 (30%/29.7%*20%) percent and 25.35 (30%/53.25%*45%) percent.
As noted earlier, for simplicity all taxes considered here are incorporated into five broad 
categories including the tax liabilities on cash income, capital gains, gross asset 
purchases (e.g. stamp duty), sales of assets and, finally, the stock of assets (wealth tax). 
Therefore, the DFiP values would be lower if an asset is also subject to taxes of other 
kinds. Moreover, the DFiP values are obtained under savers’ marginal rates of income 
tax without considering any special allowances or concessions. For instance, tax 
allowances for private pensions in the United Kingdom are worth between 29 and 34 
percent more (depending on age) for single pensioners than for people of working age 
and 39-43 percent for married couples: the extra allowance is withdrawn above a 
ceiling. The United States offers an extra $1,000 deduction for single pensioners and 
$1,800 for married couples. Calculations taking account of these concessions would be 
complex, but the effect obviously would be to increase the DFiP values.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the value of DFiP is very sensitive to the 
assumptions made on the ratio of interest income to capital gain, y/g and turnover rate a. 
If the rate of tax on interest income is lower than the rate of tax on capital gain then the 
higher the ratio of y/g (and the lower the a) assumed the higher the DFiP values can be 
obtained. On the other hand, if the rate of tax on interest income is higher than the rate 
of tax on capital gain, then the higher the ratio of y/g (and the lower the a) is assumed 
the lower the DFiP values can be obtained. However, if interest income y and capital 
gains g are taxed at the same rate and a is assumed to be 1, then the value of DFiP is 
indifferent to the rate of split between y and g.
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Table 5-2 Assumptions for the Calculations of DFiP
1. Zero rate of inflation in China: 71 =  0
2. A fixed 10 percent pre-tax rate of return: ii ' H—
*
O $
3. The yield (including interest income and capital gains) of the five different assets based
on the following assumptions:
Bank deposits: Full yield as interest, zero capital gains. y =  P= 10%, g =  0
Bond ownership: 80 percent yield as interest, 30 percent 
as capital gains.
y  = 80%xP = 8% 
g =  20 %xP = 2%
Share ownership: 30 percent of the yield as dividend, 70 
percent as capital gains.
y =  30 %xP =  3% 
g =  70%xP =  7%
Private pensions: Pension asset holding 60 percent as 
equities and 40 percent as government 
bonds. The yield for equities and bonds 
are the same as above.
yb =  80 %xP =  8% 
gb =  20 %xP =  2% 
ye =  30 %xP =  3% 
ge =  70%xP =  7%
Home ownership: 45 percent of the real return as housing 
services, the balance as capital gains.
y =  45%xP = 4.5% 
g =  55%xP =  5.5%
4. The turnover rate:
Bank deposits: Not relevant
Government bonds: a =  0 .2
Share ownership: a  =  0 .2
Pension contract: Fixed for 15 years
Bond holdings a =  0.0667
Equity holdings a =  0.0667
Home ownership: a =  0.0667
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5.4 The Value of DFiP on Private Pensions and Implications
This section analyses the degree of fiscal privileges, if any, of private pensions in the six 
countries, based on the results calculated by using the assumptions made in the last 
section. The first part compares the DFiP of private pensions under the tax system in 
China with that of the five OECD countries. The second part addresses the problem of 
unequal distribution of tax benefits between taxpayers if private pensions are taxed 
under a more favourable tax model.
5.4.1 The DFiP on private pensions
Table 5-3 DFiP Values for the Chinese 20% Rate Taxpayers 
under the Tax System in China and Five OECD Countries (%)
Tax regimes 
of pensions Country Deposit
Bond Share Pension Housing
TTT China 0.0 20.0 10.7 -2.0 10.9
EET France 6.0 5.2 9.8 20.0 11.7
TEE Germany 0.0 4.0 22.3 20.0 18.0
ETT Sweden 0.0 0.9 1.7 15.3 6.8
TTE New Zealand 0.0 4.0 23.4 4.4 20.0
EEt The UK 2.6 3.0 8.2 24.5 10.8
Table 5-4 DFiP Values for the Chinese 45% Rate Taxpayers 
Under the Tax System in China and Five OECD Countries (%)
Tax regimes 
of pensions Country Deposit Bond Share Pension Housing
TTT China 25.0 45.0 35.7 -3.4 35.9
EET France 32.5 18.5 9.4 45.0 24.5
TEE Germany 0.0 4.5 39.6 45.0 41.0
ETT Sweden 19.6 5.0 5.2 38.8 12.4
TTE New Zealand 0.0 9.0 45.0 22.5 45.0
EEt The UK 0.0 0.0 12.0 58.7 33.4
The calculated results are presented in Tables 5-3 and 5-4. According to Hills (1984: 
28), if DFiP is positive the return is being taxed more lightly than the saver’s marginal 
income tax rate would lead us to expect, whilst a negative DFiP indicates it is being 
taxed more heavily. By definition, a zero DFiP represents a neutral treatment.
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The tables show that private pensions have higher fiscal privileges than other forms of 
savings in four countries, namely, the United Kingdom, France, Germany44 and Sweden. 
This can be seen as a higher DFiP on pensions than on the other four assets. It is 
noticeable that the value of DFiP varies across the countries, ranging from 24.5 percent 
in the United Kingdom to 20 percent in France and Germany, and 15.3 percent in 
Sweden. The variations are a result of whether part of pension fund investment income 
is taxed and whether part of benefits paid out of funds are tax-free. Private pensions 
have the highest DFiP in the UK tax system because a quarter of total benefits received 
by pensioners is excluded from pensioners’ taxable income. On the other hand, the 
value of DFiP under the Swedish tax system is the lowest because part of the yields 
within funds are taxed, although treated lightly in comparison to other capital income 
(see Table 5-1).
However, private pensions in New Zealand are taxed basically the same way and at the 
same rates as bank deposits and government bonds. The very high DFiP on shares is due 
to the imputation tax system that provides an arrangement by which shareholders who 
receive a dividend also receive a tax credit for corporate tax and other taxes (such as 
withholding tax) that the company has paid. Under this system, the tax paid on its 
distributed profits at the corporate level is fully or partially credited against 
shareholders’ personal income tax liability. The high value of DFiP on owner-occupied 
housing indicates a preferential tax treatment on house purchases, which provides 
imputed income tax-free together with a tax-free capital gain. It is stated in the last 
chapter that private pension funds in New Zealand fell immediately after the 1990 tax 
reform under which the tax model of pension funds moved away from the EET model to 
the current TTE model. On the other hand, due to the preferential tax treatment on house 
purchases, the most important form of savings by individuals in New Zealand has been 
the purchase of a house.
In China the obtained value of DFiP on private pensions is the lowest within the five 
financial assets in the comparison. In particular, the negative DFiP means pensions are 
taxed more heavily than individuals’ marginal income tax rates. This is because not only
44 Except the case in Germany where the standard rate taxpayers have higher DFiP on the saving in shares 
than that in private pension schemes.
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is investment income is taxed within the fund but also both contributions to and pension 
benefits from the fund are subject to personal income taxation. China is one of two 
countries in the world that tax all three transactions of pension funds at full marginal 
rates.45 Therefore, the high tax burden on pension funds can provide some explanation 
of the minor importance allotted private pensions in China.
The government bond is the most popular asset in China. This is attributed to its nature 
of high security (there is no risk) and low tax liabilities (the tax liability is zero). It can 
be seen from the tables that the DFiP on bonds is the highest among the five assets. 
Since 1990 the opening of the two stock exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai, buying 
and selling shares has become the daily life of many Chinese people in urban cities. As 
financial markets develop, if the government does not remove the current generous tax 
treatment on trading, investment in shares will remain one of the most popular choices 
for Chinese investors. The introduction of tax on bank interests in 1999 has not reduced 
the reliance of the majority of Chinese people on commercial banks as a means of 
saving instrument. This is because the investment choice in China is limited and bank 
deposits have lower risk and higher flexibility than stocks. It must be pointed out that 
although the tax treatment on owner occupied housing is quite generous, buying a house 
is still beyond the reach of the majority of Chinese households due to the fact of low 
wages and imperfections in credit markets.
If the tax models of private pensions in the five OECD countries are introduced in 
China, the DFiP on private pensions would be extremely high under the UK tax system, 
substantially high under the French and German tax systems and relatively moderate 
under the Swedish tax system. There would be no fiscal privilege for private pensions 
under the New Zealand tax system. This implies that if China keeps the current tax 
treatments on bank savings unchanged (equivalent to the tax pattern of TTE) the 
introduction of any of the three tax models on private pensions - EEt (the UK model), 
EET (the French model) and TEE (the German model) - would shift part of saving flows 
from banks to private pension funds.
45 The other country is Russia. As mentioned in the last chapter, Australia has a “ttt” model on pensions 
instead of a “TTT” model.
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5.4.2 Tax Incentives and Inequality
Table 5-4 shows that, in general, top rate taxpayers have higher DFiP than standard rate 
taxpayers. This finding may have implications when tax privileges for private pensions 
are concerned. It implies that, if exemptions are given to private pensions, high income 
workers gain more because they are in a higher marginal income tax bracket and are 
able to take advantage of retirement savings plans to a greater extent than low income 
workers. As Stanley Surrey (1973) describes, these tax benefits provide most support to 
the most well-off, less to the average, very little to the lower-paid and nothing at all to 
the poor. Hence the distribution of private pension benefits often provides greater 
rewards to higher earnings and income categories. They provide very significant 
‘upside-down’ benefits.
The character of unequal distribution of tax benefits is observed by some researchers 
when examining tax concessions on private pensions in some OECD countries. Ippolito 
(1986), for example, presents some calculations of the tax benefits of pensions under the 
US tax code of 1979 and points out that the benefit of the tax exemption of asset returns 
depends on the rate of return and the tax rates. At an interest rate of 8 percent he 
calculates that the benefit is 10 per cent of pensionable income for the median worker 
and 20 percent for those on three times average earnings. Overall, as a result of these tax 
benefits, a worker on average earnings might obtain a 20 per cent higher pension and a 
worker on three times average earnings one a 40 per cent higher. He concludes that 
benefits of pension-tax exemption are regressively distributed. A study for the UK by 
Agulnik and Le Grand (1998) also shows “a strongly regressive pattern, with those on 
income over £100,000 receiving an amount equivalent to 3.3 per cent of their income, 
compared with 0.5 per cent for those on incomes between £3,525 and £4,000. Overall, 
half the benefit of tax incentive on pension contributions goes to the top 10 percent of 
taxpayers, and a quarter to the top 2.5 percent”. Under such circumstances workers who 
have not made substantial earnings during their working life are likely to have little net 
gain from occupational plans. In a private discussion with the author, Agulnik points out 
that tax concessions are regressive even under a flat-rate tax system because the really 
poor do not pay tax and secondly, richer people save more (both proportionately and 
absolutely) so get more benefits. He argues that: “[although] using the tax relief system
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to bribe people to make greater pension provision is potentially one way out of the 
morass of means testing... The current system that favours the better-off, offering more 
assistance to well paid workers than to low earners, may be reason enough for reform.” 
(Agulnik and Le Grand, 1998; Agulnik, 1999).
The unequal distribution effect of tax systems raises much debate. Based on the 
examination on the distribution of public and private pension benefits and their relative 
importance in the income of elder households across a number of countries, Pestieau 
(1992) states that a significant shift from public to private pension benefits could widen 
disparities in income among the oldest members of society. Richard Titmuss describes 
tax treatment of occupational pensions as a form of privilege as higher-salary workers 
are the primary beneficiaries of occupational pensions. He argues that “the outlines of a 
dangerous social schism are clear, and they are enlarging.... Already it is possible to see 
two nations in old age; greater inequalities in living standards after work than in work; 
two contrasting social services for distinct groups based on different principles, and 
operating in isolation of each other as separate, autonomous, social instruments of 
change” (Titmuss, 1958: 73-74). He suggests that tax reliefs should be cut back, thus 
allowing a much larger Exchequer grant to be paid to the National Insurance Fund and 
hence allowing the level of universal flat-rate pension benefits to rise, from which the 
poor would gain most proportionately.
5.5 Making Tax incentives Work in the Chinese Context
Preferential tax treatments on private pensions in China do not ensure that all 
individuals have an adequate retirement saving. The following three groups of people 
may fail to save through private pension even with tax incentives:
• The first group of people are those who have joined the public pension programme. 
Due to the high level of pension benefits they can receive at retirement, they have a 
low saving capacity in private pensions or feel no need to save one at all.
• The second group of people includes those who are myopic and super-rational 
(problem of myopia and moral hazard). They would not save on their own and are
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unlikely to do so in the future even if provided with tax incentives. This is because 
either they can not make accurate estimates of how much they need to save to 
provide a given post-retirement standard of living or they anticipate that if they do 
not take care of their retirement savings themselves the government will do it for 
them.
• The third group of people is those who are currently not covered by the insurance- 
based public pension and are not able to save for their retirement.
It must be noted that failure to save for retirement may lead to different consequences. 
The first group would not rely on the government at retirement having not saved 
because the insurance-base public programme guarantees them adequate retirement 
income. What concerns the government is the second group whom, having not saved 
(enough), at retirement it must look after. However, tax incentives will have a minor 
effect on the last group which has a very low income or lives in poverty. Providing this 
group with an adequate retirement income will be the Government’s responsibility if 
they are not to rely on their family members or informal transfers from the society. This 
is a crucial issue and a solution to this is suggested in Chapter 7. This chapter focuses on 
the first two groups as to what policy should be taken in order to boost retirement 
saving.
5.5.1 Reducing the Benefit of Public Pension
The level of public pension may reduce the effects of tax incentives afforded to private 
pension plans. As noted, if the current public pension programme provides generous 
benefits individuals would not be able or need to save through a private scheme.
In the social-democratic welfare regimes46, including Finland, Denmark and Norway, 
the state plays the dominant role in providing for retirement. In this type of welfare 
regime the public pension programme offers comprehensive, generous and universal 
entitlements with a clear preference for state provision over private protection. It is 
believed that the role of such states in constructing systems of social protection dwarfs
131
Chapter 5
and stifles the contributions of both markets and community. Similarly, the corporatist 
welfare regime, which includes the majority of European continental nations - Italy, 
France, Germany, Belgium and Austria, also employs state power in order to partially 
offset insecurities and inequalities in the market system. As in the social-democratic 
welfare regime, the role of the market in this type of welfare state is minimal in so far as 
eamings-related benefits ensure the maintenance of previous living standards for the 
beneficiaries. Thus, the need for supplementary benefits is also reduced. Therefore, the 
role of the state/market partly determines the relative importance of public/private 
provisions for retirement incomes in each country. Public pension provisions in both 
corporatist and social-democratic welfare states offer generous benefits to beneficiaries 
so that little room is left for the development of private pensions. It can be seen from 
Appendix (5-1)47 that these countries with generous public pension schemes have 
historically had fewer private pensions, even though private pensions are singled out for 
fiscal privileges. The assets of pension funds as a percentage of GDP (data for 1996) 
were highest in Finland (40.8%) and Sweden (32.6%)48, followed by Denmark (23.9%) 
and, far behind, Germany (5.8%), France (5.6%), Belgium (4.1%), Spain (3.8%), Italy 
(3%) and Austria (1.2%).
However, in the liberal welfare regimes including Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Ireland, Canada and Japan, public pension mainly guarantees basic needs 
in retirement. It is said that in this type of welfare state priority is given to market 
discipline rather than social solidarity. Therefore, the private sector is seen as the proper 
place to deal with economic insecurity for all but the least fortunate citizens. As a result, 
in this system public benefits are modest whilst private pensions are prominent. Data in 
Appendix (5-1) shows that the pension assets are much higher than that in other OECD 
countries, with 117.1% in Switzerland, 74.7% in the United Kingdom, 58.2% in the 
United States, 45% in Ireland, 43% in Canada and 41.8% in Japan.
46 Esping-Andersen’s influential study (1990) grouped 18 OECD countries observed into three social 
policy regimes: the “liberal” regime, the “social democratic” regime and the “corporatist” regime.
47 Appendix 5-1 provides the general picture of private pensions in 23 OECD countries including 
coverage rates, way of establishment of pension schemes (whether the system is mandated or voluntary), 
method of financing and asset accumulations of funds.
48 It should be noted that the higher pension assets in Finland and Sweden could be a result of compulsion.
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The fundamental point is that public pension wealth could discourage private response, 
as discovered by Feldstein and Pellechio (1979). A recent study by Richard Disney 
(1999) shows that the development of private pensions has a negative relationship with 
public pension expenditure. From a regression of private pension assets (% GDP) on age 
structure (65+%), real GDP per capita and public pension expenditure (% GDP), Disney 
has found that a rise in public pension spending commitments would be associated with 
a halving of the value of the assets49. The significant substitution effect of the public 
pension system on private pension funds indicates that lower public pension 
commitments may encourage the development of the private pension. The generosity of 
public pension provisions may hinder the development of private pensions but it does 
not necessarily follow that with less generous public provision in the future private 
pensions will automatically grow. Nevertheless, the experience in some OECD 
countries shows that the private sector does respond to tax incentives as public benefits 
are made less generous. As Disney puts it: the ‘voluntary’ route of offering incentives 
to individuals to make private retirement arrangements at the same time as public 
arrangements are cut back has proved a popular form of pension scheme transition in 
developed countries (Disney, 1999: 2).
5.5.2 Mandating Private Pensions
For various reasons50 some countries have experimented with mandatory private 
pension plans as an alternative or substitution to eamings-related public PAYG systems. 
Today approximately thirty world nations have mandatory private saving schemes. 
These mandated private systems can be classified into two broad clusters, centralised 
and decentralised schemes. Under the centralised management individuals are 
compelled to make contributions to a provident fund, which holds an account in their 
name, managed by a public agency. At retirement, the individual receives his 
accumulation. The first nationally mandated provident fund, EPF (the Employee’s 
Provident Fund), was established in Malaysia in 1951 and the largest such fund is
49 He also notes that the level of real income and of financial development of the economy is also positive 
related to the value of pension assets.
50 The reasons include the problems of high contribution rate and the unsustainability of public PAYG 
systems, as well as the motivation to increase private and national saving.
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Singapore’s Central provident Fund, created in 1955. India and Indonesia established 
provident funds in the early 1950s, but with limited coverage. Several African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Island countries followed in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (The 
World Bank, 1994: 213-214). The central feature of decentralised mandatory retirement 
saving schemes is the crucial role played by private sector financial institutions 
investing accumulations and administering payouts. Decentralised mandatory retirement 
saving schemes are operated in Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Peru and some OECD 
countries, including Australia, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, France and Sweden. The 
most famous example is Chile’s, set up by the World Bank (1994) as an efficient private 
saving model; the latest is that of Hong Kong, founded in August 1995. Centrally 
managed private funds are subject to direct or indirect government controls and are 
therefore more vulnerable to political risks. However, the administrative costs are 
generally lower due to the economy of scale. Decentralised saving schemes, on the other 
hand, are operated on a basis of market competition and are therefore argued to provide 
higher investment returns but are subject to higher administrative costs.
Compulsory private saving schemes can be justified on two grounds. First and foremost 
is to correct the private sector’s failure at providing retirement incomes. Without 
mandation individuals may not save (enough), despite tax incentives, when public 
pensions are reduced. This mainly results from the discriminative nature of private 
provisions (coverage is focused on big firms, men and high-income earners) and the 
problems of myopia and moral hazard.
A study by Disney (1999) reports that in the United States when a public pension system 
is partially replaced by a voluntary funded private pension system individuals do not 
save enough. He also finds similar evidence in the United Kingdom that many people 
who have partially opted out of social security in order to buy individual retirement 
saving accounts are not doing enough saving although “the degree of ‘inadequacy’ 
remains contentious”. This finding implies that if Chinese government encourages 
workers to demand a private pension and employers to provide private pension schemes 
for their workers through employment-related occupational pensions or individual 
pensions and also mandates adequate rates of contribution to funded pension schemes, 
both the participation rate and the adequacy of saving would doubtless be increased. The
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consequence of a system with an adequate private benefit combined with public 
arrangements would be to enable retired workers to maintain retirement living standards 
while avoiding increases in public expenditures on income maintenance programmes.
It is noted that Australia is the only one among the OECD countries studied to 
implement a tax model of “TTT” in which taxes are levied on all three points of activity 
- pension contribution, fund accumulation and benefit distribution. Before the tax 
reform, private pensions in Australia were taxed under the EET model. Since the late 
1980s contributions, previously untaxed, have been taxed at 15 per cent, the tax levied 
on the fund. Investment earnings (nominal income), with capital gains adjusted for 
inflation, are also taxed at 15 per cent. To offset the tax on contributions, taxes on 
benefits were reduced by 15 per cent. However, unlike New Zealand, Australia has not 
seen a dramatic decrease in pension funds. This may be attributed to two factors. First, 
private pensions in Australia still enjoy some fiscal privileges: the 15 percent tax rate is 
much lower than the statutory marginal income tax rate applied on labour (47 percent 
for top rate taxpayers) and capital income (interests and dividends are received gross 
and taxed as ordinary income). The second and possibly more important reason is that 
private pensions (Superannuation Guarantee in Australia) are mandatory. In Australia 
trade union and the federal government require a minimum rate of employer’s 
contribution to superannuation. This rate has been increasing from 3 per cent of wages 
in 1989 to 9 per cent in 2002. Under this regulation, it is no surprise that the rate of 
pension coverage in Australia is much higher than in New Zealand, 91.5 percent versus 
23 percent in 1998, and was one of the highest in OECD countries of that year. 
Appendix 5-1 shows that the rates of coverage are generally higher in countries where 
private provisions are compulsory, with more than 80 percent of the working population 
covered. Also, the ratio of fund assets to GDP is seen to be very high in these countries, 
except in France where the mandatory private pensions are financed on a PAYG basis.
The second justification for a mandatory retirement saving is based on the regressive 
benefits distribution of tax privileges. If more individuals, including low-income 
workers, were covered by private pension schemes the tax privileges to private pension 
schemes would be more evenly spread. It may be argued that tax incentive is not 
necessary if the membership of private pension schemes is mandatory. The role of tax
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incentives can be seen as to make the compulsion easier for people to accept. In OECD 
countries both voluntary and compulsory participation in private pension schemes are 
implemented in combination with some form of tax incentives.
Mandatory retirement saving, however, also has disadvantages, some of which have 
been observed in practice. First, mandated participation in private pension schemes 
would make it difficult for those on low-income, who would not otherwise save, to 
make financial arrangements for their life time contingencies within a lower capacity of 
consumption. This may have implications for China where there are stringent controls 
on financial credits to individuals. Second, compulsory employee contribution would 
affect saving incentives. They would see contributions as tax as in the public PAYG 
system. This may create some incentives for tax avoidance and evasion by understating 
wages or substituting in-kind benefits for wages distribution (World Bank, 1994: 214). 
Third, high compulsory contribution rates for employers would affect demand for labour 
leading to higher unemployment. This is because wage rigidity prevents employers from 
shifting part of their contribution to workers. Singapore has experienced this effect in 
1984 when it raised the contribution rate to 50 percent of wages, shared equally by 
employers and employees. The employers’ rate was cut in half the following year 
because of the belief that this had adversely affected employment {ibid.). Finally, a 
compulsory system is more costly then a voluntary one. The government must have 
various regulations to ensure that a mandated private pension functions well. The 
government may have to determine the type of a pension scheme - DB or DC - and the 
allowable features of private pensions - such as the vesting and adequacy of a pension 
scheme. It may have to guarantee pensions in case of inflation and enterprises 
insolvency and give some protection from exposure to investment risks and so on. All 
the regulatory issues mentioned are particularly important for China where there is an 
absence of a strong and transparent capital market, a lack of tradition of private pension 
funds and a lack of familiarity of workers with capital market instruments.
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5.6 Conclusion
Following an examination on the tax systems in China, France, Germany, Sweden, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, this chapter has analysed the extent to which private 
pensions are treated differently from other forms of saving in these countries. The 
analysis is conducted by comparing the DFiP between private pensions and the other 
four financial assets, i.e. bank deposits, bond ownership, share ownership, private 
pensions and owner-occupied housing, under each of the tax system in these six 
countries.
The DFiP obtained under the assumptions set up in Section 5.3 lead to five main 
conclusions. First, in France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom private 
pensions are more lightly taxed than other forms of saving because the DFiP on 
pensions is the highest amongst all the assets compared. Second, in New Zealand 
private pensions are taxed basically the same way and at the same rate as other savings 
vehicles including bank deposits and bond ownership. However, share ownership and 
owner-occupied housing are more advantageous in terms of fiscal treatment in this 
country. Third, the private pension in China is heavily taxed both vertically in terms of 
international comparison and horizontally in comparison to the other four financial 
assets in China. Fourth, changing the current tax system by reducing the tax liabilities of 
private pension schemes in China could encourage more individuals and enterprises to 
build up a retirement pension plan. This is because tax incentives can alter the 
composition of savings. It can affect investors’ decisions as to what asset to choose for 
their saving purposes (other things being equal). Finally, top-rate taxpayers who pay 
taxes at a marginal rate of 45 percent have a higher DFiP than standard-rate taxpayers 
who pay taxes at the marginal rate of 20 percent. This implies that a preferential tax 
treatment on private pensions will provide more tax benefits to high-income people, 
which may eventually enlarge the income gap between rich and poor.
From the apparent significance of tax incentives for private pension development in 
many OECD countries it can be expected that a preferential tax treatment on private 
pensions in China would provide a high incentive for people to save for their retirement. 
This chapter recommends two approaches as supplementary policies to preferential tax
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treatments, through which self-insurance can be improved. The policies include 
reducing the replacement rate of the public pension to facilitate the first group’s saving 
and mandating the membership of the private pension to force the second group to save. 
A tax system favouring private pensions combined with a reduction in public pension 
benefits and a compulsion of membership would encourage a higher uptake.
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VI. THE ESTIMATION OF THE TAX COST Of PRIVATE PENSIONS
6.1 Introduction
There should not be any doubt about the positive effect of the preferential tax treatment 
on promoting private pensions. However, the preferential tax treatment is, on the other 
hand, an expense for government revenues. The tax exemption of pension contributions 
(or pensions) and returns, the likely lower income-tax bracket in which tax will be paid 
on pensions received after retirement and tax-free lump-sums can make for enormous 
costs for governments’ budgets. With the introduction of the concept of tax expenditures 
by Surrey in 1973, governments of OECD countries have shown increasing interest in 
the cost of tax privileges for private pensions. According to Whitehouse (1999), as a 
percentage of GDP in 1995, tax expenditures on private pensions were O.l percent in 
Germany, 0.9 percent in the United State, l.7 percent in Australia, l.9 percent in Ireland 
and the Netherlands and 2.4 percent in the United Kingdom”. Among these the United 
Kingdom had the highest ratio of tax reliefs to GDP of the OECD member countries 
(OECD, 1994). Sinfield ( l999) stresses that “the tax reliefs to private pensions costs the 
taxpayer 45 percent more than all selective or means-tested social security assistance 
paid to the poorest old people”. Although the cost of tax reliefs is lower in the United 
States, “it has historically been the largest contributor to the total; in 1990, of $ll8bn” 
(Andrews, 1993).
This chapter attempts to estimate the tax revenues raised under the five alternative tax 
treatments, i.e. EET, TEE, EEt, ETT and TTE, and to calculate the relative cost of the 
tax privileges to private pensions with respect to the benchmark tax treatment on bank 
saving in China, through which the five tax models can be compared from the point of 
view of the government. The structure is as follows. Section 6.2 gives the proper 
definition of the cost of preferential tax treatments on private pensions and sets up 
assumptions for the estimation. In Section 6.3 the five tax models above are compared 
within the hypothetical scenario that the size of covered population is static. In Section 
6.4 annual tax revenue and the relative cost under the five tax models are estimated 
within the scenario where the size of covered population expands over time. The static
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analysis in 6.3 is rather artificial and unrealistic, however, it can achieve an easier and 
better understanding of the dynamic analysis in 6.4. Section 6.5 draws conclusions on 
this chapter.
6.2 The Measurement of the Cost of Tax Privileges
Before moving on to calculating the cost of tax privileges on private pensions, it is of 
importance to specify the concept of cost. The first part of this section aims to define the 
cost of preferential tax treatments on private pensions. The second part sets up 
assumptions for the estimation.
6.2.1 The Measurement of the Cost in the Estimation
In 1955 British professor Richard Titmuss (published in 1958: 42-45) defined the cost 
of tax privileges as a kind of ‘fiscal welfare’. In the chapter of “Social Division of 
Welfare” in Essay on the Welfare State, Titmuss examined fiscal welfare and 
occupational welfare in addition to public welfare. Fiscal welfare is where that social 
services or social benefits are delivered through the use of allowances, reliefs, 
deductions and other such preferential tax treatments. Although Titmuss did not use the 
expression of tax cost, he indicated that these allowances, reliefs, deductions and 
exemptions etc. cost the government money, even though they do not show up in the 
budget.
In the United States the concept of tax cost was defined in the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 as “revenue losses attributed to provisions of the 
federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross 
income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax 
liability” (McGill et al, 1999). This definition is accepted by the OECD and was written 
in the 1994 report: “tax costs are due to special provisions in the tax system that are 
designed to achieve identifiable social and economic objectives. Such programs are 
generally carried out through the provision of special exemptions, deductions, 
exclusions, credits and preferential rates in the tax system” (OECD, 1994:144).
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According to this definition, the tax cost in a country occurs when the government loses 
some amounts of revenue that would otherwise be collected. The foregone revenues 
result from special tax provisions that are deviations from the essential tax system of 
that country.
Although the costs of tax privileges are recognised as foregone revenues resulting from 
provisions that are deviations from the tax system, computing foregone revenues is not 
straightforward in practice. The problem arises from the need to identify an essential tax 
system, deviations from which can then be treated as cost. The way of calculating the 
cost of tax privileges varies across OECD countries due to the different essential tax 
systems used with which the costs are compared. For instance, in the 1996 OECD 
review, fourteen of the twenty-four countries took apart. Of these Germany (and the 
Netherlands and Portugal) reported to the OECD that tax arrangements for old-age 
pensions were part of the system and did not, by definition, constitute a cost of tax 
privileges (OECD, 1996, part 2). In the United States (and other countries such as 
Australia, Canada and Spain), the regular saving account is used as the benchmark: the 
total cost in the year in question is calculated by summing the tax reliefs on 
contributions by employees and employers and on pension funds’ investment incomes 
and then taking off tax liabilities on pensions in payment (OECD, 1996: 144). In the 
United Kingdom, the actual tax treatment of private pensions is compared with 
unapproved pension schemes, where employees’ contributions (employers contributions 
are deductible as business expenses) and investment returns are taxed but the 
withdrawal of the pension as a lump-sum is free of tax, though benefits in the form of an 
annual pension would be taxable. The Inland Revenue uses this as a benchmark with 
which the approved schemes can be compared. The total cost in the year in question is 
calculated by adding the estimated taxes that would be paid on contribution to the 
estimated taxes that would be paid on the earnings accruing to the funds and subtracting 
the estimated taxes paid on benefits in payment. In fact, both the Treasury of the United 
States and the Inland Revenue of the United Kingdom use systems close to the Income 
Tax system, the TTE tax model in particular, in calculating the cost of tax privileges on 
private pensions, although the benchmark in use in the two countries is different.
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As the calculated results are highly sensitive to the choice of the tax system, that choice 
is significant in measuring the cost of preferential tax treatments. In fact, the cost could 
be either under- or over-estimated. For instance, Dilnot and Johnson (1993a) calculate 
cost for the UK based on separate ‘benchmarks’ of tax-free equity accounts (PEPs) 
(treated close to the TEE model) and ordinary bank deposits (taxed under the TTE 
model) and obtain vastly different results, i.e. £lbn versus £4bn. They conclude that it is 
only meaningful within the context of a benchmark against which the cost of tax relief 
can be measured, then the benchmark in use also determines the size of the cost.
It is obvious that the choice of benchmark tax system for measuring the cost of tax 
privileges to private pensions should reflect the fiscal policy of that country in which it 
would be measured. The question of which is the best essential tax system - Expenditure 
or Income - is a question of whether taxes should be levied on investment income to 
financial assets in general and to pension funds in particular, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
One can expect that the answer to this question may vary among countries due to 
distinctive social as well as economic objectives. If it is argued that all income in China 
should be taxed - that an Income Tax system is required as the basic tax structure -  it is 
reasonable that the implementation of the ETT or TTE models would have no cost to the 
government whilst that of EET and TEE would be small. The EEt model, however, 
would have a large tax privilege cost. On the other hand, if it is argued that all 
investment income in China should be tax-exempted - that an Expenditure Tax system 
is believed to be the best system - one can expect that EEt would have small cost while 
EET and TEE have no cost. ETT and TTE models would suffer very large negative cost.
In this chapter the tax treatment on interest-bearing bank saving is considered a 
contrasting benchmark tax system against which can be estimated the cost of tax 
incentives, if any, to private pensions under the five tax models. The choice of this 
benchmark tax system is not to suggest that China should adopt an Income Tax system. 
On the contrary, as argued in Chapter 4, private pensions must be treated under the 
Expenditure Tax system with all investment returns exempted from the tax base of 
personal income tax. The estimate of the cost of tax privileges requires some 
assumption about what individuals’ reactions would be if tax privileges afforded private 
pension schemes were available. If savings through private pensions are more lightly
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taxed than other types of investment, households may respond by transferring their 
money from other saving accounts to pension schemes. The result of those changes is to 
alter the original tax base and to affect government revenues. Thus, a cost occurs when 
the government loses some of the revenue that otherwise would have been collected. 
Bank saving is chosen as a benchmark as it is the most significant investment means for 
the majority of Chinese households. It is probably the most accurate costing as if 
preferential tax treatments were given to pension funds, saving now made through banks 
would be likely to move to those funds.
6.2.2 The Estimation Assumptions
The basis of the estimation assumes that a person earns the same amount of earnings 
each year and saves the same proportion of his earnings annually for a certain number of 
years in either a private pension scheme or a bank. At retirement, the accumulated 
savings together with investment returns (including income and capital gains) in both 
the pension fund and the bank account are used to purchase annuities that can be paid 
until death. The cost to the government of tax privileges for private pensions can be 
shown as the difference between the tax revenues received from the pension scheme and 
that through the bank saving. Cost occurs if tax revenues from pension schemes are 
lower than those from bank savings. It can be expected that the size of the cost will 
depend on the deviations of the tax treatments on pensions from those on bank saving. It 
was noted in the previous chapter that bank account savings in China are currently made 
from after-tax income. A 20 percent withholding tax is levied on the interest of bank 
deposits. There are no taxes on withdrawals. This tax arrangement for bank saving can 
be characterised as the TtE tax regime (here “t” refers to a tax at 20 percent which is 
lower than the 33 percent rate of corporation tax on pension fund returns). Therefore, 
the current tax treatment on bank deposits, i.e. the TtE model, is used in the estimation 
as a bench mark tax model to calculate the cost of tax privileges under the following 
five alternative models. They are:
• EET model: contributions and investment income tax exempted, pension 
benefits taxed;
143
Chapter 6
• TEE model: contributions taxed and investment income and pension benefits tax 
exempted;
• EEt model: contributions, investment income tax exempted, part of pension 
benefits can be taken as a tax-free lump sum with the remaining pensions being 
fully taxed;
• TTE model: contributions and investment income taxed, pension benefits tax 
exempted; and
• ETT model: contributions tax exempted, investment income and pension 
benefits taxed.
Potential revenues from contributors, pension funds and recipients would be crucially 
dependent on developments in the economy, especially with regard to economic factors 
(such as labour force, wages, interests and private pension coverage) and their growth. It 
is beyond the scope of the thesis to make detailed investigations for projections on these 
macro- and micro-economic variables. The specific numbers and assumptions made in 
the estimations about level and growth rate of earnings, rate of contribution, term of 
investment, life expectancy and investment returns are set for ease of computation. They 
are presented in Table 6-1.
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Table 6-1 Estimation Assumptions
Starting age o f work 21
Earliest age o f entry to pension schemes 21 (men and women)
Latest age of entry to pension schemes 51 (women) and 56 (men)
Pensionable age 56 (women) and 61 (men)
Life expectancy 78 for men and women, the life span 
after 60 is 18 years
Estimation period from 2010 to 2067
Terms o f contributions 
Average wage at start
between 5-30 years 
18,833 Yuan
Wage growth rate 8% (gross)
Rate o f contributions to:
- pension funds
- bank accounts
10% of total wage p.a. 
10% of total wage p.a.
Rate o f return on pension fund investment 10% (gross)
Rate of return on bank deposit
Rate of personal income tax
(on contributions and pension benefits)
3% (gross)
(a) 20% before and after retirement
(b) 20% during working life and 5% 
after retirement
Rate o f tax on fund returns 33%
Rate o f tax on bank interest 20%
Percentage o f accumulated funds that can 
be taken at retirement as tax-free lump sum
25% of accumulated fund income
Share of non-agricultural labour force in 
population group 21-56:
- share of labour force in age group 21-56
- share of labour in non-agriculture
72%
90%
80%
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In China there are 11 years of compulsory schooling. If everyone goes to school at age 7 
and also has two years of professional training after 11 years of compulsory education 
then the labour market is entered at the age of 21. In the estimation it is assumed that the 
retirement age is 60 for men and 55 for women, the current official retirement ages for 
workers in China. For simplicity, the life expectancy is allowed to be the same for both 
sexes - 18 years at 60.
The minimum length of saving allowed is 5 years. This means that male workers over 
56 and female workers over 51 are not able to save in a pension scheme or bank 
account. The maximum term of contribution to a pension fund is 30 years as individuals 
for various reasons may not remain within one pension scheme for long. For example, 
some workers may stop contributing to pension schemes due to maternity, caring for a 
child or the old or sickness. The same term of investment through bank saving will be 
assumed for comparative purposes.
After 5-30 years of contribution, the accumulated income in a pension fund or bank 
account will continue to accumulate until the saver reaches his/her retirement at age 
60/55. For comparative purposes, it is assumed that on retirement all savings made 
through the pension fund and bank account are used to purchase annuities51 with the 
exception that under the EEt model 25 percent of accumulated funds is taken as a tax- 
free lump-sum at retirement while the remaining amount is used to purchase annuities.52
It is assumed that the year of the creation of the private retirement saving plan is 2010 
when the old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the population of 65+ to the population between 
14 and 64, begins to increase (see Figure 2-1 in Chapter 2). According to the 
assumptions set above, the saving plan ceases its operation in 2067 when the youngest
51 Annuity is calculated by using the following equation:
1
Annuity = Value of accumulated savings at retirement x —-----------
S'O+r)'
Where: i is interest rate on savings and n is number of years that annuity is paid from the year of 
retirement until death. In this estimation, n is 18 years for men whilst 23 years for women as 
women retire 5-years earlier than men.
52 The estimation assumes that the tax-free lump sum will be consumed immediately (on a holiday for 
example). In reality, individuals may invest part of it in a bank or other financial asset such as government
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plan members (21 years old) at the year of the creation of the saving plan reach the end 
of their lives (the size of covered population is assumed static). Therefore, the whole 
time period for the estimation in this chapter is between 2010 and 2067.
The estimation assumes that the initial gross wage is 18,833 Yuan for all individual 
workers in year 2010. This wage level is calculated on a wage base of 7,479 Yuan with 
a growth rate of 8 percent per year for 12 years. The 7,479 Yuan was the level of annual 
average wage of the urban employees in China in 1998 (Chain Statistics Year Book, 
1999 version). Between 1982 and 1996 the average money wage grew at an annual rate 
of 15.2 percent.53 This was associated with high economic growth which was attributed 
to the “high level of capital formulation and the large opportunities in China for 
technological catch-up with more advanced countries” (World Bank, 1996: 147). 
According to the World Bank, the economic growth will come down in the longer term 
due to a declining savings rate and smaller scope for technological catch-up, although it 
may remain high for several years. An 8 percent growth rate of money wage is therefore 
reasonable for the estimation period between 2010 and 2067. To simplify the 
calculation, it is assumed that the pension scheme is a defined contribution type. This 
enables the contribution rate, namely 10 percent of total wage, to be fixed over the term 
of individuals’ membership.
In order to examine the pure tax effect, the same rate of return must be used to compare 
the tax revenues that would be collected from the pension fund with those from the 
bench mark bank account. In reality pension fund returns are not the same as bank 
interest rates. Between 1982 and 1996 the average nominal yield on long-term 
government bonds in China was 10 percent54 while the interest rate on a 5-year term 
bank saving was about 3 percent. Therefore, the different accrual rates used in the 
estimation, namely 10 percent for pension funds and 3 percent for bank savings, will 
provide more realistic indications of the revenues as well as the cost of the tax privileges 
than would the same rate of return on both accounts.
bonds and shares. Therefore, the actual tax revenue under the EEt model may be a little higher than the 
figures obtained later in this chapter.
53 Table 3-11 in Chapter 3.
54 Based on Table 3-9 in Chapter 3.
147
Chapter 6
Pension fund returns are subject to 33 percent corporation income tax while bank 
interests are taxed at 20 percent55. Therefore, the estimated cost of tax privileges to 
private pensions incorporates both differential rates of return on accrued fund incomes 
and differential tax treatments on pensions and bank savings. In order to compare the 
effect of changes in personal income tax rates on tax cost the estimation will be 
calculated not only with the same personal income tax rates before and after retirement 
but also with different tax rates of 20 percent during working life and 5 percent in 
retirement.
Finally, the estimation requires an annual population distribution by age and gender, 
which depends on assumptions about age-specific fertility, mortality etc.. The cost 
estimation uses the population projections made in the United Nations publication, 
Long-Range World Population Projections: Based on the 1998 Revision (The United 
Nations, 2000). This long-range projection provides projected populations for the world 
and its major areas including China over the period 1950-2150. The projected 
populations are based on five-year projection intervals. Figures of age group 21-56 
between the intervals are obtained by interpolation.
The estimation assumes that the private pension scheme covers a non-agricultural labour 
force aged between 21 and 56. This means the scheme membership includes not only 
employees in urban units but also employees in Individual and Private Enterprises (IEs 
and PEs), employees in Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and the self- 
employed. The share of non-agricultural labour in the population group 21-56 depends 
on two variables: a) share of labour in age group 21-56; b) share of labour in non­
agriculture. Firstly, in view of the fact that the government is making more effort to 
improve national education, it is assumed that labour force participation in population 
group 21-56 becomes 90 percent by 2010 and stabilises thereafter. Secondly, according 
to the World Bank projection, the share of labour force in non-agriculture becomes 71 
percent by 2010, 83 percent by 2030 and 89.5 percent by 2050. To simplify the 
estimation this ratio is assumed to be 80 percent throughout the period for estimation; 
the share of non-agricultural labour in the population group 21-56 is constant - 72 
percent throughout 2010 to 2067.
55 These are the current tax rates in China.
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6.3 Features of the Alternative Tax Models
This section assumes the scenario that the retirement saving plan (through either a 
private pension scheme or a bank) covers all non-agricultural sector employees aged 21- 
56/51 in 2010. There are no new members after that year and so the population size for 
estimation is static. The purpose of this assumption, as mentioned earlier, is to generate 
a simplified but clear characteristic of alternative tax models, with an aim of obtaining a 
better understanding of the analysis in the next section. Section 6.3.1 estimates the 
population of contributors and beneficiaries over the period of 2010 to 2067. Section
6.3.2 compares the differences and similarities of the five tax models by computing the 
present value of revenues raised under each. The last section 6.3.3 analyses the effect of 
timing on taxation.
6.3.1 Population Distributions
Under the assumptions stated in the last section the population distribution between 
contributors and beneficiaries is calculated in Figure 6-1, assuming the size of the 
population to be static - all non-agricultural sector employees aged from 21 to 56/51 
begin to join the saving plan in 2010 and there are no new members afterwards.
As can be seen from the graph, about half a billion individuals contribute to the pension 
scheme (or the bank account) each year during the first five years, between 2010 and 
2014. Then the number of contributors starts to decrease as those who are oldest at the 
commencement of the plan (51 year-old women and 56 year-old men) reach their 
retirement age. This figure becomes zero in 2040 as the result of the assumption that 
there are no new members after 2010.56 Figure 6-1 also shows that there is no 
beneficiary during the first five years. After that the number of beneficiaries begins to 
increase for about 30 years before it starts to decrease in 2046. This figure again 
becomes zero by 2067 when the youngest at the time of the creation of the saving plan 
reach the end of their lives.
56 Under the assumption that the maximum term of contributing to a pension fund is 30 years, there is one 
group of people who have completed their 30 years’ of contribution but are still a few years younger than
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A marked feature under this scenario is that before the year 2031 the number of 
contributors exceeds that of beneficiaries. However, after 2031 as more plan members 
reach retirement age, the number of beneficiaries exceeds the number of contributors.
Figure 6-1 Population Distribution between Contributors and Recipients
(With static size of covered population, in thousands)
Population before retirementRecipients Contributors
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6.3.2 Outcome of Revenues
The tax revenues accrued under the five tax models, i.e. EET, TEE, EEt, ETT and TTE, 
can be estimated using the assumptions set out in Table 6-1. The calculated revenues are 
based on the different tax treatments on the contributions made over the period in 
question, the investment returns and the annuities paid to individual savers after their 
retirement. Revenues from each year after the initial year of creation (namely 2010) of 
the saving plan are discounted to the year of creation. In other words, to make all the 
figures comparable, the figures are brought forward to the year of creation using the 
same discount rate, which is the 10 percent long-term interest rate on government 
bonds. The results are presented in Table 6-2.
The first part of Table 6-2 shows the present value of revenues raised under the five tax 
treatments on private pensions under the assumption that the personal income tax rate is
their official age of retirement. It must be noted that during this period, namely from 2040 to 2049, they 
do not make contributions, nor do they receive annuities.
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stable throughout the individual’s lifetime, 20 percent during working life and 20 
percent after retirement. The figures in the table lead to three important conclusions:
First of all, the EET and the TEE models ultimately lead to the same amount of 
discounted revenues, whilst the ETT has the same outcomes as the TTE model. The 
amount of revenues in present value terms is respectively 3,269bn Yuan under the EET/ 
TEE and 9,536bn Yuan under the ETT/TTE. Appendix 6-1 and 6-3 provide the 
estimated after tax annuities to pensioners under the five tax treatments. For example, 
facing a 20 percent rate of income tax before and after retirement, a 21 year-old male in 
2010 at retirement can receive annuities of 193,581 Yuan under the tax treatments of 
EET and TEE, or alternatively, 70,523 Yuan under the ETT and TTE. This means that 
the EET/ETT and TEE/TTE not only ultimately have the same outcome of revenue but 
also deliver the same outcome of benefit.
Second and equally important, in comparison with the EET and TEE models, the ETT 
and TTE models bring higher tax revenues to the government with the same tax rate. 
This indicates that the same amount of revenue can be raised by the ETT and TTE 
models with a lower tax rate as the tax base is larger. On the other hand, the EET and 
TEE reduce the size of the tax base by making all returns on savings tax-deductible. To 
make up the forgone revenues which would be raised under the ETT and TTE, tax rates 
under the EET and TEE tax models have to be higher. Thus, the ETT and TTE are more 
efficient in raising revenues.
Last, but not least, the EEt tax model collects the lowest revenues for the government 
under the same assumption. The total tax payments received by the government under 
this model between 2010 and 2067 are 22 percent and 73 percent lower than those under 
the EET/TEE and ETT/TTE models respectively. This is because the EEt model further 
reduces the size of the tax base by allowing 25 percent of accumulated funds to be taken 
away as tax-free lump sums. Although this tax treatment on the private pension scheme 
offers higher post-tax return to saving than any other tax models observed, it does not 
ultimately increase the retirement incomes of retirees if the tax-free lump sums are not 
used for the explicit provision of retirement income. For example, a 21 year-old male in 
2010 has annuities of only 145,186 Yuan after retirement. It can be calculated that the
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replacement rate (ratio of annuity to wage received in the year before retirement) for a 
21 year-old male individual is 51 percent under the EET and TEE models whilst it is 38 
percent under the EEt model.
Table 6-2 Total Revenues Raised under Different Tax Models
(With static size of covered population, present value, in billion Yuan)
(a) 20% rate o f personal 
tax during retirement
income tax during working life, 20% rate o f personal income
Tax models EET TEE ETT TTE EEt
Initial income (Yuan) 
Tax on contribution 
Tax on return 
Tax on annuity 
Sum of tax payment
18,833.00
0.00
0.00
3.269.13
3.269.13
18,833.00
3.269.13 
0.00 
0.00
3.269.13
18,833.00
0.00
7,833.76
1,702.37
9,536.13
18,833.00
3.269.13 
6,267.00
0.00
9.536.13
18,833.00
0.00
0.00
2.556.54
2.556.54
(b) 20% rate o f personal 
tax during retirement
income tax during working life, 5% rate o f personal income
Tax models EET TEE ETT TTE EEt
Initial income (Yuan) 
Tax on contribution 
Tax on return 
Tax on annuity 
Sum of tax payment
18,833.00
0.00
0.00
811.32
811.32
18,833.00
3.269.13 
0.00 
0.00
3.269.13
18,833.00
0.00
7,833.76
425.59
8,259.35
18,833.00
3.269.13 
6,267.00
0.00
9.536.13
18,833.00
0.00
0.00
612.96
612.96
6.3.3 Timing of Taxation
As noted, EET and TEE are equivalent in that they both obtain a post-tax rate of return 
on savings equal to the pre-tax rate of return on investments (Chapter 4). It has also 
been proved that they generate the same amount of discounted revenues. However, the 
two models raise revenue at different times. Revenue is deferred until retirement under 
EET but received immediately under TEE. With regard to ETT and TTE, they are 
equivalent in that they both offer a lower post-tax rate of return on saving than pre-tax 
rate of return and determine the same income tax base. However, they also differ 
somewhat in the timing of collection of tax payments.
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Figure 6-2 illustrates the timing of taxation and the amount of revenue reused under the 
five tax models. For purposes of comparison the tax revenues are calculated in present 
value terms. As can be seen, during the first five years from 2010 to 2014 EET does not 
provide the government any tax revenue. It starts to provide revenue in 2015 when the 
oldest members at the time of the creation of the retirement saving plan reach retirement 
age. Although EET provides lower revenue than TEE before 2031, it provides higher 
revenues thereafter. The increase in future revenues under EET is due to two factors. 
The first factor is the proportion of beneficiaries in the total covered population. As 
more plan members reach retirement age the number of beneficiaries rises over time. 
When the number of pension beneficiaries exceeds the number of contributors the tax 
base for EET is larger compared to TEE and consequently higher revenue is received by 
the government. The second factor which determines a higher future revenue under EET 
is that each successive age cohort of new beneficiaries has a larger taxable income from 
a longer saving period. These two factors come into play in determining the timing of 
when EET collects higher revenues than TEE.
When ETT and TTE are compared the two factors examined above also apply. To sum 
up, ETT provides lower revenue during the years following the creation of the plan but 
provides higher revenue in later years. TTE works the opposite way, raising present and 
reducing future revenues. The TEE model provides no revenue to the government after 
year 2040 (the number of contributors becomes zero) but TTE still brings some tax 
revenue due to the taxes levied on the investment income of the fund. Finally, the figure 
also shows that EEt and EET have the same pattern of taxation although the former 
collects 25 percent less revenue for the government.
The differing points at which the tax payments occur have effects on the revenue to the 
government as well as on retirement benefit to individual savers. If the tax rate on 
benefit is replaced by the tax on contributions at the same rate there is no change in the 
value of tax revenue or in the value of the net retirement benefit. If individuals’ annual 
income were to fluctuate over their lifetime under a progressive tax system, then EET 
and TEE would no longer be equivalent, nor would ETT and TTE. If individuals’ 
taxable income is subject to a lower income tax rate during retirement than during 
working years then the tax revenue raised under EET/ETT would be lower than that
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raised under TEE/TTE. The second part of Table 6-2 provides the present value of 
revenue raised under the five tax treatments, EET, TEE, ETT, TTE and Eet, under the 
assumption that the personal income tax rate falls when individuals reach retirement, i.e. 
20 percent during working life and 5 percent after retirement. The figure shows that as 
individuals’ income tax rate falls, total discounted revenue under EET, ETT and EEt 
drops 75 percent, 13 percent and 78 percent respectively. This means that under EET, 
ETT and EEt there will be some loss in terms of government revenue when taxpayers’ 
marginal tax rate is lower in retirement. However, the principal advantage of the three 
models to the individual saver is that when the tax is deferred the subsequent level of 
income tax is reduced and consequently the retirement benefit is higher. It can be 
calculated from the data in Appendix 6-2 and 6-4 that when the income tax rate 
decreases from 20 percent to 5 percent net retirement benefit received by the saver 
increases by 18.75 percent.
Figure 6-2 Patterns of Taxation under Different Tax Models
(With static size of covered population, present value, in billion Yuan)
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6.4 Cost of Preferential Tax Treatments on Private Pensions
This section estimates tax payments and forgone revenues within the scenario that the 
size of covered population expands over time. In this scenario the saving plan covers not 
only employees aged 21-56/51 in 2010 (the covered population in the last section) but 
also 21 year-old new employees each year from 2011 to 2067. The first part of this 
section compares the discounted revenue raised under the five tax models and the 
second part calculates the annual cost of tax privileges to private pensions.
6.4.1 End Value of Revenues
Before comparing the tax payment collected under different tax treatments on private 
pensions and the forgone revenue to the government it is useful to briefly describe the 
population distributions between contributors and beneficiaries throughout the period of 
2010 to 2067 which play an important role in the timing of taxation, as stressed in the 
last section.
The population distributions between contributors and pensioners (in either a pension 
fund or a bank account) over the period of 2010 to 2067 are displayed in Figure 6-3. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, the total pension members here include 
employees aged 21-56/51 in the year of 2010 and new employees aged 21 after that 
year. In order to examine the effect of population distribution on tax revenues raised 
under each tax model, the total population between 2010 and 2067 is divided into two 
groups. The first group contains those who join the saving plan in 2010 (which is the 
population size for the last section) and the second group includes those who join the 
plan after 2010. While curves Ci and Pi represent respectively changes in the numbers 
of contributors and beneficiaries in the first group, curves C2 and P2 represent 
respectively changes in the numbers of contributors and beneficiaries in the second 
group. As the figure shows, changes in the numbers of contributors and beneficiaries 
within the first group have the expected result - more contributors than recipients before 
the year of 2031 and vice versa after 2031. However, within the second group there are 
no recipients before the year of 2046.
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The population effect of the first saving group on the timing of revenues has been 
analysed in the previous section. As that section says, if the size of covered population is 
static, the amount of revenue raised each year under different tax treatments depends on 
two factors - the share of contributors and beneficiaries in total covered population and 
the amount of taxable incomes of taxpayers. EET/ETT determines a smaller tax base in 
comparison with TEE/TTE during the early years following the creation of the plan. 
This is because there are more contributors than beneficiaries during this period and also 
the early-retired members have smaller taxable incomes because of a shorter saving 
period. However, EET/ETT determine a larger tax base in later years when the number 
of pension beneficiaries exceeds the number of contributors, also, the later retired 
members have larger taxable incomes because of the longer saving period. Nevertheless, 
when the plan has matured the end values under EET/ETT and TEE/TTE are the same. 
It must be noted that the length of time for a saving plan to mature after its creation 
depends on three factors - age of the youngest at the time of creation of the plan, eligible 
age for benefit and life expectancy. For example, under the assumption set up in this 
chapter the process for plan maturation takes 58 years (61-21+18). This means that the 
plan has matured by 2067 when the 21 year-old cohort, the youngest at the time of 
creation of the plan, reaches life end.
As regards the population effect of the second saving group, individuals’ taxable income 
ceases to play a role in distinguishing the tax base of EET/EET from that of TEE/TTE 
because the taxable incomes of new beneficiaries are the same. The only factor which 
affects the amount of tax revenue under the different tax models is the share of 
contributors and beneficiaries in the total covered population. As its membership 
increases each year, each successive expansion in coverage brings new group of 
members into the plan, increasing the number of contributors and only later increasing 
the number of beneficiaries. Therefore, the saving plan would take longer to mature as 
each new cohort of covered population (21 year-old) sets off a new maturation process. 
In view of the fact that during 2010 to 2067 there are more individuals contributing than 
receiving benefits (as new members entering the plan after 2033 (female) and 2028 
(male) are under retirement age) the discounted revenue under EET/ETT is much lower 
than that under TEE/TTE (see Figure 6-4 and 6-5).
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Table 6-3 presents the discounted revenue under the five tax models including the total 
covered population, i.e. the two saving groups, while the pattern of timing on taxation is 
illustrated in Figure 6-6. It can be seen from Table 6-3 that between 2010 and 2067 TTE 
provides the highest discounted revenue followed by ETT. TEE provides lower 
discounted revenue than ETT but higher than EET. As expected, EEt provides the 
lowest revenue. It must be noted that if covered population after 2068 is stable in size, 
the long-term effect of EET/ETT and TEE/TTE are the same as long as the income tax 
rate during retirement does not differ from that during working period. Thus one can 
expect that in Figure 6-6 the discounted revenue line for EET/ETT will converge with 
that for TEE/TTE to be horizontal. However, if the rate of coverage after 2068 is zero 
then the plan will be mature by 2125. In this case one can expect that the TEE/TTE 
curve will decline immediately while the EET/ETT curve will decline later.
Figure 6-3 Population Distribution between Contributors and Recipients
(With expanding size of covered population, in thousands)
New contributors New beneficiariesOld contributors —X— Old beneficiaries
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Figure 6-4 Revenues from the Second Saving Group under EET and TEE
(Present value, in billion Yuan)
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Figure 6-5 Revenues from the Second Saving Group under ETT and TTE
(Present value, in billion Yuan)
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Table 6-3 Total Revenues Raised under Different Tax Models
(With expanding size of covered population, present value, in billion Yuan)
(a) 20%  rate o f  personal 
tax during retirement
income tax during working life, 20%  rate o f  personal income
Tax models EET TEE ETT TTE EEt
Tax on contributions 
Tax on investment 
Tax on benefits 
Sum of tax payment
0.00
0.00
4.170.05
4.170.05
8.209.92 
0.00 
0.00
8.209.92
0.00
18481.57
1985.08
20,466.65
8209.92
14785.26
0.00
22,995.18
0.00
0.00
3.216.02
3.216.02
(b) 20%  rate o f  personal 
during retirement
income tax during working life, 5%  rate o f  personal income tax
Tax models EET TEE ETT TTE EEt
Tax on contributions 
Tax on investment 
Tax on benefits 
Sum of tax payment
0.00
0.00
1037.27
1037.27
8.209.92 
0.00 
0.00
8.209.92
0.00
18481.57
496.27
18977.84
8209.92
14785.26
0.00
22,995.18
0.00
0.00
3.216.02
3.216.02
Figure 6-6 Patterns of Taxation under Different Tax Models
(With expanding size of covered populations, present value, in billion Yuan)
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6.4.2 Cost estimates with respect to the Chosen Benchmark Tax Treatment
Using the assumptions stated in Table 6-1, the cost to the government in terms of 
forgone revenues is calculated using the tax treatment on bank saving TtE as a 
benchmark. The cost of tax privileges to private pensions is calculated by subtracting 
the revenue received by the government under the five tax treatments, i.e. EET, TEE, 
ETT, TTE and EET, from the revenue received under bank savings, i.e. TtE. For 
example, supposing that tax revenues raised under EET, TTE and TtE are 2bn, 5bn and 
4bn Yuan respectively, then EET would have a cost of 2bn Yuan to the government, 
while TTE would have a negative cost of lbn Yuan. To compare the effect of a change 
to the income tax rate on revenues, the estimation provides the results under two 
assumptions. First, individuals’ income tax rate is stable throughout their lifetime - 20 
percent before and after retirement. Second, income tax rate during retirement differs 
from that during the working period - 20 percent at work while 5 percent during 
retirement. Total costs in present value terms are shown in Table 6-4; figures for annual 
costs are displayed in Table 6-5 and 6-6.
Part 1 of Table 6-4 presents the discounted tax revenues under TtE. The figure of 
8,209.92bn Yuan is tax revenue collected from contributions to bank accounts and 
l,799.38bn Yuan is revenue from bank interests giving total discounted revenue of
10,009.3 lbn Yuan under bank savings. When these figures are subtracted by those in 
Table 6-3 item by item, the cost under private pensions can be obtained and presented in 
Part 2 of Table 6-4. Therefore, the figure in Table 6-4 incorporates the tax treatment of 
contributions, investment earnings and retirement benefits on pensions which are 
deviations from those on bank savings.
The figure shows that under the TTE model the government gains 12,985.88bn Yuan 
because fund investment earnings (subject to 33 percent) are taxed more heavily than 
bank interests (subject to 20 percent). Under the ETT model the more revenue raised 
from fund investment earnings partly offsets the cost of 8,209.92bn Yuan on 
contributions paid to the fund, therefore the government gains slightly less revenues - 
10,457.34bn Yuan during the same period. Under the EET and TEE models, the cost to 
the government in terms of forgone revenues occurs due to the exemptions on
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investment returns. The total costs between 2010 and 2067 are 5,839.26bn and 
l,799.38bn Yuan respectively. In view of the fact that the plan is not yet mature during 
the period for estimation, EET results in higher cost than TEE.57 Amongst the five tax 
models, the EEt model has the highest cost to the government with a total revenue loss 
of 9227.43bn Yuan. This is because lump sums are not included in the tax-base of 
personal income when pensions are paid out, also, contributions and investment 
incomes are tax-free. Again, the cost to the government increases under the EET, ETT 
and EEt models when individuals’ marginal tax rate decreases from 20 percent to 5 
percent after retirement. This indicates that as tax revenues deferring from a period 
when taxpayers are subject to a higher tax rate to one when subject to a lower tax rate, 
the cost to the government increases and is shown in a reduction in future revenues.
Next to Table 6-5. When the system begins to function EET systematically raises less 
revenue than TtE (tax model on bank savings). It is not until 2038 that revenue under 
EET exceeds revenues under TtE. From then on the revenue increases each year until 
2067, thus the cost is shown negative for 30 years. In comparison to EET, EEt has the 
same amount of cost for the first five years. It has higher cost than EET from 2014 when 
the oldest members reach retirement age and is not until 2040 that the cost becomes 
negative. Also, the negative cost is lower than that of EET. When TEE is examined, 
unlike EET which has cost in the early years but negative cost in later years, TEE 
systematically has positive cost throughout the time span from 2010 to 2067, although 
TEE provides higher present value of revenues. As regards TTE and ETT, the cost 
under the former is negative during the 58 years whereas under the latter it is positive in 
the first six years until it becomes negative from 2017. Again, Table 6-6 shows that the 
cost to the government increases under EET, ETT and EEt when individuals’ marginal 
tax rate decreases from 20 percent to 5 percent after retirement.
Finally, the reliability of the estimates has to be analysed. First, in the estimation the 
private retirement saving plan is assumed to cover the whole of the non-agricultural 
sector employees aged 21-56. This rate of coverage is obviously far too high. For 
example, if the rate of coverage in age group 21-56 is 30 percent, then all the estimates
57 The estimation also takes account of mortality of the covered population. This means that contribution 
tax receives higher revenues in present value terms than benefit tax even when saving plans have matured.
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of revenues as well as costs produced in this chapter can be decreased by 42 percent. 
Second, for comparative purposes, revenues estimated under the pension scheme and 
the bank saving plan are discounted at 10 percent. Therefore, the present value of tax 
revenue from bank savings is reduced as bank savings accrue 3 percent per year under 
the assumption set up in Table 6-1. This means the cost is underestimated. When 
revenues from bank savings are discounted at 3 percent the relative cost to the 
government under the EET tax model increases from 5,839.26bn to 23,319.13bn if 
individuals’ income tax rates stay unchanged. Third, the estimation does not take 
account of employer contributions. Under the current regulation 5 percent of employer 
contributions to complementary pension schemes are deducted from the tax base as 
business expenses. However, fund returns and pensions are taxed. Therefore employer 
contributions are taxed under an ETT model. If ETT or TTE are applied in China 
employer contributions will have zero cost to the government. If, on the other hand, the 
EET or TEE model were applied, there would be some cost resulting from tax 
exemption on fund investment returns. Finally, the cost is only estimated assuming an 
investment term of 30 years. One can expect that as the term increases the cost to the 
government decreases as the longer period enables a higher taxable pension to be 
accrued.
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Table 6-4 Cost on Pensions with Tax Treatment on Bank Savings as Benchmark
(With expanding size of covered population, present value, in billion Yuan)
Part 1
Tax revenues under the tax treatment on bank savings, TtE, in present value terms
Tax on contributions = 8,209.92 
Tax on bank interests = 1,799.38 
Tax on benefits = 0.00 
Total tax revenues = 10,009.31
Part 2: Obtained by subtracting figures in Table 6-3 from figures in Part 1.
(a) 20% rate o f income tax during working life, 20% rate o f income 
retirement
tax during
Tax models EET TEE ETT TTE EEt
Cost on contributions 
Cost on investment 
Cost on benefits 
Total cost
8,209.92
1,799.38
-4,170.05
5,839.26
0.00
1.799.38 
0.00
1.799.38
8,209.92 
- 16,682.19 
- 1,985.08 
-10,457.34
0.00 
- 12,985.88 
0.00 
-12,985.88
8,209.92 
1,799.38 
- 3,216.02 
6,793.29
(b) 20% rate o f income tax during working life, 5% rate o f income 
retirement
tax during
Tax models EET TEE ETT TTE EEt
Cost on contributions 
Cost on investment 
Cost on benefits 
Total cost
8,209.92 
1,799.38 
- 1,037.27 
8,972.04
0.00
1.799.38 
0.00
1.799.38
8,209.92 
- 16,682.19 
-496.27 
- 8,968.53
0.00 
- 12,985.88 
0.00 
-12,985.88
8,209.92
1,799.38
-781.88
9,227.43
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Table 6-5 Annual Cost on Private Pensions with respect to Bank Savings
(20% tax rate during working, 20% tax rate after retirement, in billion Yuan)
Y ear
2010
EET
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
TEE
251,51 
282,41 
315,39
341,49
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
2051
2052
2053
2054
2055
2056
2057
2058
2059
2060
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
Accumulated cost
366,38 
391,45
416.55 
442,11 
467,37 
487,05 
504,58 
519,42 
531,69
540.00 
541,15
536.00 
523,48 
503,22 
472,94 
444,41 
405,78 
356,82 
295,89
220.56 
142,86
50,05
-183,88
-825,51
-1.061,07I 
-1.319,19 
-1.601,51 
-1.909,78
-2.246,68
-2.605,91
-2.981,52 
-3.376,37 
-3.793,59
-4.234,91
-4.614,77
-4.978,49
-5.328,29
-5.666,72
-5.994,27
-6.268,67
-6.523,29
-6.759,82
-6.982,43
-7.193,40
-7.341,25
-7.462,08
-7.556,38
-7.627,48
-7.678,86
-7.685,87
-7.656,94
-128.745,21
-58,00
4,63
9,84
15.71 
22,31 
29,65
37.72 
46,27 
55,54 
65,58 
76,37 
88,00 
99,95
112,71
126,35
140,86
156.33 
171,67
187.80
204.80 
222,66
241.39
259.89
279.02
298.85 
319,43
340.65
362.03 
383,83
406.09
428.85 
382,05 
392,20
401.66 
410,37 
418,25
425.33
432.82
439.69 
445,91 
451,46
456.89
461.00
464.39
467.10
469.16 
470,73
471.17 
471,13
470.67
469.86
468.80
467.00 
464,95
462.69 
460,28 
457,77
455.83 
453,82 
17.758
EEt ETT TTE
197,76 165,89 -20,86
223,40 154,36 -45,39
251,51 139,18 -74,16
282,41 119,75 -107,82
315,39 95,06 -146,61
342,43 56,95 -190,78
368,61 12,06 -239,27
395,38 -40,10 -293,46
422,67 -100,39 -353,95
■Hi 450,82 -168,52 -420,87479,29 -246,12 -495,02
» j! 503,20 -333,60 -573,53
525,93 -432,05 -659,55
547,11 -542,69 -753,81
566,87 -665,60 -856,59
584,15 -802,58 -968,61
595,57 -947,33 -1.083,15
602,60 -1.106,69 -1.206,31
604,45 -1.282,10 -1.338,83
600,87 -1.474,00 -1.481,13
590,07 -1.684,07 -1.633,48
580,90 -1.893,72 -1.787,66
564,36 -2.119,46 -1.950,45
540,32 -2.361,77 -2.122,42
507,57 -2.622,31 -2.304,26
464,19 -2.901,49 -2.495,33
419,43 -3.185,23 -2.691,15
363,37 -3.485,40 -2.894,54
295,93 -3.802,05 -3.105,90
215,21 -4.137,20 -3.325,82
-652,45 -4.915,19 -3.566,49
-821,85 -5.254,10 -3.744,16
-1.007,40 -5.595,60 -3.919,56
-1.210,27 -5.939,12 -4.092,31
-1 414,91 -6.284,00 -4.262,02
-1.646,88 -6.629,00 -4.427,24
-1.904,87 -6.956,82 -4.573,68
-2.173,90 -7.277,25 -4.712,51
-2.455,98 -7.590,60 -4.843,86
-2.734,09 -7.897,26 -4.967,93
-3.043,72 -8.196,07 -5.083,46
-3.312,11 -8.441,57 -5.174,39
-3.566,56 -8.666,32 -5.254,30
-3.808,51 -8.872,05 -5.324,38
-4.031,13 -9.060,59 -5.385,92
-4.255,73 -9.233,32 -5.439,78
-4.440,08 -9.366,98 -5.476,36
-4.607,02 -9.480,61 -5.503,11
-4.816,73 -9.576,01 -5.521,31
-4.984,14 -9.656,83 -5.532,41
-5.142,88 -9.725,44 -5.537,69
-5.254,97 -9.761,27 -5.534,41
-5.346,85 -9.779,10 -5.523,91
-5.418,90 -9.780,51 -5.507,41
-5.473,58 -9.769,23 -5.486,25
-5.513,49 -9.748,00 -5.461,83
-5.520,11 -9.720,85 -5.443,77
-5.499,78 -9.681,04 -5.423,42
-86.657,12 -268.445,98 -176.344*57
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Table 6-6 Annual Cost on Private Pensions with respect to Bank Savings
(20% tax rate during working, 5% tax rate after retirement, in billion Yuan)
Y ear EET TEE EEt ETT TTE
2010 197,76 4,63
251,51
165,89 -20,86
2011 223,40 IlK I 9,84 154,36 -45,39
2012 251,51 15,71 139,18 -74,16
2013 282,41 22,31 282,41
315,39
119,75 -107,82
2014 315,39 29,65 95,06 -146,61
2015 344,33 37,72 344,56 58,98 -190,78
2016 373,08 46,27 373,64 16,81 -239,27
2017 403,25 55,54 404,23 -31,82 -293,46
2018 434,91 65,58 436,44 -87,63 -353,95
2019 468,24 76,37 470,42 -150,57 -420,87
2020 503,12 88,00 506,10 -221,83 -495,02
2021 535,49 99,95 539,52 -301,06 -573,53
2022 568,62 112,71 573,96 -389,53 -659,55
2023 602,50 126,35 609,43 -488,17 -753,81
2024 637,23 140,86 646,02 -597,21 -856,59
2025 672,43 156,33 683,46 -717,85 -968,61
2026 707,38 171,67 718,02 -844,09 -1.083,15
2027 738,74 187,80 752,46 -981,85 -1.206,31
2028 769,31 204,80 786,65 -1.132,14 -1.338,83
2029 798,95 222,66 820,57 -1.295,45 -1.481,13
2030 827,23 241,39 853,62 -1.472,61 -1.633,48
2031 856,74 259,89 887,99 -1.650,24 -1.787,66
2032 884,37 279,02 921,17 -1.839,92 -1.950,45
2033 910,13 298,85 953,19 -2.042,28 -2.122,42
2034 933,59 319,43 983,87 -2.258,31 -2.304,26
2035 954,19 340,65 1.012,35 -2.487,79 -2.495,33
2036 975,27 362,03 1.041,69 -2.721,83 -2.691,15
2037 992,70 383,83 1.068,33 -2.967,34 -2.894,54
2038 1.006,48 406,09 1.092,29 -3.224,69 -3.105,90
2039 1.015,81 428,85 1.113,16 -3.494,94 -3.325,82
2040 524,74 382,05 634,54 -4.201,95 -3.566,49
2041 469,47 392,20 594,31 -4.459,11 -3.744,16
2042 408,05 401,66 549,30 -4.714,68 -3.919,56
2043 340,01 410,37 499,14 -4.968,11 -4.092,31
2044 264,52 418,25 443,44 -5.218,88 -4.262,02
2045 181,71 425,33 381,72 -5.465,32 -4.427,24
2046 95,39 432,82 318,15 -5.688,10 -4.573,68
2047 4,49 439,69 251,00 -5.901,77 -4.712,51
2048 -93,83 445,91 179,72 -6.106,54 -4.843,86
2049 -196,09 451,46 103,70 -6.302,69 -4.967,93
2050 -304,48 456,89 23,06 -6.488,85 -5.083,46
2051 -396,94 461,00 -45,46 -6.636,82 -5.174,39
2052 -485,91 sis ill 464,39 -111,53 -6.769,14 -5.254,30
2053 -571,92 467,10 -175,55 -6.887,36 -5.324,38
2054 -655,56 469,16 -237,96 -6.993,16 -5.385,92
2055 -736,85 470,73 -298,73 -7.087,72 -5.439,78
2056 -805,87 471,17 -350,64 -7.156,26 -5.476,36
2057 -870,31 471,13 -399,23 -7.210,49 -5.503,11
2058 -930,54 470,67 -444,76 -7.252,07 -5.521,31
2059 -987,55 469,86 -487,98 -7.283,27 -5.532,41
2060 -1.041,84 468,80 -529,21 -7.305,94 -5.537,69
2061 -1.082,41
iM l
467,00 -560,84 -7.313,74 -5.534,41
2062 -1.116,41 464,95 -587,61 -7.310,22 -5.523,91
2063 -1.143,94 111# 462,69 -609,57 -7.296,94 -5.507,41
2064 -1.165,78 460,28 -627,30 -7.276,08 -5.486,25
2065 -1.182,76 457,77 -641,41 -7.249,67 -5.461,83
2066 -1.188,57 455,83 -647,13 -7.228,19 -5.443,77
2067 -1.185,46 453,82 -646,17 -7.201,39 -5.423,42
Accumulated cost 5.330 17.758 16.441 -211.623,58 -176.344,57
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6.5 Conclusion
Tax incentives are economically equivalent to public expenditure and should be 
included in fiscal consideration. This chapter has compared the different tax treatments 
on private pensions - EET, TEE, ETT, TTE and Eet - by estimating their tax revenues 
and relative costs between 2010 and 2067 with respect to the benchmark TtE which is 
the tax treatment on bank savings in China.
In order to achieve an easier understanding of the five tax models the estimation is 
conducted within two scenarios, i.e. the size of covered population is static and the size 
of covered population expands over time from 2010 to 2067. In the first scenario EET 
and TEE have the same present value of tax revenue, as have ETT and TTE. The EEt 
model produces the lowest revenue to the government because it allows both investment 
income and pension benefits to be tax exempt. However, the revenue decreases under 
EET, ETT and EEt when individuals’ marginal tax rates decrease from 20 percent to 5 
percent after retirement.
If the size of covered population expands over time from 2010 to 2067, the estimated 
results differ from those in the first scenario. When ETT and TTE are compared there 
are two differences between these two models. First, the former generates higher present 
value of tax revenue that the latter. This is because during the period for estimation there 
are more contributors in the scheme producing a larger base for tax purposes under the 
TTE model than that under the ETT. Second, although the total costs under the two 
models are all negative, 12,985.88bn Yuan and 10,457.34bn Yuan respectively, 
resulting from the higher tax rate on fund returns than that on bank interests, they show 
different patterns annually. The annual cost under the former is systematically negative 
during the 58 years, whereas under the latter it is positive for six years before it becomes 
negative from 2017. There are also two differences between the EET and TEE models. 
First, EET has a lower present value of tax revenue than TEE during the estimation 
period. Consequently, the cost to the government in terms of forgone revenues under the 
former is higher than that under the latter, 5,839.26bn Yuan versus l,799.38bn Yuan. 
Second, unlike EET which has positive cost in the early years and negative cost in later 
years, TEE systematically has positive cost throughout the time span from 2010 to 2067.
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VII. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The objective of this chapter is to summarise this thesis and provide some suggestions 
as to what policies should be implemented in China. Section 7.1 recaps on the main 
analysis and findings in the previous chapters. To encourage individuals to save for their 
retirement, Section 7.2 draws some conclusions for future policy mainly concerning the 
tax arrangements on private pensions. Section 7.3 addresses potential problems 
connected of with regard to the recommended tax treatment on pension funds and gives 
some alternative solutions. The last section highlights some important issues that have 
not been considered and need further research.
7.1 Summaries of the Thesis
Following a review of the development of the public pension system in China, Chapter 
2 investigates the central issues of the current public provision for retirement income. 
The increasing contribution rate made necessary by the ageing population and higher 
dependency ratio will be a large burden for enterprises: it hinders their restructuring and 
damages national economic growth. Although design changes within the existing 
system, such as extension of coverage, indexation to prices, reduction in replacement 
rates and increase of retirement age, can improve the financial viability of the system in 
the short or middle term, the current system is not financially viable over the long term. 
The thesis suggests that one of the solutions to this problem in China is to reduce state 
pension provision by promoting private pension schemes. This is to say that a portion of 
old age security must instead be provided by self-insurance or occupational pensions. 
People especially high-income earners, must save for themselves, shifting consumption 
from their younger productive years to their older years when consumption exceeds 
income.
Chapter 3 discusses the respective roles of a pay-as-you-go public pension provision and 
a funded private pension arrangement and how they could be integrated. The first 
advantage of a pay-as-you-go public system is its ability to finance benefits rests on the 
entire economy thus giving the public system a financial security not easily matched by
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private plans. The second advantage is its provision for social solidarity and protection 
against the risk of personal misfortune. It provides a broad array of benefits besides 
retirement benefits such as pensions for widows and disabled and their independents, 
which are absent in a private plan. The third advantage is its ability to redistribute 
income from the rich to the poor: the benefit formula can, for instance, weight the 
benefits in favour of the low-paid workers. Finally, a pay-as-you-go public system also 
assures workers that their protection will follow them when they change jobs, this is not 
always found in private plans. However, a funded private system is also seen as having 
several advantages over a pay-as-you-go public system. For one, it avoids the problems 
of financing such a scheme resulting from an aging population. It also provides 
welcome funds for capital development and investment. Moreover, it gives individuals 
higher incentive to save due to a stronger linkage between contributions and retirement 
benefits. Finally, it is able to offer individuals higher rates of return on saving when the 
growth rates of both wage and economically active population are slowing down while 
the financial market is booming.
In China, a pension mix with pay-as-you-go based public provisions and funded private 
arrangements would benefit both individuals and the national economy. First, on one 
hand, the public system provides a safety net of retirement insurance for the old, low- 
income earners, part-time female workers, and those who have to leave the labour 
market due to disability. Private pension plans, on the other hand, would satisfy the 
requirement from high-income earners to maintain (or increase) their standard of living 
after retirement. Second, a mix would give individuals more flexibility over their 
decisions on retirement saving and more freedom to choose between the two schemes. A 
diversification across differing retirement arrangements, financing mechanisms and 
portfolio management can protect individuals against exposure to extreme failure of any 
one retirement arrangement and portfolio management, reducing overall risk and 
maximising returns to pensioners. Third, the heavy pension contribution burden on 
enterprises is reduced by the individual taking on part of the responsibility for retirement 
provision: a lower rate of contribution from enterprises, State-Owned Enterprises in 
particular, would help to facilitate and accelerate their reform and restructuring. Fourth, 
a mix offers a better balance of burden-sharing between the government, enterprises and 
individuals, thus reducing public expenditure on caring for the old in the long term.
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Chapter 4 studies the tax treatments of private pensions in 20 OECD countries. 
According to the Andrew Dilnot taxonomy in 1992, the tax treatments of private 
pensions in 20 observed member countries of the OECD fall into five categories: ETT, 
TTE, EET, TEE and EEt. Under the first two models, returns to pension funds are taxed 
and either contributions (TTE) or pensions (ETT) are also taxed. Nations following this 
pattern include New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden, Japan and Belgium (for self­
administered funds). Under the third and fourth models, either contributions (TEE) or 
pension benefits (EET) are taxed while fund investments are not. However, the EET 
model is the common regime in the majority of OECD countries such as Finland, 
France, Germany (for book-reserve financing), Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, and 
Portugal. The last model, EEt, taxes pension savings the same way as the EET model 
except for a further exemption of 25 percent of lump sum payment on retirement. 
Examples of this model are the United Kingdom and Ireland.
Theoretically, the ETT and TTE models are equivalent to an Income Tax system in 
which all types of incomes are taxed whether saved or consumed. However, this system 
taxes savings more heavily than consumption because the post-tax rate of return on 
saving is lower than pre-tax rate of return. Therefore, these two models are seen as 
discouraging saving behaviour, more precisely, saving for retirement. On the other hand, 
the EET and TEE tax models are equivalent to an Expenditure Tax system. This system 
taxes pension saving on a consumption-tax basis by either allowing pension 
contributions and fund returns to be deductible from the income tax liability while 
subjecting the pension benefit to tax, or taxing only contributions while leaving pension 
benefits and fund returns untaxed. Because the two models both confer a post-tax rate of 
return to savings equal to pre-tax rate of return, they are seen to be neutral between 
current and future consumption and thus to encourage saving for retirement. However, 
they raise revenues at different times. The EET model also called “cash-flow” tax or 
benefit tax, taxes pensions but exempts investment income (in fact, investment returns 
are taxed when pensions are paid to pensioners) and contributions. This treatment 
implies that taxes are deferred until retirement. The TEE model sometimes called 
“prepayment” tax or contribution tax, taxes contributions but exempts pensions and 
investment income. In this case, pension premiums are taxed before they are contributed 
to a pension scheme, so that the tax deferral benefit does not exist.
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Chapter 5 calculates the Degree o f Fiscal Privileges (DFiP) of five financial assets, i.e. 
bank deposits, government bonds, shares, private pensions and houses, using the tax 
treatments in five OECD countries, i.e. France, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. The choice of these five OECD countries was made because their tax 
treatments on private pensions are different. France has the EET model, Germany (for 
provident funds) has the TEE model, Sweden has the ETT model, New Zealand has the 
TTE model, and finally, the United Kingdom has the EEt model. The DFiP for standard- 
rate taxpayers, who face the 20 percent rate of marginal income taxation, is extremely 
high under the UK tax system (24.5%) and, substantially high under the French and 
German tax systems (20%). On the other hand, it is relatively moderate under the 
Swedish tax system (15.3%) although the tax rates applied to investment returns on 
pension funds (10%) are lower than the tax rates on other capital income (30%). There 
are no fiscal privileges to private pensions under the tax system in New Zealand. If 
China keeps the current tax treatments on bank savings unchanged, (equivalent to the 
TTE model) the introduction of either of the three models, EEt, EET, and TEE, on 
private pensions would attract part of saving flows from bank accounts to private 
pension funds.
Chapter 6 has estimates tax revenues under the five tax models for the period of 2010 to 
2067, and also calculates the revenue losses with respect to a benchmark model of TtE, 
i.e. the tax treatment on bank savings in China. If individuals’ marginal rates of income 
tax do not change between working years and retirement years, the total revenue in 
present value terms under the five tax models EET, TEE, ETT, TTE and EEt are 
respectively 4,170bn, 8,209bn, 20,466bn, 22,995bn and 3,216bn Yuan. Consequently, 
the revenue losses are respectively 5,839bn, l,799bn, -10,457bn, -12,985bn and 
6,793.29bn Yuan, in comparison to the benchmark of tax treatment on bank savings. 
The amount of revenue losses for each of the models shows that in present value terms 
the TTE and ETT models do not result in any cost to the government (in fact the cost is 
negative), while EET has higher cost than TEE but lower than EEt. However, the 
distribution of the cost is different under the five models, which is shown by their 
annual costs during the period for estimation. The TEE model has cost throughout 58 
years from 2010 to 2067, while the TTE model brings more revenues to the government 
every year. The TTE model has cost for the first 6 years but has negative cost thereafter.
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The EET model results in cost for the first 28 years but brings more revenues thereafter. 
The EEt model has a similar pattern to the EET model, however, the value of the cost is 
higher.
The value of GDP in 1988 was 7,939.57bn Yuan in China. Suppose that it grows at 8 
percent58 between 2010 and 2067 then the annual average cost as a share of GDP59 
under the four models ETT, EET, TEE and EEt is 0.06%, 0.38%, 0.15% and 0.42% 
respectively. Even in a year with the highest cost, this ratio is only a little higher than 1 
percent. Noting that the tax expenditures on private pensions as a percentage of GDP for 
1995 were 0.1% in Germany, 0.9% in the United State, 1.7% in Australia, 1.9% in 
Ireland and the Netherlands and 2.4% in the United Kingdom, the costs estimated in 
China are not high in terms of international comparisons.
7.2 Future Policies on the Promotion of Private Pensions
For the purpose of encouraging Chinese people to save for their retirement, this thesis 
suggests the following three points as future policies:
■ The application of the EET tax model to private pensions in order to alter 
individuals’ choice about in which assets to invest. More specifically, higher 
return from pension saving can be expected to shift part of saving flows from bank 
accounts, which mainly of the short-term, to pension funds where the saving flows 
and accumulations are locked until retirement;
■ The mandation of membership of private pension schemes in order to correct 
market failure in providing retirement income to those who have low income and 
short periods of employment but still have the capacity to save for their retirement, 
those who are short-sighted and do not care about their future needs, and those 
who are free riders and rely on society instead of saving during their productive 
years;
58 Assuming that the average rate of population growth is stationary, then GDP will have an annual growth 
rate of 8 percent, which is the rate of wage growth used in the estimation in Chapter 6.
59 See Appendix 7-1 and 7-2.
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■ The reduction of the benefit level of the current eamings-related public pension in 
order to leave a larger room for the development of private pensions. A reduction 
in pension benefits would tend to boost retirement saving by those who are 
currently covered by the public programme.
(a) Why EET model?
The choice of EET model is based on its three advantages in comparison to its 
alternatives. First, as discussed in chapter 4, the ETT and TTE models tax future 
consumption more heavily than current consumption by applying a tax on investment 
income; they can be seen as discouraging retirement saving behaviour. The EET model, 
however, does not favour current consumption over future. The nature of equal rate of 
return on saving before and after tax provides individuals higher incentive to save. 
Consequently, under the EET model, individuals facing the same tax rate have lower tax 
liability and thus expect more pension benefits in retirement.
Second, the EET model is more attractive to individuals than the TEE model because of 
the tenancy towards income smoothing under progressive income taxation in which 
marginal income tax rates increase as income increases. The EET model allows 
individuals to arrange the timing of saving and consumption according to their different 
earnings and tax liabilities between working and retirement years. Individuals who earn 
the bulk of their income during their working lives can avoid paying high marginal 
income tax rates on pension contributions whilst working and instead can pay 
considerably lower marginal income tax rates when they receive their pension benefits 
during retirement. They can do this by postponing their consumption until retirement 
through pension saving. The ability to defer taxation on pension savings until retirement 
confers sizeable tax benefits on individuals because marginal tax rates during the 
working life often exceed marginal tax rates during retirement. Therefore, tax incentives 
enhance the incentive for individuals to set up private pensions.
Third, the EET model is a better choice than the EEt model in taxing private pension 
saving. In comparison to the EEt model, which gives exemptions to lump-sum 
payments, the EET model guarantees individual savers adequate retirement incomes and 
also costs less in tax expenditure. The EEt model is shown to be an inappropriate tax
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policy for supporting retirement saving and a waste of resources in terms of the loss of 
government revenues which would be raised otherwise. Although it provides higher 
return on saving, this tax treatment reduces the expected value of adequate retirement 
incomes for retirees and their dependants.
(b) Why cut public pensions?
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and fully explained in Chapter 2, the replacement rate of 
public old-age pension in China is high enough (could be as high as 90 percent) to 
maintain the living standard of covered workers in retirement life. Under this 
circumstance, the scope and role of private pensions are limited. The high level of 
benefits can reduce the incentive for people to save as they would neither need nor be 
able to have a private pension, as has been stated in Chapter 5. As already noted, this 
group of people would not need extra help from the government at retirement, having 
not saved, because the public programme guarantees them with adequate retirement 
income. Nevertheless, international experience proves that people do save in private 
funded retirement saving vehicles in the face of prospective cutbacks in public pension 
benefits, especially if provided with tax incentives at the same time. This means that a 
reduction in pension benefits would tend to boost retirement saving by those currently 
covered by the public programme. The role of tax incentives can be seen as 
compensation for the reduced pension benefits that they expect to receive.
(c) Why compulsion?
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and fully explained in Chapter 5, in about 30 countries either 
employers are mandated to set up a pension scheme for employees or individuals are 
mandated to contract with a personal pension scheme or life insurance company. 
Mandating savings for retirement can help to correct market failure in providing 
retirement income. It can mitigate the discriminative nature of private provision 
schemes in which the coverage is focused on large employers and high-income earners. 
It can also diminish the problem of myopia and moral hazard. If left to behave in 
accordance with their own preferences during their working life, some people may not 
save or not save adequately for their retirement because either they do not predict 
accurately how much they will need in retirement or they choose to rely on the
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government. A policy of compulsion is important for those people as an inadequate 
saving during their working years will result in either poverty in old age or increases in 
future public spending. Although compulsion is an effective way of ensuring adequate 
saving, tax incentives will play a role of making the compulsion easier for people to 
accept because “tax privilege mitigates the associated element of coercion” (Davis, 
1995: 105).
7.3 Problems with the EET Model and Appropriate Solutions
Promoting private pension schemes by using preferential tax arrangements, the 
application of the EET model in particular, has also raised three economic problems.
The first problem is a distortion of choice between saving through private pensions and 
saving via other financial instruments, especially interest-bearing bank accounts, 
because bank savings are currently taxed under the TTE tax model. The distortionary 
effect on resources allocation is hard to estimate because of two reasons pointed out by 
Heady: first, “it involves people making savings decisions that will have effects for a 
long time into the future”; second, “the financial markets are so complex that it is often 
difficult to trace through the effects of all these different tax treatments and demonstrate 
the way in which resources are being misallocated” (Heady, 1993: 39). From the 
viewpoint of individuals, private pension saving is not as flexible (low liquidity) as 
other forms of saving because the cash flows are tied up and can not be withdrawn 
before retirement. However, it is this nature that makes the private pension scheme more 
valuable than other saving instruments in terms of providing guaranteed benefits to 
individual savers on retirement until their death.
The second problem is inequality. The inequality results from the natures of private 
pension plans and progressive income taxation systems - private pension provisions do 
not tend to redistribute income towards lower income workers preferential tax 
treatments on private pension funds do not tend to treat different income groups fairly in 
terms of vertical equity. As shown in Chapter 3, private pension plans are more likely to 
cover workers of large organisations, the high-paid and the fully and steadily employed. 
Those who are unemployed, part-time or temporarily employed are less likely to have a
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private pension. Moreover, tax privilege to private pension funds has adverse benefits 
distribution as the value of tax incentives to private pensions usually increases with 
taxpayers’ marginal rates. The calculations in Chapter 5 show that the Degree o f Fiscal 
Privilege for taxpayers facing a marginal rate of 45 percent on income tax is higher than 
that for taxpayers facing a rate of 20 percent. This implies that the generous tax 
treatment would apply to only a small segment of private pension scheme members, 
especially those high-income workers who are in a higher marginal income tax bracket 
and would be able to use retirement saving plans to a greater extent than low-income 
workers. The estimations of tax costs in Chapter 6 also show that the EET tax treatment 
on private pension funds has a regressive impact on equity. The tax deferral benefit 
under the EET tax model has greater value for high-income workers the more 
progressive the scale of income taxation and the greater the income disparity between 
active working and passive retirement life. To sum up, the change in the pension mix 
would make low-income workers worse off as they would receive reduced public 
pension benefits and would be unlikely to receive benefits from private pension 
schemes. Conversely, it would benefit high-income earners who would enjoy relatively 
higher fiscal welfare from tax afforded private pension schemes.
The distribution of income through what Titmuss called fiscal welfare must be taken 
into account in analysing and designing the overall welfare system. This is because 
fiscal welfare provides the government with less financial resources to allocate through 
public social policy programmes. To narrow the gap between the rich and the poor 
resulting from the partial privatisation of pension provision through tax incentives, the 
government must provide a form of social assistance for those who are currently not 
covered by the eamings-related public pension nor capable of saving for their 
retirement. Suggestions to this point include either or both of the following two 
alternatives.
■ The first alternative is the provision of a ‘first tier’ pension with either means-tested 
benefits or universal benefits. Compared to the universal approach, means testing 
has two main advantages. The first advantage is high redistribution. The benefit is 
based not on previous income from work measured by the number of years of 
employment but on individuals’ present income. More specifically, the benefit is
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provided to low-income groups who require redistribution of resources across 
individuals and generations. The second advantage is low cost: means-testing is 
tailored to the conditions of individuals - benefits are targeted only at those who are 
in absolute need, having no or very low income resources. However, the means- 
testing approach has two disadvantages. The first disadvantage is administrative 
complexity: it requires investigations of personal circumstances such as need and 
income. It would be extremely difficult to conduct such investigations in China 
where the share of the population in poverty is large, as it is of those just above the 
poverty line and vulnerable to poverty. The second disadvantage is that it acts as a 
saving disincentive for those in the eligible income range.
Contrasting to its counterpart, the universal approach seems to be more practical. 
Gough argues that a universal approach has the advantage of administrative 
simplicity over means testing. “The benefit does not relate to previous earnings or 
present income but to all people who are retired (or who reach a certain age, say, 65). 
As it is paid to all people who have satisfied their eligibility through their ID card, 
the problem encountered in targeting poor people does not exist” (Gough, 2002). 
However, this approach has two distinctive disadvantages. First, it has higher costs so 
may encounter political and financial difficulties in its operation. Second, it is less 
redistributive due to its inclusiveness. This is because the benefit is paid to everyone 
including those who have already had a public pension and those with high-incomes 
though the benefit can be fixed instead of being linked to former income or 
contributions paid.
■ The second alternative requires an extension of the current insurance-based public 
pension programme. The coverage must be extended further to the three groups 
including those urban citizens who are not covered by the system, those workers 
employed in Individual and Private Enterprises (IEs and PEs), Township and Village 
enterprises and peasants who constitute 80 percent of the national population but 
have limited income resources in their old age in comparison to urban citizens.
The third problem of the EET model is the cost to the government in terms of foregone
revenues. The estimations under the assumptions set up in Chapter 6 show that EET
results in much higher cost compared to the ETT model, with an annual average cost of
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0.38 percent and 0.06 percent of GDP respectively during the period of 2010-2067 for 
the estimation. The ratio of cost to GDP is still higher in comparison to that under the 
TEE model, 0.38 percent versus 0.15 percent on average during the same period. 
Moreover, as tax payments defer from a period when taxpayers are subject to a higher 
marginal tax rate of 25 percent to a period when they are subject to a lower marginal 
rate of 5 percent, the annual average cost as a percentage of GDP under the EET model 
increases from 0.38 to 0.52. However, the distribution of the cost under the two models 
is different. Unlike the TEE model that systematically has positive cost during the 58 
years, the EET model results in higher cost in the first 28 years following the creation of 
the private pension scheme, however but generates negative cost thereafter. This is an 
important feature for fiscal consideration.
The government could have the following five approaches to keeping the cost of tax 
privileges on private pensions manageable. However, a combination of the last three 
approaches can be regarded as optimal.
■ The first approach is to apply the ETT model at the start of the pension scheme and 
later move on to the EET model. As the investment incomes of pension funds are 
not tax exempt, the cost resulting from revenue losses will be lower. The 
disadvantage is that private pensions are not tax privileged under this tax treatment. 
Under this circumstance, enterprises or employers may not have incentives to 
provide retirement pensions for their employees. Similarly, individuals may not save 
in private pension schemes in which their money is tied up for up to 30 or 40 years.
■ The second approach is to apply the TEE model at the start of the pension plan and 
later move to the EET model. This approach has two main advantages. First, both 
employers and individuals are given tax incentives to participate in private pension 
schemes. Second, the cost is lower and thus manageable in the early years of the 
creation of the pension scheme because the TEE model leads to reduced annual 
government deficits in the near term. The disadvantage is that once government 
revenue has been placed in earlier years, it is difficult to rearrange it in later years as 
the tax treatment moves to the EET model because of the relative importance of this 
income item in the budget.
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■ The third approach is to apply the EET tax treatmentt directly from the creation of 
the pension scheme. However, the pension schema ccovers only part of the urban 
working population such as government employees amd workers in large enterprises 
during the early years and expands to other employees , gradually. The first advantage 
of this approach is policy consistency. Experience tellss us that changes in tax policy 
are often associated with administrative complexity or* difficulties. Also, a stable tax 
policy will help to build up individuals’ confidence Dm private pension schemes. The 
second advantage is budget sustainability. As mentbmed earlier, tax revenues come 
in later years under the EET model. This is an importaant practical issue because the 
society expects more aged people especially from the ssecond half of the twenty-first 
Century when more revenues are required to suppDrtt the aged population in their 
retirement. In this sense, the EET model is seen as dssiirable to bring the government 
fiscal arrangement into balance.
■ The fourth approach is to increase tax revenues by improving tax administration on 
personal income in particular. Although in the pistt two decades, revenue from 
personal income taxation grew from 7.2bn in 1994 tD 666bn Yuan in 1998, it remains 
very low with respect to total government revenues. rThe ratio of personal income 
tax to total tax revenues in China stood at only 5.21 peercent in 2000. This low ratio 
is partly due to tax evasions by high-income earners succh as actors, athletes, lawyers, 
employees in financial sectors and some self-employeed. Statistics (China Daily, 22 
August 2001) for 2000 from the State Administration o)f Taxation reported that high- 
income earners, who made up 8.7 percent of the tctall population and owned more 
than 60 percent of the funds in bank accounts, contrilbuted less than 20 percent to 
total income tax revenues. Becke (1968) and Allinghaim and Sandmo (1972) suggest 
that tax evaders are willing to take the risk of not complying with tax laws if the 
benefit for doing so outweighs the expected cost. Taerrefore, the tax authorities can 
enhance tax administration by keeping track of souice;s of personal income, setting 
up special files for especially high-income earners and! strengthening the inspection 
of these taxpayers’ income tax. It is also necessary that: tax law breakers be punished 
with proportionate fines or, for severe cases, imprisonrment. One can expect that the 
ratio of personal income taxation to total revenues willl grow further as a result of a 
more efficient administration on income taxation in Chiina.
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It must be pointed out that enhancing personal income tax administration also has 
positive effect on private pensions. Supposing that an individual who has income Y 
has a choice between either investing in a tax advantages afforded private pension 
plans with tax exemption on returns (r) to saving, or alternatively, investing in other 
forms of saving without tax advantages. He would gain a benefit that equals r from 
the former as returns are not taxed, whilst he would finish up with an income of (1- 
t)*r from the latter (t is the rate of tax on return to saving). Obviously, the individual 
would choose saving through private pensions rather than other forms of saving. 
However, suppose that the individual succeeded in evading taxes by, for example, 
concealing all of his investment income, he would gain exactly the same amount of 
income r as he saved in a private pension scheme. Were this the case, the individual 
would have no incentive to save through private pensions under preferential tax 
treatments. In this sense, an improved tax administration would prevent individuals 
from evading tax liabilities, whilst encouraging them to invest in tax advantaged 
private pensions, designed with a view to minimising the size of tax liability.
■ The fifth approach to dealing with the cost is that of government borrowing. 
However, it must be noted that the current debt has to be paid in future years and is 
shown as an increase in income taxes paid by future generations. This relates to the 
issue of intertemporal budget balance that requires that future generations are not 
made worse off compared to current generations.
7.4 Future Works
Possible future work on this subject could include:
■ first, an analysis of the extent to which the current pay-as-you-go public pension 
should be replaced by funded privately administrated pensions in China. Certainly, 
the analysis must be conducted from social, economic as well as political 
perspectives. In the Chinese context, the answer to this has to reflect the Chinese 
social and economic objectives that intertwine with the Chinese culture.
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■ second, an examination of the distortionary effect on resources allocations resulting 
from the preferential tax treatments on private pensions and the impact of pension 
funds on capital markets in China as more saving flows shift from bank accounts to 
pension funds.
■ third, a study on how to make means-tested benefits or universal benefits available 
in China, what the level of the benefits should be and to whom these benefits should 
be provided. This is an important issue because, on one hand, it affects the welfare 
status of low-income people in comparison to that of the rich, on the other, it 
increases government expenditures on public social policy programmes.
■ last but not least, a research on the impact of a pay-as-you-go based pension, a move 
towards a funded pension and debt finance for making up government deficits on 
intra-generational redistribution. The question of whether these policies place a 
burden on future generations can be assessed by the method of generational 
accounting (Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibffitz, 1999).
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A p p en d ice s
1-1: The Rate of Coverage of Private Pension Schemes in China
Part 1: Number of employees
Year Enterprises pension schemes Personal pension schemes Total
SOEs COEs Others SOEs COEs Others
1993 453,949 18,867 31,828 615,414 91,427 21,337 1,232,822
1994 1,006,191 36,181 36,720 707,148 99,785 23,615 1,909,640
1995 933,866 44,240 84,597 954,861 161,998 78,755 2,258,317
1996 946,369 35,017 6,281 1,082,981 156,218 1,927 2,228,793
Part 2: The rate of coverage (%) *
Year Enterprises pension schemes Personal pension schemes Total
SOEs COEs Others SOEs COEs Others
1993 0.59 0.06 0.60 0.81 0.28 0.40 1.07
1994 1.33 0.12 0.49 0.94 0.32 0.32 1.67
1995 1.25 1.25 0.97 1.28 0.55 0.90 2.00
1996 1.28 0.12 0.07 1.46 0.55 0.02 1.99
Source: Numbers in Part 1 are from Tables 2-71, 2-72, 2-75, 2-76 in the 1997 China Social 
Insurance Statistics Yearbook. Numbers in Part 2 are calculated by the author based 
on part 1 and Tables 2-6, 2-7 in the same reference.
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5-1: The Features of Private Pensions in Some OECD Countries
Country Establishme
nt
Coverage Type of 
scheme
Financing Fund assets 
as % 
GDP(1996)
Australia Voluntary/
Compulsory
91.5% DB or DC Mainly
Funded
31.6
Austria n.a. n.a. n.a. Funded 1.2
Belgium Voluntary 31% DB mainly Funded 4.1
Canada Voluntary 45% DB or DC Funded 43.0
Denmark Compulsory 80% DC Funded 23.9
Finland Compulsory 100% DB Mainly
Funded
40.8
France Compulsory 100% DB PAYG 5.6
Germany Voluntary 50% DB or DC Funded 
(mainly book 
reserves)
5.8
Greece Voluntary 5% n.a. PAYG 12.7
Ireland Voluntary 46% DB or DC Mainly funded 45.0
Italy Voluntary 5% DB or DC Funded 3.0
Japan Voluntary/ 
Opting out
37% DB Funded 41.8
Luxembourg Voluntary 30% DB Funded 
(mainly book 
reserves)
19.7
Netherlands Voluntary 50% DB Funded 87.3
N Zealand Voluntary 23% DB or DC Funded n.a.
Norway Voluntary 25% DB Funded 7.3
Portugal Voluntary 15% DB mainly Funded 9.9
Spain Voluntary 3% DC mainly Funded 3.8
Sweden Compulsory 100% DB PAYG/Funde
A
32.6
Switzerland Compulsory 100% DB or DC
u
Funded 117.1
Turkey n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
UK Voluntary/ 
Opting out
48% DB or DC Funded 74.7
USA Voluntary 58.8% DB or DC Funded 58.2
Source: (1) Pestieau, P. “The Distribution of Private Pensions: How Fair Is It?”, Table 3.1. in 
OECD (1992) Private Pensions And Public Policy.
(2) Kalisch, d. w. and Tetsuya Aman (1998). “Retirement Income Systems: The 
Reform Process Across OECD Countries”, Table 5. Paris: OECD.
(3)Laboul, A. (1998). “Private Pension Systems: Regulatory Policies”, pp. 21; 26. 
Paris: OECD.
(4) OECD (1998: p. 65). Maintaining prosperity in an Ageing Society, Table 
V.l. Paris, OECD.
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6-1 Annuities at Retirement under Alternative Tax Treatments
(Men, 20% tax rate during working, 20% tax rate during retirement, Yuan)
EET ETT EEt TEE TTE BankD
193581.35 70523.37 145186.01 193581.35 70523.37 20061.68
175983.05 66095.00 131987.28 175983.05 66095.00 18905.76
159984.59 61944.71 119988.44 159984.59 61944.71 18462.65
145440.53 58055.02 109080.40 145440.53 58055.02 18029.93
132218.67 54409.58 99164.00 132218.67 54409.58 17607.36
120198.79 50993.05 90149.09 120198.79 50993.05 17194.68
109271.62 47791.04 81953.72 109271.62 47791.04 16791.68
99337.84 44790.11 74503.38 99337.84 44790.11 16398.13
90307.13 41977.61 67730.34 90307.13 41977.61 16013.80
82097.39 39341.71 61573.04 82097.39 39341.71 15638.47
74633.99 36871.33 55975.49 74633.99 36871.33 15271.95
66137.45 33190.61 49603.09 66137.45 33190.61 13944.41
58540.11 29842.16 43905.08 58540.11 29842.16 12719.81
51750.84 26797.62 38813.13 51750.84 26797.62 11590.41
45687.47 24030.97 34265.60 45687.47 24030.97 10549.06
40275.96 21518.34 30206.97 40275.96 21518.34 9589.13
35449.60 19237.82 26587.20 35449.60 19237.82 8704.49
31148.30 17169.35 23361.22 31148.30 17169.35 7889.47
27317.91 15294.50 20488.43 27317.91 15294.50 7138.81
23909.73 13596.40 17932.29 23909.73 13596.40 6447.65
20879.87 12059.57 15659.90 20879.87 12059.57 5811.49
18188.89 10669.84 13641.66 18188.89 10669.84 5226.17
15801.26 9414.229 11850.95 15801.26 9414.22 4687.83
13685.07 8280.83 10263.80 13685.07 8280.83 4192.92
11811.61 7258.78 8858.71 11811.61 7258.78 3738.13
10155.08 6338.09 7616.31 10155.08 6338.09 3320.41
8692.32 5509.65 6519.24 8692.32 5509.65 2936.92
7402.50 4765.12 5551.87 7402.50 4765.12 2585.07
6266.94 4096.86 4700.21 6266.94 4096.86 2262.43
5268.89 3497.90 3951.66 5268.89 3497.90 1966.77
4393.29 2961.86 3294.97 4393.29 2961.86 1696.00
3626.67 2482.92 2720.00 3626.67 2482.92 1448.22
2956.95 2055.75 2217.71 2956.95 2055.75 1221.66
2373.30 1675.50 1779.97 2373.30 1675.50 1014.68
1866.03 1337.73 1399.52 1866.03 1337.73 825.76
1426.46 1038.40 1069.85 1426.46 1038.40 653.50
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6-2 Annuities at Retirement under Alternative Tax Treatments
(Men, 20% tax rate during working, 5% tax rate during retirement, Yuan)
EET ETT EEt TEE TTE Bank D
229877.86 83746.50 172408.39 193581.35 70523.37 20061.68
208979.87 78487.82 156734.91 175983.05 66095.00 18905.76
189981.70 73559.34 142486.27 159984.59 61944.71 18462.65
172710.64 68940.34 129532.98 145440.54 58055.02 18029.93
157009.67 64611.38 117757.25 132218.67 54409.58 17607.36
142736.06 60554.24 107052.04 120198.79 50993.05 17194.68
129760.05 56751.87 97320.04 109271.62 47791.04 16791.68
117963.69 53188.25 88472.76 99337.84 44790.11 16398.13
107239.71 49848.41 80429.78 90307.13 41977.61 16013.80
97490.65 46718.28 73117.99 82097.39 39341.71 15638.47
88627.86 43784.71 66470.90 74633.99 36871.33 15271.95
78538.22 39413.85 58903.67 66137.45 33190.61 13944.41
69516.38 35437.56 52137.29 58540.11 29842.16 12719.81
61454.12 31822.17 46090.59 51750.84 26797.62 11590.41
54253.87 28536.77 40690.40 45687.47 24030.97 10549.06
47827.71 25553.02 35870.78 40275.96 21518.34 9589.13
42096.41 22844.92 31572.30 35449.60 19237.82 8704.49
36988.60 20388.61 27741.45 31148.30 17169.35 7889.47
32440.02 18162.22 24330.02 27317.91 15294.50 7138.81
28392.80 16145.72 21294.60 23909.73 13596.40 6447.65
24794.85 14320.74 18596.14 20879.87 12059.57 5811.49
21599.30 12670.44 16199.48 18188.89 10669.84 5226.17
18764.00 11179.39 14073.00 15801.26 9414.22 4687.83
16251.02 9833.49 12188.27 13685.07 8280.83 4192.92
14026.29 8619.80 10519.72 11811.61 7258.78 3738.13
12059.16 7526.48 9044.37 10155.08 6338.09 3320.41
10322.13 6542.71 7741.60 8692.32 5509.65 2936.92
8790.47 5658.58 6592.85 7402.50 4765.12 2585.07
7442.00 4865.02 5581.50 6266.94 4096.86 2262.43
6256.80 4153.76 4692.60 5268.89 3497.90 1966.77
5217.03 3517.21 3912.77 4393.29 2961.86 1696.00
4306.68 2948.47 3230.01 3626.67 2482.92 1448.22
3511.38 2441.21 2633.53 2956.95 2055.75 1221.66
2818.29 1989.66 2113.72 2373.30 1675.50 1014.68
2215.91 1588.56 1661.93 1866.03 1337.73 825.76
1693.93 1233.10 1270.44 1426.46 1038.40 653.50
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6-3 Annuities at Retirement under Alternative Tax Treatments
(Women, 20% tax rate during working, 20% tax rate during retirement, Yuan)
EET ETT EEt TEE TTE BankD
110973.27 45322.35 83229.95 110973.27 45512.33 14240.27
100884.79 42476.43 75663.59 100884.79 42476.43 13877.48
91713.44 39809.21 68785.08 91713.44 39809.21 13552.22
83375.86 37309.47 62531.89 83375.86 37309.47 13234.59
75796.23 34966.70 56847.17 75796.23 34966.70 12924.41
68905.67 32771.04 51679.25 68905.67 32771.04 12621.49
61061.26 29499.64 45795.94 61061.26 29499.64 11524.35
54047.03 26523.55 40535.27 54047.03 26523.55 10512.28
47778.85 23817.58 35834.13 47778.85 23817.58 9578.89
42180.86 21358.59 31635.64 42180.86 21358.59 8718.27
37184.69 19125.38 27888.52 37184.69 19125.38 7924.93
32728.77 17098.48 24546.58 32728.77 17098.48 7193.82
28757.60 15260.03 21568.20 28757.60 15260.03 6520.25
25221.20 13593.67 18915.90 25221.20 13593.67 5899.86
22074.60 12084.41 16555.95 22074.60 12084.41 5328.65
19277.30 10718.48 14457.97 19277.30 10718.48 4802.90
16792.85 9483.30 12594.64 16792.85 9483.30 4319.16
14588.48 8367.31 10941.36 14588.48 8367.31 3874.26
12634.71 7359.96 9476.03 12634.71 7359.96 3465.24
10905.04 6451.56 8178.78 10905.04 6451.56 3089.37
9375.66 5633.26 7031.74 9375.66 5633.26 2744.15
8025.16 4896.95 6018.87 8025.16 4896.95 2427.22
6834.34 4235.21 5125.75 6834.34 4235.21 2136.43
5785.94 3641.27 4339.45 5785.94 3641.27 1869.79
4864.49 3108.91 3648.36 4864.49 3108.91 1625.43
4056.10 2632.49 3042.07 4056.10 2632.49 1401.66
3348.32 2206.80 2511.24 3348.32 2206.80 1196.88
2730.00 1827.14 2047.50 2730.00 1827.14 1009.64
2191.14 1489.18 1643.36 2191.14 1489.18 838.58
1722.81 1188.97 1292.10 1722.81 1188.97 682.45
1316.98 922.92 987.738 1316.98 922.92 540.09
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6-4 Annuities at Retirement under Alternative Tax Treatments
(Women, 20% tax rate during working, 5% tax rate during retirement, Yuan)
EET ETT EEt TEE TTE BankD
131780.76 53820.29 98835.57 110973.27 45322.35 14210.54
119800.69 50440.76 89850.52 100884.79 42476.43 13877.48
108909.72 47273.44 81682.29 91713.44 39809.21 13552.22
99008.83 44305.00 74256.62 83375.86 37309.47 13234.59
90008.03 41522.96 67506.02 75796.23 34966.70 12924.41
81825.48 38915.62 61369.11 68905.67 32771.04 12621.49
72510.24 35030.82 54382.68 61061.26 29499.64 11524.35
64180.85 31496.72 48135.64 54047.03 26523.55 10512.28
56737.38 28283.38 42553.04 47778.85 23817.58 9578.89
50089.77 25363.33 37567.32 42180.86 21358.59 8718.27
44156.83 22711.39 33117.62 37184.69 19125.38 7924.93
38865.42 20304.44 29149.06 32728.77 17098.48 7193.82
34149.65 18121.28 25612.23 28757.60 15260.03 6520.25
29950.18 16142.49 22462.63 25221.20 13593.67 5899.86
26213.59 14350.23 19660.19 22074.60 12084.41 5328.65
22891.79 12728.20 17168.84 19277.30 10718.48 4802.90
19941.51 11261.41 14956.13 16792.85 9483.30 4319.16
17323.82 9936.18 12992.87 14588.48 8367.31 3874.26
15003.72 8739.95 11252.79 12634.71 7359.96 3465.24
12949.74 7661.23 9712.30 10905.04 6451.56 3089.37
11133.60 6689.50 8350.20 9375.66 5633.26 2744.15
9529.88 5815.13 7147.41 8025.16 4896.95 2427.22
8115.78 5029.31 6086.83 6834.34 4235.21 2136.43
6870.81 4324.00 5153.10 5785.94 3641.27 1869.79
5776.58 3691.84 4332.43 4864.49 3108.91 1625.43
4816.62 3126.08 3612.46 4056.10 2632.49 1401.66
3976.13 2620.58 2982.10 3348.32 2206.80 1196.88
3241.87 2169.73 2431.40 2730.00 1827.14 1009.64
2601.98 1768.40 1951.49 2191.14 1489.18 838.58
2045.83 1411.90 1534.37 1722.81 1188.97 682.45
1563.92 1095.97 1172.94 1316.98 922.92 540.09
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6-5 Annual Tax Revenues under Alternative Tax Treatments
(20% tax rate during working, 20% tax rate during retirement, billion Yuan)
Y ear EET TEE EEt ETT TTE B ank  D
2010 - 193,12 - 31,87 218,62 197,76
2011 - 213,56 - 69,04 268,79 223,40
2012 - 235,81 - 112,33 325,67 251,51
2013 - 260,10 - 162,66 390,22 282,41
2014 - 285,73 - 220,33 462,00 315,39
2015 3,78 307,55 2,84 288,32 536,05 345,27
2016 8,94 329,05 6,70 363,26 614,59 375,32
2017 i 15.74 351,65 11,80 447,28 700,64 407,18
2018 24,49 375,46 18,37 541,42 794,99 441,03
2019 34,84 400,59 26,13 645,48 897,82 476,95
2020 47,67 427,04 35,76 761,16 1.010,06 515,04
2021 64,58 451,69 48,44 885,23 1.125,17 551,63
2022 85,39 477,26 64,04 1.022,02 1.249,52 589,97
2023 110,78 503,85 83,09 1.172,89 1.384,01 630,20
2024 140,71 531,54 105,53 1.338,00 1.528,99 672,40
2025 176,57 560,24 132,42 1.519,15 1.685,18 716,57
2026 217,70 587,17 163,27 1.706,18 1.841,99 758,84
2027 266,41 614,61 199,81 1.909,11 2.008,73 802,41
2028 323,90 642,58 242,92 2.129,47 2.186,21 847,38
2029 390,58 671,14 292,93 2.367,80 2.374,93 893,80
2030 ! 468,52 700,07 351,39 2.625,53 2.574,94 941,47
2031 545,94 730,47 409,46 2.884,07 2.778,02 990,35
2032 634,33 761,09 475,75 3.159,56 2.990,56 1.040,11
2033 733,99 791,96 550,49 3.452,58 3.213,23 1.090,81
2034 §46,74 823,21 635,06 3.764,94 3.446,89 1.142,63
2035 974,51 854,42 730,88 4.096,56 3.690,40 1.195,07
2036 1.106,24 887,08 829,68 4.434,34 3.940,26 1.249,11
2037 1.253,27 919,49 939,95 4.788,72 4.197,86 1.303,32
2038 1.415,75 951,66 1.061,81 5.159,79 4.463,64 1.357,74
2039 1.596,36 983,63 1.197,27 5.549,68 4.738,30 1.412,48
2040 1.796,98 589,42 1.623,92 5.886,66 4.537,96 971,47
2041 2.037,39 584,13 1.798,17 6.230,42 4.720,48 976,32
2042 2.299,68 578,83 1.987,89 6.576,09 4.900,05 980,49
2043 2585,42 573,54 2.194,18 6.923,02 5.076,22 983,90
2044 2.896,27 568,24 2.401,40 7.270,49 5.248,51 986,49
2045 3.234,96 562,95 2.635,16 7.617,27 5.415,52 988,28
2046 3.598,84 560,11 2.897,80 7.949,76 5.566,62 992,93
2047 3.978,49 557,28 3.170,87 8.274,22 5.709,48 996,97
2048 4.376,72 554,45 3.456,33 8.590,96 5.844,21 1.000,36
2049 4.796,66 551,61 3.737,16 8.900,33 5.971,00 1.003,07
2050 5.240,58 548,78 4.049,39 9.201,74 6.089,13 1.005,67
2051 5.623,77 548,00 4.321,11 9.450,57 6.183,39 1.009,00
2052 5.990,10 547,22 4.578,17 9.677,93 6.265,91 1.011,61
2053 6.341,83 546,45 4.822,06 9.885,59 6.337,92 1.013,54
2054 6.681,55 545,67 5.045,97 10.075,42 6.400,75 1.014,83
2055 7.009,89 544,89 5.271,36 10.248,95 6.455,40 1.015,63
2056 7.283,73 543,89 5.455,14 10.382,04 6.491,42 ^015^06
2057 7.537,31 542,89 5.621,04 10.494,63 6.517,13 1.014,02
2058 7.772,38 541,89 5.829,29 10.588,57 6.533,87 1.012,56
2059 7.993,17 540,88 5.994,88 10.667,57 6.543,15 1.010,74
2060 8.202,08 539,88 6.151,56 10.734,12 6.546,37 1.008,68
2061 8.345,12 536,87 6.258,84 10.765,15 6.538,29 1.003,87
2062 8.460,89 533,86 6.345,66 10.777,91 6.522,72 998,81
2063 8.549,93 530,86 6.412,45 j 10.774,06 6.500,95 993,55
2064 8.615,61 527,85 6.461,71 10.757,36 6.474,37 988,13
2065 8.661,47 524,84 6.496,10 10.730,62 6.444,44 982,61
2066 8.663,06 521,36 6.497,30 10.698,04 6.420,96 977,19
2067 8.628,64 517,88 6.471,48 10.652,74 6.395,12 971,70
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6-6 Annual Tax Revenues under Alternative Tax Treatments
(20% tax rate during working, 5% tax rate during retirement, billion Yuan)
Y ear EET TEE EET(L) ETT TTE B ank  D
2010 - 193,12 31,87 218,62 197,76
2011 - 213,56 - 69,04 268,79 223,40
2012 - 235,81 - 112,33 325,67 251,51
2013 . 260,10 - 162,66 390,22 282,41
2014 . 285,73 - 220,33 462,00 315,39
2015 0,95 307,55 0,71 286,29 536,05 345,27
2016 2,23 329,05 1,68 358,51 614,59 375,32
2017 3,93 351,65 2,95 439,00 700,64 407,18
2018 6,12 375,46 4,59 528,67 794,99 441,03
2019 8.71 400,59 6,53 627,53 897,82 476,95
2020 11,92 427,04 8,94 736,87 1.010,06 515,04
2021 16,15 451,69 12,11 852,69 1.125,17 551,63
2022 21,35 477,26 1 16,01 979,50 1.249,52 589,97
2023 27,70 503,85 20,77 1.118,37 1.384,01 630,20
2024 35,18 531,54 26,38 1.269,61 1.528,99 672,40
2025 44,14 560,24 33,11 1.434,42 1.685,18 716,57
2026 51,46 587,17 40,82 1.602,93 1.841,99 758,84
2027 63,67 614,61 49,95 1.784,26 2.008,73 802,41
2028 78,07 642,58 60,73 1.979,52 2.186,21 847,38
2029 94,85 671,14 73,23 2.189,25 2.374,93 893,80
2030 114,23 700,07 87,85 2.414,08 2.574,94 941,47
2031 133,62 730,47 102,36 2.640,60 2.778,02 990,35
2032 155,74 761,09 118,94 2.880,03 2.990,56 1.040,11
2033 180,68 791,96 137,62 r“ 3.133,08 3.213,23 1.090,81
2034 209,04 823,21 158,76 3.400,94 3.446,89 1.142,63
2035 240,88 854,42 182,72 3.682,86 3.690,40 1.195,07
2036 273,84 887,08 207,42 3.970,93 3.940,26 1.249,11
2037 310,62 919,49 234,99 4.270,65 4.197,86 1.303,32
2038 351,26 951,66 265,45 4.463,64 1.357,74
2039 396,67 983,63 299,32 4.907,42 4.738,30 1.412,48
2040 446,73 589,42 336,93 5.173,42 4.537,96 971,47
2041 506,85 584,13 382,01 5.435,44 4.720,48 976,32
2042 572,44 578,83 431,19 5.695,17 4.900,05 980,49
2043 643,90 573,54 484,77 5.952,02 5.076,22 983,90
2044 721,97 568,24 543,05 6.205,37 5.248,51 986,49
2045 806,56 562,95 606,55 6.453,60 5.415,52 988,28
2046 897,55 560,11 674,78 6.681,04 5.566,62 992,93
2047 992,47 557,28 745,97 6.898,74 5.709,48 996,97
2048 1.094,18 554,45 820,64 7.106,90 5.844,21 1.000,36
2049 1.199,17 551,61 899,37 7.305,76 5.971,00 1.003,07
2050 1.310,14 548,78 982,61 7.494,52 6.089,13 1.005,67
2051 1.405,94 548,00 1.054,46 7.645,82 6.183,39 1.009,00
2052 1.497,53 547,22 1.123,14 7.780,75 6.265,91 1.011,61
2053 1.585,46 546,45 1.189,09 7.900,90 6.337,92 1.013,54
2054 1.670,39 545,67 1.252,79 8.007,99 1.014,83
2055 1.752,47 544,89 1.314,36 8.103,34 6.455,40 1.015,63
2056 1.820,93 543,89 1.365,70 8.171,32 6.491,42 1.015,06
2057 1.884,33 542,89 1.413,24 8.224,50 1.014,02
2058 1.943,10 541,89 1.457,32 8.264,63 6.533,87 1.012,56
2059 1.998,29 540,88 1.498,72 8.294,02 6.543,15 r  1.01 o / T 1
2060 2.050,52 539,88 1.537,89 8.314,62 6.546,37 1.008,68
2061 2.086.281 536,87
- - - - - - 8.317,61 6.538,29 1.003,87
2062 2.115,22 533,86 1.586,42 8.309,03 6.522,72 998,81
2063 2.137,48 530,86 1.603,11 8.290,48 6.500,95 993,55
2064 2.153,90 527,85 1.615,43 8.264,21 6.474,37 988,13
2065 2.165,37 524,84 1.624,03 8.232,28 6.444,44 982,61
2066 2.165~,77H 521,36 1.624^321 8.205,39 6.420,96 977,19
2067 2.157,16 517,88 1.617,87 8.173,09 6.395,12 971,70
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7-1 Annual Cost as a Share of GDP under Alternative Tax Treatments
(20% tax rate during working, 20% tax rate during retirement, billion Yuan)
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7-2 Annual Cost as a Share of GDP
(20% tax rate during working, 5% tax
under Alternative Tax Treatments
rate during retirement, billion Yuan)
N N M M
1,18
-1.64
■ I .84
-1.77
-1.85
- 1 . 1 7
-0,04
190
Bibliography
B ibliography
Aaron, H. (1966). “The Social Insurance Paradox”. The Canadian Journal o f Economics 
and Political Science, 32(3). pp.371-4.
Agell, J. and Edin, Per-Anders (1990). “Marginal taxes and the Asset portfolios of 
Swedish Households”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 92(1). pp.47-64. 1990.
Agulnik, P. (1999). “Pension tax reliefs in the UK and directions for reform”, for 
presentation at the ENRSP Seminar. Amsterdam. 1-2 October 1999.
Agulnik, P. and Le Grand, J. (1998). “Tax relief and partnership pensions”. Fiscal 
Studies. 19(4). November, pp.403-428.
Allingham, M. G. and Sandmo, A. (1972) “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-328.
Andrews, W. D. (1974), “A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax”. 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 87, April 1974.
Andrews, W. D. (1974), “A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax”. 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 87, April 1974.
Atkinson, M. E., Creedy, J. and Knox, D. M. (1999). “Some Implications of Changing 
the Tax Basis for Pension Funds”. Fiscal Studies. 20(2). pp. 189-203.
Auerbach, A. and Kotlikoff, L. (1987). Dynamic Fiscal Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Auerbach, A. J., Kotlikoff, L. J. and Leibfritz, W. (eds.) (1999). Generational 
Accounting around the World. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Banks, J. and Emmerson, C. (2000). “Public and Private Pension Spending: Principles, 
Practice and the Need for Reform”. Fiscal Studies. 21(1). pp. 1-63.
Barr, N. (1998). The Economics o f the Welfare States. 3rd ed. Oxford: University Press. 
Barrientos, A. (1998). “Supplementary Pension Coverage in Britain”. Fiscal Studies. 19. 
November 1998.
Beattie, R. and McGillivray, W. (1995) “A Risky Strategy: Reflections on the World 
Bank Report Averting the Old Age Crisis”, International Social Security Review, No. 3- 
4, 1995: 3-22.
Beattie, R. and McGillivray, W. (1996) “Rejoinder”, International Social Security 
Review, No. 3, 1996: 17-20.
Becker, G. S. (1968) “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 76, 1968: 169-217.
191
Bibliography
Benjamin, B. et al (1987). Pensions: The Problems o f Today and Tomorrow. London: 
Allen & Unwin.
Bittker, B. I. et al (1968). A Comprehensive Income Tax Base?: A Debate. Branford: 
Federal Tax Press.
Blake, D. (1992) Issues in Pension Funding, London: Routledge.
Blake, D. (1995). Pension schemes and pension funds in the United Kingdom. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Blake, D. (1996). Pension Schemes As Options on Pension Fund Assets: Implications 
for Pension Fund Management. London: University of London.
Blum, W. J. (1955) “The Effects of Social Provisions in the Income Tax on Taxpayers 
Morale”, in Joint Economic Committee, Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and 
Stability, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, pp. 250-251.
Boadway, R. (1997). “Comments”. In: Banting, K. G. and Boadway, R. (ed.), Reform of 
Retirement Income Policy: international and Canadian Perspectives. Kingston, Queen’s 
University.
Bodie, Z. (1990) “Pension Funds and Financial Innovation”, Financial Management. 
Autumn.
Bodie, Z. (1990). “Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance”. Journal o f Economic 
Literature. 28 March, pp.28-49.
Boulding, K. (1958). Principles o f Economic Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice- 
Hall.
Bovenberg, L. and Peterson, C. (1992). “Public Debt and Pension Policy”, Fiscal 
Studies. 13(3). pp. 1-14.
Bradford, D. F. (1980). “The Case for A Personal Consumption Tax”, In: Pechman, J. 
A. (ed.). What Should Be Taxed: Income or Expenditure? Washington: Brookings 
Institution.
Bradford, D. F. (1986). Untangling the Income Tax, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Burtless, G. (2000). How Would Financial Risk Affect Retirement Income Under 
Individual Account?. The Brookings Institution.
Capital Tax Group (1989). Neutrality in the Taxation of Savings: An Extended Role for 
PEPs, Commentary no. 17. London: IFS.
Charkham, J. P. (1994). Keeping Good Company, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
192
Bibliography
China Daily (2001) ‘Tax System Needs Overhaul”, China Daily, 22 August 2001.
China Labour Yearbook Editorial Board (1999). China Labour statistics Yearbook, 
Beijing: China Statistics Press.
Chou, R. F. (1999). “Report on Monetary Policy”. Chain Daily. 25th October. 1999. 
China.
Clark, R. L. and Wolper, E. (1997) “Pension Tax Expenditures: Magnitude, Distribution 
and Economic Effects”. In: Schieber, S. J. and Shoven, J. B. (eds.) Public Policy 
towards Pensions, Cambridge, Mass.: MTT Press.
Corsetti, G. (1994). “An Endogenous Growth of Social Security and the Size of the 
Informal Sector”. Revista deAnalisis Economico. 9(1). pp.57-76.
Corsetti, G. and Schmidt-Hebbel, K. (1997). “Pension Reform and growth”. In: The 
Economics o f Pensions: Principles, Policies, and International Experience, ed. S. 
Valdes-Prieto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Creedy, J., Disney, R. and Whitehouse, E. (1992) ‘The Eamings-Related State Pension, 
Indexation and Lifetime Redistribution in the UK”, 1FS Working Paper W92/1. London.
Cui, L. F. (1998). Fiscal Burden on Ageing Population (Ren Hou lao ling Hua Cai 
Zheng Fu Dan Wen Ti Yian Jiu) (ed.). China: Jilin Mei Shi publishers.
Dakin, C. D. (1994). Pension Provision in Britain, London: HMSO.
Dale, A., Arber, S. and Proctev, M. (1988) Doing Secondary Analysis, London: Unwin 
Hyman.
Davis, E. P. (1992). Debt Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk. Oxford: University 
Press.
Davis, E. P. (1993a). “The Development of Pension Funds, an Approaching Financial 
Revolution for Continental Europe”. In: R. O’Brin (ed.). Finance and the International 
Economy 7 (Winners o f the 1993 Amex Bank Essay Competition). Oxford: University 
Press.
Davis, E. P. (1993b). “The Structure, Regulation, and performance of Pension Funds in 
Nine Industrial Countries”. Policy Research Working Paper. No. 1229. The World Bank.
Davis, E. P. (1994). “An International Comparison of the Financing of Occupational 
Pensions”. LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper Series. No.62. September.
Davis, E. Philip (1995). Pension Funds: Retirement-Income Security and Capital 
Market. Oxford: Clarendon press.
Davis, J., St. Hilaire, F. and Whalley, J. (1984). “Some Calculations of Lifetime Tax 
Incidence”, American Economic Review, 74, September: 63349.
193
Bibliography
Devereux, M. P. (1996). “Introduction”. In: Devereux, M. P. (ed.). The Economics of 
Tax Policy. Oxford: University Press.
Diamond, P. A. (1977). “A Framework for Social Security Analysis”. Journal of Public 
Economics. 8. pp.275-298.
Diamond, P. and Valdes-Prieto, S. (1994) “Social Security Reforms”. In: Barry 
Bosworth et al (eds.), The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Dicks-Mireaux, L. D. L. and King, M. A. (1983). “Portfolio composition and pension 
wealth: an econometric study”. In: Z. Bodie and J. B. Shoven (ed.). Financial Aspects 
o f the United States pension System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dilnot, A. (1992). “Taxation and private pensions: costs and consequences”. In: OECD. 
Private Pensions and Public Policy. Paris: OECD.
Dilnot, A. (1997). “Public and Private Roles in the Provision of Retirement Income”. 
In: Banting, K. G. and Boadway, R. (ed.), Reform of Retirement Income Policy: 
international and Canadian Perspectives. Kingston, Queen’s University.
Dilnot, A. and Johnson, P. (1993a) ‘Tax Expenditures: The Case of Occupational 
Pensions”, Fiscal Studies. 14(1). pp. 42-56.
Dilnot, A. and Johnson, P. (1993b) The Taxation of Private Pensions, London: IFS.
Disney, R. (1999) “Declining Public Pensions in An Era of Demographic Ageing: Will 
Private Provision Fill the Gap?”, Discussion papers in Economics, University of 
Nottingham.
Disney, R. and Whitehouse, E. (1993). “Will Younger Cohorts Obtain a Worse Return 
on their Pension Contribution? In: J. Creedy and M. Casson (ed.). Economic Inequality 
and Industrial Structure: Essays in Honour ofP.E.Hart. Aldershot: Edward Elggar.
Duskin, E. (1992). “Changing the mix of public and private pensions: the issues”. In: 
OECD. Private Pensions and Public Policy. Paris: OECD.
EC (1998). Social protection in the Member States o f the European Union. Belgium: 
EC.
Emmerson, C. and Tanner, S. (2000). “A Note on the Tax Treatment of Private Pensions 
and Individual Savings Account”, Fiscal Studies. 21(1). pp. 65-74.
Engen, E. M. and gale, W. A. and Schols, J. K. (1994). “Do Saving Incentives Work?”. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. No.l. pp.85-180.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Policy Press.
194
Bibliography
Falkingham, J. and Rake, K. (1999). “ ‘Partnership in Pensions’: Delivering A Secure 
Retirement for Women?”, CASE paper 24, LSE.
Feldstein, M. (1977). “Social Security and Private Saving: International Evidence in an 
Extended Life Cycle Model”. In: M. Feldstein and R. Inman (ed.). The Economics o f 
Public Services (International Economic Association).
Feldstein, M. (1978). “The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 86: S29-51.
Feldstein, M. and Pellechio, A. J. (1979) “Social Security and Household Wealth 
Accumulation: New Microeconomic Evidence”, Review o f Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 61,1979: 361-368.
Feldstein, M. S. (1976). “Personal taxation and portfolio composition: an econometric 
analysis”. Econometrica. 44. pp.631-50.
Fennell, A. and Zhu, L. (1996). “Ageing and Pensions in China”. In: Ageing and Social 
Policy: Global Comparisons edited by Peter Lloyd-Sherlock and Paul Johnson. London: 
LSE.
Franco, D. (1996). “The Taxation of Funded Pension Schemes and Budget Policy”. 
Economic Papers. No. 117. September. European Commission.
Fry, V. C. Hammond, E. M. and Kay, J. A. (1985). The Taxation of Occupational 
Pension Schemes in the UK. London: IFS.
Gary, S. (1999). Funding Versus PAYG. Occasional Paper: Number 3 Financing 
Pensions. Http ://www. abi .org.uk/industry/market/payg. asp
Ghilarducci, T. (1992) Labour’ Capita: The Economics and Politics o f Private 
Pensions. London: The MIT Press.
Ghilarducci, T. (1994). “U.S. Pension Investment Policy and Perfect Capital Market 
Theory”. Challenge. July-August, pp.4-10.
Gillion, C. and Bonilla, A. (1992) “Analysis of A National Private Pension Scheme:
The Case of Chile”, International Labour Market Review, 132, No. 2, 1992.
Ginn, J. & Arber, S. (1992). “Towards Women’s Independence: Pension systems in 
three contrasting European welfare states”, Journal of European Social Policy 2(4): pp. 
255-277.
Gong, S. (1999). “The Political Economics of Chinese Pension System”. Unpublished 
Paper.
Goode, R. (1977). “The Economic Definition of Income”, In: Pechman, J. A. (ed.) 
Comprehensive Income Taxation. Washington: Brookings Institution.
195
Bibliography
Goode, R. (1980). “The Superiority of the Income Tax”, In: Pechman, J. A. (ed.). What 
Should Be Taxed: Income or Expenditure! Washington: Brookings Institution.
Gordon, M. (1988). Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries: A Comparative 
Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gough, I. (2000). “Welfare Regimes in East Asia and Europe”. Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics Europe 2000. Paris. 27 June 2000.
Gough, I. (2002). “Securing Social Protection”. Unpublished Paper.
Hannah, L. (1992). “Similarities and Differences in the Growth and Structure of Private 
Pensions in OECD Countries”, In: Private Pensions and Public Policy, Paris, OECD.
Hansen, H. (1998). Elements o f Social Security. Denmark: The Danish National Institute 
of Social Policy.
Hauser, R. (1998) “Adequacy and Poverty among the Retired”, OECD Ageing Working 
Papers. Paris: OECD.
Heady, C. J. (1993), “Optimal Taxation as a Guide to Tax Policy: A Survey”, Fiscal 
Studies (1993) 14(1). pp.15-41.
Heady, C. J. (1994). ‘The Financing of Labour Market Insurance”. Unpublished paper.
Heller, P. (1998) “Rethinking Public Pension Initiatives”, International Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper, 98/61, April 1998: 9.
Hills, John (1984). Savings and Fiscal privilege. London: IFS.
Horlick M. (1987). “The Relationship Between Public and Private Pension Schemes: An 
Introductory Overview”, In: OECD (1987), Conjugating Public and Private: The Case 
of Pensions, Paris: OECD.
Howard, C. (1997). The Hidden Welfare Economy: Tax Expenditure and Social Policy 
in the United States, Princeton: University Press.
Hubbard, R. G. (1985). “Personal taxation, pension wealth and portfolio composition”. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, pp.53-60.
Hubbard, R. G. and Skinner, J. S. (1996). “Assessing the Effectiveness of Saving 
Incentives”. National Bureau o f Economic Research. Working Paper no. 5686.
Hubbard, R. G., Skinner, J. S. and Stephen, P. Z. (1995). “Precautionary Saving and 
Social Insurance”. Journal o f Political Economy. 103. pp.360-399. April 1995.
Ian (2002) “Securing Social Protection”, Unpublished paper.
196
Bibliography
IFS (1994). Setting Savings Free. London: IFS.
International Labour Organisation (1977). Pensions and Inflation. Geneva: International 
Labour Office.
Ippolito, R. A. (1986). Pensions, Economics and Public Policy (Pension Research 
Council, Dow Jones Irwin, Homewood, 7).
James, E. (1997) “Public Pension Plans in International Perspective: problems, 
Reforms, and Research Ideas”, In. Salvador Valdes-Prieto (eds.), The Economics of 
Pensions: Principles, Policies, and International experience, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
James, E. (1997). “New Systems for Old Age Security: Theory, Practice and Empirical 
Evidence”. Paper Presented at Social Security Seminar. Beijing. April 1997.
James, E. (2000). “New Models for Old Age Security -  How Can They be Applied in 
China?”. World Bank Office. Beijing.
Johnson, P. (1999). Older Getting Wiser. London. Institute of Fiscal Studies.
Johnson, P. and Falkingham, J. (1992). Ageing and Economic Welfare. London: Sage.
Johnson, P., Conard, C., and Thomson, D. (1989). Workers versus Pensioners: 
Intergenerational justice in an ageing world. Manchester. Manchester University Press.
Kaldor, N.(1955). An Expenditure Tax. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Kalisch, d. w. and Tetsuya Aman (1998). “Retirement Income Systems: The Reform 
Process Across OECD Countries”, paper presented at a jointed ILO-OECD workshop 
on the development and reform of pension schemes, held in Paris, 15-17 December 
1997.
Kay, J. A. (1986). “Approaching an expenditure tax”. Fiscal Studies. 7. pp.33-37.
King, M. A. and Leape, J. I. (1984). “Wealth and portfolio composition: theory and 
evidence”. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper no. 1468.
Knox, D. M., (1990) “The taxation Support of Occupational Pensions: a long-term 
view”, Fiscal Studies 1990.11(4). pp.29-43.
Kvist, J. & Sinfield, A. (1996) Comparing Tax Routes in Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, SFI: The Danish National Institute of Social Research.
Laboul, A. (1998). “Private Pension Systems: Regulatory Policies”, a series of analytic 
papers that supported the OECD’s horizontal work on ageing. Paris: OECD.
Le Grand, J. and Robinson, R. (1984). Privatisation and the Welfare State (ed.), 
London: George, Allen and Unwin.
197
Bibliography
Leape, J. (1990). “The Impossibility of Perfect Neutrality: Fundamental Issues in Tax 
Reform”. Fiscal Studies. (2). 1990.
Lei, J. Q. (1994). The New Changes o f Marriages and Families in the Chinese 
Countryside Since the Reform of the Economic System (Gai Ge Yi Lai Zhong Guo Nong 
Cun Hun Yin Jia Ting De Xin Bian Hua). Beijing: Beijing University Press.
Leimer, D. R. (1994) “Cohort-Specific Measures of Lifetime Net Social Security 
Transfers”, ORS Working Paper, No. 59. Office of Research and Statistics, Social 
Security Administration, February 1994.
Leimer, D. R. (1995) “A Guide to Social Security Money’s Worth Issues”, Social 
Security Bulletin, Vol. 58, No. 2, Summer 1995: 3-20.
Leung, J. C. B. (1995). Authority and Benevolence: Social Welfare in China. Hong 
Kong: The Chinese University Press.
Leung, J. C. B. (1996). “Family Support for the Elderly in China: Continuity and 
Change”. Monograph Series. Social Welfare in China. No.5. August 1996. The 
University of Hong Kong.
Lu, H. P. (1998). “Examining the Delay of Pension Payout in China”. (Yang Lao Jin 
Wei He Hui Chu Xian Tuo Qian). In: Cui, L. F. (1998). Fiscal Burden on Ageing 
Population (Ren Hou Lao Ling Hua Cai Zheng Fu Dan Wen Ti Yian Jiu) (ed.), China: 
Jilin Mei Shi publishers.
McDaniel, Paul R. & Surry, S.. (1985) International Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A 
Comparative Study (eds.). Deventer: Kluwer.
McGill, Brown, Haley and Schieber (1998). Fundamentals of Private Pensions.
Meade, J. E. (1978). The Structure And Reform of Direct Taxation. London: IFS
Merrell, C. (1997). “Swift Response to Chancellor’s Raid”. The Times. 5th July 1997.
Minns, R. (1996). “The control and investment of pension funds”. Paper presented to 
the conference on Pensions in the European Union. European Network for research on 
Supplementary Pensions. Munster. June 14-15 1996.
Mintz, J. M. and Wilson, T. A. (1997). “Private Provision of Retirement Income: Tax 
Policy Issues”, In Banting, K. G. and Boadway, R. (ed.). Reform of Retirement Income 
Policy: International and Canadian Perspectives, Ontario: Queen’s University.
Mitchell, O. S. and Zeldes, S. P. (1996). “Social Security Privatisation: A Structure for 
Analysis”. American Economic Review. 86(2). pp.363-7.
MOL (1995). The Ministry of Labour Document 164 of 1995.
198
Bibliography
Munnell, A. (1979). “Are Private Pensions Doomed?”. New England Economic Review 
(March/April), pp.5-20.
Munnell, A. H. and Yohn, F. O. (1992). “What is the Impact of Pensions on Saving?”. 
In: Z. Bodie and A. H. Munnell (ed.). Pensions and the Economy (Pension Research 
Council and University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia).
Musgrave, R. A. (1968). “In Defence of An Income Concept”. In: Bittken, B. L, Galvin, 
C. O., Musgrave, R. A. and Pechman, J. A. (ed.). A Comprehensive Income Tax Base. 
Branford: Federal Tax Press, Inc.
NAPF. (1998). “Radical tax simplification crucial to pension reform, says NAPF’. 
London. National Association of Pension Funds. Press Release. 10 April 1998.
NAPF. (1999). “NAPF seeks tax ‘league table’ to favour long term pension provision”. 
London. Nation Association of Pension Funds. Press Release. 10 February 1999.
OECD (1988) Reforming Public Pensions. Paris.
OECD (1993a). Private Pensions in OECD Countries: New Zealand. Paris.
OECD (1993b). Private Pensions in OECD Countries: The United States. Paris.
OECD (1994). Taxation and Household Saving. Paris.
OECD (1996) Tax Expenditures: Recent Experiences. Paris.
OECD (1998a). Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society. Paris.
OECD (1998b). Retirement Income Systems: The Reform Process across OECD 
Countries. Paris.
OECD (1998c). Social Expenditures Database, Labour Market and Social Policy. 
Occasional Papers. Paris.
OECD (2000). Taxing Wages. Paris.
OECD (2000). The OECD Tax Data Base, Paris.
OECD (2001). ‘Tax and the Economy: A comparative Assessment of OECD 
Countries”, OECD Tax Policy Studies. No. 6. Paris.
Orszag, P. R. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1999). “Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About 
Social Security Systems”. Presented at the conference on “New Ideas About Old Age 
Security”, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., September 14-15, 1999.
Overbye, E. (1999). “Political cognition and the equal treatment merry-go-around: some 
lessons from the study of tax policy vis-a-vis occupational pensions”, for presentation at 
the ENRSP Seminar. Amsterdam. 1-2 October 1999.
199
Bibliography
Palmer, E. (1987). “Public and private pension and saving in Sweden”. In: ISSA (ed.). 
Conjugating Public and Private: The Case of Pensions. Geneva: ISSA.
Papadakis, E. and Taylor-Gooby, P. (1987). The private Provision o f Public Welfare. 
Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books. Ltd.
Pappas, G., Queen, S., Hadden, W. and Fisher, G. (1993) “The Increasing Disparity in 
Mortality between socio-economic Groups in the United States, 1960 and 1986”, 
Journal o f the American Medical Association 329, No. 2, 1993: 103-109.
People’s Bank of China (1999). The People's Bank o f China Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin. Beijing.
Pestieau, P. (1992). “The distribution of private pension benefits: how fair is it?”. In: 
OECD. Private Pensions and Public Policy. Paris: OECD.
Quadagno, J. and Hardy, M. (1996). “Private Pensions, State Regulation and Income 
Security for Older Workers: The US Auto Industry”, In: Shalev (ed.) The Privatisation 
of Social Policy? London: Macmillan.
Reid, G. and Mitchell, O. S. (1995). “Social Security Administration in Latin America 
and the Caribbean”. World Bank Report 14066. Washington DC. March 1995.
Rein, M. and Wadensjo, E. (1998). “The Relation Between Social and Occupational 
Security”, In: Theodore R. Marmor and Philip R. De Jong (ed.) Ageing, Social Security 
and Affordability, England: Ashgate.
Reynaud, E. (1994). Comparing Social Welfare System in Europe. Oxford: MIRE.
Reynaud, E. (1995). “Complementary schemes: company pensions in Germany and the 
United Kingdom”. In: Bruno Palier (ed.), Comparing Social Welfare Systems in 
Europe. Paris, MIRE.
Robson, M.(1996). “Deficits, Tax Policy, and Saving” In: Steuerle, C. E. and Kawai, 
M. (1996) (ed.). The New World Fiscal Order: Implications for Industrialised Nations. 
England: The Urban Institute Press.
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. (1976). “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: 
an essay on the economics of imperfect information”. Quarterly Journal o f Economics. 
90. pp.629-649.
Samuelson, P. (1987) “Comment”, In: Bodie, Z. and Shoven, J. (eds.), Financial 
Aspects of the US Pension System, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Samuelson, P. A. (1958). “An Exact Consumption-loan Model of Interest with or 
without the Social Contrivance of Money”. Journal of Public Economy. 66. pp.467-82. 
SC (1958). State Council Document. May 1958.
200
Bibliography
SC (1978). State Council Document 104 of 1978.
SC (1986). State Council Document 77 of 1986.
SC (1991). State Council Document 33 of 1991.
SC (1995). State Council Document 6 of 1995.
SC (1997). State Council Document 26 of 1997.
Schieber, S. J. and Shoven, J. B. (1994) “The Consequences of Population Ageing on 
Private Pension Fund Saving and Asset Markets”, NEBR Working Paper, No. 4665.
Schulz (1980), The Economic of Ageing. Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth.
Schulz, J. H. (1980). The Economics of Ageing (Second Edition). California: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.
Shalev, M. (1996). “Introduction”, In: Shalev (ed.), The Privatisation o f Social Policy? 
London: Macmilan.
Sinfield, A. (1999). ‘Tax benefits and supplementary pensions”. For presentation at the 
ENRSP Seminar. Amsterdam. 1-2 October 1999.
Song Xiaowu, Zhang Zhongjun and Zhen Dingquan (1998). Twenty Years of 
Establishment of China’s Social Security System (Zhong Guo She Hui Bao Zhang Zhi 
Du Jian She 20 Nian). Beijing: Zhong Zhou Gu Ji Publishing House.
State Statistical Bureau (1995). China Statistics Yearbook (Zhong Guo Tong Ji Nian 
Jian). Beijing: State Statistical Publishers.
State Statistical Bureau (1999). China Population Statistics Yearbook (Zhong Guo Ren 
Hou Tong Ji Nian Jian). Beijing: China Statistical Publishers.
Stears, G. (1999). “Financing Pensions: Funding Versus PAYG”. Association of British 
Insurers, Occasional Paper. No.3. January 1999. Http://www.bi.org.uk/industry/market/ 
payg.asp.
Steinmeyer, Heinz-Dietrich (1999). “Tax Treatment of Supplementary Pensions in 
Germany”, for presentation at the ENRSP Seminar. Amsterdam. 1-2 October 1999.
Stephens, R. (1993). “Radical Tax Reform in New Zealand”. Fiscal Studies. 14(3). 
pp.45-63.
Sun, G. (1999) “The Effect of Personal Income Tax System In China” (Zhong Guo Ge 
Ren Suo De Shui Yun Xing Ji Xiao Fen Xi), IFS Working Paper, No. 222, April 1999, 
Beijing.
201
Bibliography
Surrey, S. S. (1973). Pathway to tax Reform: The Concept o f Tax Expenditures. 
Cambridge. Mass.. Harvard University Press.
Tanzi, V. (2000). Public Spending in the 2Cth Century: A Global Perspective. 
Cambridge: The University Press.
The Financial Times (1996). “Strident Adolescent Decides to Play the Game: now Body 
Shop is staying public, it will pay more attention to its investors”. 10 April 1996.
The Ministry of Labour (1995). Hand Book of Pension Insurance System Reform (Shen 
Hua Yiang Liao Bao Xian Zhi Du Gai Ge Shi Yong Shou Ce). Beijing: China Labour 
Publishing House.
The Ministry of Labour (1997). China Social Insurance Statistics Yearbook (Zhong Guo 
She Hui Bao Xian Nian Jian). Beijing: Zhong Guo Personnel press.
The World Bank (1995) World Population Projections, 1994-1995.
The World Bank (1996). China Pension System Reform. The World Bank: Government 
Discussion Draft. Unpublished.
Thomson, D. (1991). Selfish Generations: The ageing o f New Zealand’s welfare state. 
Wellington: Bridget Williams Books.
Threadgold, A. R. (1980). Personal Savings: The Impact o f Life Assurance and Pension 
Funds (Bank of England Discussion Paper No. 1).
Tian, X. Y. (1991). China’s Elderly Population (Zhong Guo Lao Nian Ren Kou). 
Beijing: China Economic Publishing House.
Titmuss, R. M. (1976). “The social division of welfare”. In: B Abel-Smith: Richard M 
Titmuss essays on “the welfare state”. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Titmuss, R. M. (1958) Essays on ‘the Welfare State’: Second Edition with a new 
chapter on the ‘Irresponsible Society ’, London: Unwin University Books.
Turner, J. (1998) “Retirement Income System for Different Economic, Demographic 
and Political Environment”, OECD Ageing working Papers, Paris: OECD.
United Nations (2000) Long-Range World Population Projections: Based on the 1998 
Revision.
Valdes-Prieto, S. and Cifuentes, R (1994). “Credit Constraints and Pensions”. Paper 
presented at a conference on ‘Pensions Privatisation’ in Santiago. Chile. 26-27 January.
Vittas, D. (1992) “The Simple(r) Algebra of Pension Plans”, mimeo. Washington, DC: 
The World Bank.
202
Bibliography
Vittas, D. (1996) “Pension Funds and Capital Markets: Investment Regulation, 
Financial Innovation, and Governance”, World Bank Working Paper, February 1996.
Vittas, D. (1998) “Regulatory Controversies of Private Pension Funds”, World Bank 
Working Paper, 1998.
Vittas, D. (1999) “Pension Reform and Financial Markets”, AGP 13 - Privatisation, 
Capital market Development and Pension System Reform, Paris, France 21-22 
September 1999.
Walker, A. (1992). “Community Care in Western Europe and the New Challenges”. 
Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong.
Whitehouse, E. (1999). “The tax treatment of funded pensions”. Unpublished Paper for 
the World Bank.
Wilson Committee (1980). Report o f the committee to review the functioning of 
financial institutions, Cmnd 7937, London: HMSO.
World Bank (1994). Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and 
Promote Growth. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank (1995). Infrastructure Development in East Asia and Pacific: Toward a 
New Public-Private Partnership. Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank (1996). China Pension System Reform. Washington DC: World Bank.
Yin, R. K. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks, 
Calif: Sage.
Young, H. (1992). “Adequacy and Private Pensions: How Adequate Are They?”, In: 
Private Pensions And Public Policy, Paris, OECD.
Yu, Z. Y. (1998). “Basic Ideas on Implementing the Social Security Tax (Guan Yu She 
Hui Bao Zhang Shui Gei Ge De Ji Ben Si Lu)”, A Report to the Ministry of Finance, 
Beijing: The Research for Fiscal Studies.
203
